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ABSTRACT

Sun, Shanxia PhD, Purdue University, May 2016. Behavioral Responses and Policy
Evaluation: Revisiting Water and Fuel Policies. Major Professors: Juan P. Sesmero and
Michael S. Delgado.

In my dissertation, I examine how policies regulating agricultural production and
clean technology impact the environment. I focus on policies affecting water depletion,
water pollution, and fuel consumption. I assess their cost-effectiveness by modeling and
quantifying the behavioral responses of farmers and households.
My first essay focuses on decreasing groundwater depletion through increasing
irrigation efficiency in Mexico. I quantify the impacts of different sources of inefficiency
on groundwater extraction, and I evaluate the effectiveness of alternative policies that
aim to reduce the over-extraction of groundwater. I find that mechanisms of electricity
cost-sharing implemented in many wells have a sizable impact on the inefficiency of
irrigation applications; thus, policies eliminating electricity cost-sharing mechanisms
have a substantial effect on decreasing groundwater depletion. In contrast, price-based
policies are less effective, and policies targeting well-sharing do not have significant
effect on reducing irrigation application and groundwater depletion.
In my second essay, I assess policies which attempt to reduce water pollution by
reducing fertilizer application. Input- and output-based economic policies designed to
reduce water pollution from fertilizer runoff by adjusting management practices are
theoretically justified and well-understood. Yet, in practice, adjustment in fertilizer
application or land allocation may be sluggish. I incorporate time cost as a new
dimension in the assessment of these policies and simultaneously quantify the magnitude
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of the policy effectiveness and the speed at which the policies take effect. I find that
while both input- and output-based policies are able to induce a significant reduction in
fertilizer application, input-based policies are more cost-effective than their output-based
counterparts. Further, input- and output-based policies yield adjustment in fertilizer
application at the same speed, and most of the adjustment takes place in the short-term.
Due to the rapid adjustment in land allocation between corn and soybeans, the long-term
effects of the policies can also be rapidly achieved. Though the time cost does not
constitute a major concern in my research area, the time dimension may be important in
research areas in which there are different crops that may not be easily substituted
between.
In my third essay, I explore household adoption of gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles
and the impact of hybrid ownership on annual miles traveled in order to understand how
hybrid ownership impacts fuel savings. I focus on issues of identification in light of
several behavioral factors that are believed to influence both hybrid adoption and miles
traveled. I measure two types of rebound effects associated with hybrid adoption. The
first one is a traditional rebound effect in which a hybrid owner drives more due to the
lower travel cost from higher fuel efficiency; the second one is a social status driven
rebound effect in which a hybrid owner drives more to signal his environmental
friendliness through driving a hybrid. I find a statistically significant traditional rebound
effect on miles traveled. However, this rebound effect is only 3% of the average annual
miles traveled and only slightly offsets the fuel savings from the higher fuel efficiency of
the hybrid. I do not find evidence of a status-driven rebound effect. I estimate that hybrid
adoption induces substantial fuel savings that amount to about half of the average fuel
consumption of regular vehicles.

1

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Water, fuel, and air are critical in many ways for human and natural systems. Water
and fuel are important inputs in numerous production and service systems (e.g.,
agriculture, industry, transportation). Water and air are essential elements that sustain life,
balance ecological systems, and create a pleasant environment.
Like all natural resources, water and fuel are not unlimited. According to the report
of Gleick and Ajami (2014), there are 3.3 billion people in the world living in the areas
with physical water scarcity, approaching physical scarcity, or economic water scarcity.
The supply of fuel is limited by the total natural reserves of oil and the ability of current
technology to exploit those reserves. The demand for energy increases with increases in
the population and with economic development; the increased demand and limited supply
can lead to sharp increases in prices (e.g., 2000s Energy Crisis). The scarcity of water and
fuel points to the importance of increasing efficiency in the use of water and fuel.
As part of the environment, water and air face continuous degradation caused by
pollution from economic production and human life. Water pollution is a serious problem
in both developed and developing countries. According to a report from the United
Nations, “Water quality is becoming a global concern of increasing significance, as risks
of degradation translate directly into social economic impacts” (UN 2012). The severity
of air pollution is already widely acknowledged. A recent report from the World Health
Organisation (WHO) states that air pollution exposure caused the death of around 7
million people in 2012 (WHO 2014). The severity of these issues points toward the
importance of controlling the pollution of water and air from economic production and
human life.
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1.1 Water and Agriculture
Water is an essential factor in many production systems. The major use of water is
agriculture, which makes up 70 percent of total freshwater use (Gleick and Ajami 2014).
In particular, I focus on the interface between water and agriculture in terms of both
water use and water quality.

1.1.1 Efficiency in Water Use
My first essay focuses on quantitative evaluation of factors influencing irrigation
efficiency in Mexico. Such evaluation allows me to identify policies which most
effectively increase irrigation efficiency and alleviate groundwater depletion from overextraction of groundwater. As an arid and semi-arid country, Mexico’s groundwater
resources are being depleted; in some areas, the depletion is severe. The Mexican federal
government subsidizes the electricity used in pumping groundwater, which creates an
incentive to extract. Other potential drivers of over-pumping in Mexico are that wells are
commonly shared by several farmers and moreover, in some shared wells the total cost of
electricity is distributed among all irrigators. Sharing wells may aggravate externalities
associated with exploitation of a common access resource and increase pumping beyond
the efficient level. Sharing electricity costs reduces the marginal cost of water pumping
since all farmers sharing the bill jointly pay for the cost of additional pumping from one
farmer. Subsidies and institutions that decrease the marginal cost of groundwater
consumption may exacerbate the over-exploitation of groundwater and aggravate
groundwater depletion. Quantification of the main causes of over-extraction of
groundwater by farmers has important policy implications.
The objective of my first essay is threefold. First, I estimate water demand, including
the potential for allocative inefficiency. Allowing for inefficiency in the estimation of
irrigation water demand results in a more reliable elasticity estimate (Kumbhakar 2001).
Second, I estimate the inefficiency in agricultural irrigation in Mexico. Finally, I quantify
the role of different sources of externalities (i.e., cost-sharing rules and the extent to
which groundwater resources are non-excludable) behind systematic inefficiency.
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1.1.2 Reducing Water Pollution from Agriculture
My second essay focuses on the assessment of policies that aim to decrease water
pollution from agriculture. Water pollution can threaten human health and the stability of
ecosystems. Also, some polluted water may become unsuitable for consumption
aggravating water scarcity. Hence mitigating water pollution may be a vehicle to address
water quantity as well as water quality issues. Fertilizer use in agriculture is a significant
source of nonpoint source pollution to water (Rabotyagov et al. 2010; Yuan et al. 2013;
Rebolledo et al. 2016). As a country with a highly developed agricultural system the
United States faces severe water pollution from agriculture. Finding the most costeffective policies to alleviate this problem is a concern of policymakers who are
interested in both the overall effect of the policy and the speed of effectiveness.
Assessing the cost-effectiveness of policies mitigating agricultural water pollution
through decreasing fertilizer use in agricultural production is my main objective.
Many policies attempt to reduce water pollution by reducing fertilizer application in
agriculture, which could be realized by decreasing the fertilizer application rate on a
certain area or switching land allocation from fertilizer-intensive crops to fertilizer-saving
crops. While the adjustment of the fertilizer application rate in a certain area can be rapid,
adjustments to land allocation across crops may be restricted by crop rotational effects
and quasi-fixed capital constraints (Orazem and Miranowski 1994; Arnberg and Hansen
2012) and require a long time to be fully realized. For policymakers, not only the
magnitude of policy effectiveness but also the speed at which policies take effect are key
concerns when they select the most suitable policy. I quantify both dimensions in the
policy assessments in my second essay.

1.2 Fuel Consumption from Household Transportation
The world transportation sector accounts for almost half the world oil consumption,
and was responsible for 23 percent of world energy-related GHG emissions in 2004.
Three quarters of the emissions come from road vehicles (Kahn Ribeiro et al. 2007). In
the United States, the transportation sector is also one of the largest contributors to U.S.
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GHG emissions, being responsible for 28 percent of total U.S. GHG emissions in 2012
(US EPA 2015).
Given the pressures faced by the transportation sector, the United States government
has designed the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards to improve the
average fuel economy of cars and light trucks sold in the United States. In part to meet
the CAFE criterion the federal government (and some state and local government) has
provided many incentives to encourage the adoption of fuel-efficient vehicles. The
gasoline-electric hybrid has been the focus of many policies, as conventional wisdom
suggests that a driver of a hybrid will consume less gasoline than had he/she driven a
conventional engine vehicle.
However, a rebound effect is often associated with the adoption of more efficient
technology, given the reality that higher efficiency means lower cost of use. In the case of
hybrid adoption, it means that the higher fuel-efficiency of a hybrid vehicle reduces the
cost of travel, which consequently may increase the driving miles of a household. It is
important to understand the extent to which the rebound effects offset the impact from
higher fuel efficiency, in order to understand the true potential for hybrid adoption to
reduce gasoline consumption. In another words, it is crucial to examine the existence and
magnitude of any rebound effects of hybrid adoption. The objective of my third essay is
to understand whether there are rebound effects associated with the adoption of hybrid
vehicles, and what the magnitudes of the rebound effects are if they exist.
My analysis focuses on two types of rebound effects. The first one is a traditional
rebound effect in which a hybrid owner drives more due to the lower travel cost from
higher fuel efficiency of the hybrid. The second one, that has yet to be discussed in the
literature, is a social status driven rebound effect. Sexton and Sexton (2014) and Delgado
et al. (2015) find that social status incentives are a significant factor underlying consumer
demand for the Toyota Prius. I hypothesize that this same social status incentive leads
hybrid owners to increase miles traveled. This hypothesis rests on two facts: first, the
most popular hybrid over the 2000’s decade was the Prius, easily identified by its unique
body trim; and second, a consumer interested in signaling his/her environmental
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preferences via vehicle ownership is better able to do so through increased driving
exposure.

6
1.3 List of References
Arnberg, S. and Hansen, L. G., 2012. “Short-run and long-run dynamics of farm land
allocation: panel data evidence from Denmark.” Agricultural Economics, 43, 179-190.
Delgado, M., Harriger, J. L. and Khanna, N., 2015. “The value of environmental status
signaling.” Ecological Economics, 111, 1–11.
Gleick, P. H. and Ajami, N., 2014. “The world's water volume 8: the biennial report on
freshwater resources.” Vol. 8, Island press.
Kahn Ribeiro, S., Kobayashi, S., Beuthe, M., Gasca, J., Greene, D., Lee, D. S.,
Muromachi, Y., Newton, P. J., Plotkin, S., Sperling, D., Wit, R., and Zhou, P. J., 2007.
“Transport and its infrastructure.” In Metz, B., Davidson, O.R., Bosch, P.R., Dave, R.,
and Meyer, L.A., eds., Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working
Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY,
USA.
Kumbhakar, S. C., 2001. “Estimation of profit functions when profit is not maximum.”
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83(1), 1-19.
Orazem, P. F. and Miranowski, J. A., 1994. “A dynamic model of acreage allocation with
general and crop-specific soil capital.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 76,
385-395.
Rabotyagov, S., Campbell, T., Jha, M., Gassman, P. W., Arnold, J., Kurkalova, L., Secchi,
S., Feng, H. and Kling, C. L., 2010. “Least-cost control of agricultural nutrient
contributions to the Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone.” Ecological Applications, 20(6), 15421555.
Rebolledo, B., Gil, A., Flotats, X. and Sánchez, J. Á., 2016. “Assessment of groundwater
vulnerability to nitrates from agricultural sources using a GIS-compatible logic
multicriteria model.” Journal of Environmental Management, 171, 70-80.
Sexton, S. E. and Sexton, A. L., 2014. “Conspicuous conservation: the Prius halo and
willingness to pay for environmental bona fides.” Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management, 67, 303–317.
United Nations, 2012, “Managing water under uncertainty and risk.” Word Water
Development Report 4. Paris: UNESCO Publishing.
U.S. EPA, 2015. “Fast facts: U.S. transportation sector greenhouse gas emissions 19902012.”
EPA-420-F-15-002,
March
2015
https://www3.epa.gov/otaq/climate/documents/420f15002.pdf.
World Health Organization, 2014. “7 million premature deaths annually linked to air
pollution.”

7
Yuan, Y., Locke, M. A., Bingner, R. L. and Rebich, R. A., 2013. “Phosphorus losses
from agricultural watersheds in the Mississippi Delta.” Journal of Environmental
Management, 115, 14-20.

8

CHAPTER 2 THE ROLE OF COMMON POOL PROBLEMS IN IRRIGATION
INEFFICIENCY: A CASE STUDY IN GROUNDWATER PUMPING IN MEXICO

2.1 Introduction
It is well known that the economically efficient use of finite natural resources
requires those resources to be priced at the marginal social cost which includes
externalities associated with extraction. When prices do not reflect the full social cost it is
expected that resource use exceeds a socially optimal level. One such resource is
groundwater; groundwater aquifers can be either renewable or non-renewable but are
always finite. Policies to reduce over-extraction such as a per-unit tax on groundwater
extraction (Shah et al. 1993; Howe 2002) or creating property rights (Provencher and
Burt 1994) may be difficult to implement. Consequently it is important to examine
alternative policy instruments that can successfully tackle the depletion problem.
Groundwater use accounts for approximately 26 percent of all water use worldwide
and is a source of almost half of all irrigation water (van der Gun 2012). Price-distorting
policies such as subsidized electricity rates may lead to excessive extraction and
exacerbate groundwater depletion (Schoengold and Zilberman 2007). Subsidized
electricity or diesel rates for irrigators are pervasive in many countries including India,
Mexico, Jordan, and Syria (Scott and Shah 2004; Shah et al. 2007).
In addition to subsidized pumping costs it is also common in developing countries
for multiple irrigators to share a single well (see Huang et al. 2013 for a discussion of this
issue in China; the current study evaluates Mexico’s shared wells). This situation may
exacerbate over-extraction due to strategic behavior by farmers (Provencher and Burt
1993). Moreover, in some communal wells, the cost of energy associated with pumping is
shared by irrigators using the well due to inadequate metering systems. Rules for costsharing may be based on parameters that are indirect measures of water use such as land
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holdings, or may be based on an arbitrary rule such as equal cost-sharing. These rules
introduce further distortions between what the farmer pays and the actual cost of
pumping and cause inefficiency in irrigation.
The objective of this study is threefold. First, we will estimate water demand,
including the potential for allocative inefficiency. Allowing for inefficiency in the
estimation of irrigation water demand results in a more reliable elasticity estimate
(Kumbhakar 2001). Second, we will gauge the inefficiency (if any exist) with which
irrigation is applied by farmers in Mexico. Finally we will quantify the role of different
sources of externalities (i.e., cost-sharing rules and the extent to which groundwater
resources are non-excludable) behind systematic inefficiency. Quantification of the main
causes of over-extraction of groundwater by farmers has important policy implications. If
institutional arrangements creating common pool problems are the main cause, as
opposed to subsidies in electricity price, institutional reforms will constitute a viable
mechanism for water conservation. If pumping is sensitive to the cost of electricity,
removal of subsidies can have a sizable impact on groundwater extraction.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the existing literature. Second,
we model key features of electricity subsidies, well-sharing, and cost-sharing, and
identify their distortions to the marginal cost of pumping. Third, we describe the
empirical model and data used to estimate water demand and farmers’ irrigation
efficiency. The final sections report estimation results, and discuss policy implications
and conclusions.

2.2 Review of Literature
It has been established theoretically that non-excludability of groundwater resources
may result in over-application of irrigation. This is because non-excludability causes a
cost externality (Gisser and Sanchez 1980; Negri 1989) and a strategic externality (Negri
1989; Provencher and Burt 1993; Rubio and Casino 2001, 2003), both of which tend to
reduce private marginal cost of pumping relative to the social marginal cost and increase
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irrigation application. Subsequent empirical analyses uncovered evidence supporting
these theoretical predictions (Pfeiffer and Lin 2012; Huang et al. 2013).
Substantial research has focused on the estimation of irrigation water demand (Ogg
and Gollehon 1989; Schoengold et al. 2006; Huang et al. 2010; Hendricks and Peterson
2012) but this research assumes that farmers use water efficiently. The assumption of
efficiency may constitute a source of bias in estimation of demand elasticity (Kumbhakar
2001). Moreover this assumption implies attributing over-extraction to random factors
precluding quantification of systematic sources behind it.
Despite sound theoretical reasons to suspect inefficiencies in irrigation application,
very few studies have quantified this inefficiency and explored their reasons. McGuckin,
et al. (1992) was the first study to estimate the sources of inefficiency in irrigation water
use among corn producers in Nebraska, United States, based on a stochastic production
frontier function. Karagiannis et al. (2003) estimate efficiency in irrigation practices for
out-of-season vegetable cultivation in Greece. Finally, Dhehibi et al. (2007) gauge both
technical and irrigation water efficiency in Tunisia. Unfortunately, these studies have not
estimated a demand for irrigation water precluding comparison between price-based
policies and other types of policies.
This study uses a stochastic frontier for estimation of irrigation efficiency and its
sources but in contrast to previous studies we use a method first developed by
Kumbhakar (1989) that allows measurement of input-specific allocative efficiency based
on a cost frontier. Using a dual measure of efficiency allows estimation of derived
demands. This is critical in this context as we are also interested in estimation of price
elasticity of irrigation water demand so that price-based and institutions-based policies
can be compared.

2.3 Groundwater Depletion in Mexico: Background
Mexico is classified as an arid and semi-arid country. Therefore irrigation constitutes
a critical input to agricultural production in many regions of the country. According to
information from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), about a quarter of total
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land area in Mexico is equipped for irrigated agriculture and about half of the total value
of agricultural production is produced under irrigation. Moreover, about a third of
irrigated land in Mexico uses groundwater and the rest is irrigated with surface water.

Source: Comisión Nacional del Agua (National Water Commission), Mexico
Figure 2.1: Aquifer Depletion in Mexico
In 2006, preliminary evaluations of the situation in Mexico were conducted with the
purpose of informing the Mexican government’s national hydrological program. The
resulting report (Programa Nacional Hidrico 2007-2012) asserted that, among other
causes, inefficiencies in the use of water had caused overexploitation of groundwater
reserves (Figure 2.1). It was further noted that electricity subsidies provided by the
federal government could also be contributing to overexploitation of groundwater. One
implication of this observation is that elimination of the electricity subsidy could help
mitigate the depletion problem. But in addition to subsidies, well-sharing and electricity
cost-sharing may also be partly responsible for inefficiency in water use. Therefore
policymakers may also tackle over-extraction by reforming the institutions under which
irrigators operate. Though mentioned in Programa Nacional Hidrico 2007-2012, an
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empirical quantification of distortionary forces behind over-extraction and the resulting
potential of alternative policies, has not yet been conducted. This study attempts to fill
that informational gap.

2.4 Distortions to Marginal Cost of Pumping
Mexican farmers do not pay for groundwater, only for the electricity used in
pumping groundwater. Therefore the cost paid by the farmer per unit of water consumed
depends on the amount of electricity used per unit of water pumped and the price of
electricity. The amount of electricity used per unit of extracted groundwater (measured as
kilowatts hour per cubic meter) is assumed to be a linear function of the depth to water
table denoted by 𝐻; i. e. ,

𝑘𝑤ℎ
𝑚3

= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐻. Parameter 𝛽 is positive as greater depth is

associated with greater electricity consumption. Parameter 𝛼 is also positive as the pump
needs to be run even if distance to groundwater is zero (𝐻 = 0). We assume that total
water extracted in a given period positively affects depth to the water table 𝐻 = 𝜇 +
∑𝑖 𝜀𝑖 𝑤𝑖 ; where parameter 𝜇 captures depth to water table in the previous period plus
recharge rate, 𝑤𝑖 represents the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ farmer’s pumping rate, and 𝜀𝑖 is the effect of the
farmer 𝑖’s pumping on water level.
We begin by considering a case where water resources are perfectly excludable
which serves as a benchmark for this analysis. Thus, since 𝜀𝑗 = 0 for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, the unit
cost of water for farmer 𝑖 is:
𝑃𝑖𝑤 = 𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ (𝑎 + 𝑏𝑤𝑖 )

(2.1)

where 𝑃𝑖𝑤 denotes unit cost of water, 𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ is the price of electricity per kilowatt hour,
𝑘𝑤ℎ
𝑚3

has been replaced by (𝑎 + 𝑏𝑤𝑖 ) (after plugging 𝐻 into this expression) with 𝑎 = 𝛼 +

𝛽𝜇, 𝑏 = 𝛽𝜀𝑖 , and the rest is as defined before. The total cost of pumping can be denoted
by:
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑤 = 𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ (𝑎 + 𝑏𝑤𝑖 )𝑤𝑖 .

(2.2)

Based on total cost (2.2), marginal cost (partial derivative of total cost with respect to
pumping rate) is depicted by:
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𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤 = 𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ (𝑎 + 2𝑏𝑤𝑖 ) .

(2.3)

This expression for marginal cost will be used as a benchmark against which marginal
cost of pumping with policy or institutional distortions can be compared.

MC,MR
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠

𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠

𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑤

𝑄𝑖𝑤

𝑄𝑖𝑤,𝑠

𝑄𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠
𝑄𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠

Water
pumped

Figure 2.2: Sources of Distortions in Marginal Cost of Pumping

2.4.1 Electricity Subsidies
The federal government in Mexico subsidizes electricity used in pumping
groundwater. Guevara-Sanginés (2006) estimates that the total subsidy to Mexican
groundwater irrigators is approximately $700 million dollars per year. 1 An electricity
subsidy operates as a reduction in the price per kilowatt hour of electricity paid by

1

Estimates are in 2004 US dollars.
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farmers. Therefore, under an electricity subsidy, the marginal cost of pumping
groundwater is denoted by:
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠 = [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ ]

(2.4)

where 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ represents the subsidy paid by the government per kilowatt hour of
electricity consumed by the farmer, and the superscript 𝑠 indicates electricity subsidy.
The reduction in marginal cost of pumping caused by the subsidy on electricity is
illustrated in Figure 1 by a clockwise rotation of the marginal cost curve from 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤 to
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠 . Figure 1 also depicts a decreasing marginal revenue curve due to decreasing
marginal productivity of irrigation. The combination of a clockwise rotation of marginal
cost and a downward sloping marginal revenue curve causes an increase in pumping. The
overall effect of the electricity subsidy on pumping will be determined by the magnitude
of the subsidy and the marginal productivity of irrigation beyond 𝑄𝑖𝑤 .

2.4.2 Sharing of Wells among Farmers
The description of marginal cost of pumping in the previous section assumed a well
is operated by a single farmer. However, different wells in Mexico function under
different institutional arrangements. Some wells are individually owned while others are
shared by multiple farmers. Table 2.1 describes the percentage of wells that are either
owned by a single producer or jointly shared by multiple producers. As expected, we
observe a large number of wells that are shared by multiple irrigators.
Models formalizing cost and strategic externalities (Provencher and Burt 1993) show
that sharing of water resources by multiple irrigators may decrease marginal cost and
aggravate over-extraction. Moreover these analyses have demonstrated that an increased
number of irrigators sharing the resource is associated with greater pumping. As revealed
by Table 2.1 the majority of wells (61 percent) are shared by multiple irrigators. Table
2.1 also shows the distribution of the number of users per well in our sample. The mean
number of users is about 12. While the median size of the group is 6, about a quarter of
wells are shared by more than 16 farmers. These figures suggest that inefficiencies or
over-extraction due well sharing may be quantitatively relevant for Mexico’s aquifers.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Number of Users for Multi-producer Wells
Number of Users
1
2–5
6 – 10
11 - 15
16 - 20
21 - 30
31 - 40
41 - 50
51 - 75
76 - 100
Total

Frequency
77
21
35
14
13
13
13
4
5
2
197

Percentage
39.1%
10.7%
17.8%
7.1%
6.6%
6.6%
6.6%
2.0%
2.5%
1.0%
100%

When multiple farmers share a well, the depth of the water table is influenced by the
sum of individual pumping rates. Moreover each farmer’s pumping has the same effect
on the depth to the water table such that 𝐻 = 𝜇 + ∑𝑖 𝜀𝑤𝑖 ; where 𝑤𝑖 represents the
𝑖 𝑡ℎ farmer’s pumping rate, 𝜀 is the increase in depth per unit of water pumped, and the rest
is as before. Thus, the unit cost of water for farmer 𝑖 who shares a well with other farmers
is:
𝑃𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 = [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ ](𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑤𝑖 + ∑𝑗≠𝑖 𝑤𝑗 ))

(2.5)

where 𝑃𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 denotes unit cost of water under an electricity subsidy and well-sharing,
with 𝑤𝑠 in the superscript indicating well sharing, and the rest is as defined before.
Based on (2.5), marginal cost can be expressed as:
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 = [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ ]((𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊) + 𝑏𝑤𝑖 (1 + 𝜌))

(2.6)

where 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 denotes marginal pumping cost of water under an electricity subsidy
and well-sharing; 𝑊 = ∑𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 + ∑𝑗≠𝑖 𝑤𝑗 ; 𝜌 is a parameter representing farmer 𝑖’s
𝜕𝑤𝑗

conjecture about others’ reactions to her pumping decisions; 𝜌 = ∑𝑗≠𝑖 𝜕𝑤 . This
𝑖

parameter typically captures the degree to which pumping rates by different farmers are
strategic substitutes 𝜌 < 0 or strategic complements 𝜌 > 0. The parameter 𝜌 is typically
considered to range between 1 and −1.
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The effect of both distortions (electricity subsidy and well-sharing) combined is
captured in Figure 1 by a clockwise rotation of marginal cost of pumping from 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤 to
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 . The specific distortionary effect of well-sharing is depicted as the wedge
between 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠 and 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 . The magnitude of the increase in pumping caused by
well-sharing depends on the size of this wedge and the slope of the marginal revenue
curve.
The magnitude of the rotation in marginal cost caused by well-sharing represents the
strength of the cost and strategic externalities previously discussed. A key parameter to
both externalities is the drawdown faced by one farmer when another extracts water.
When multiple farmers draw from the same well, drawdown caused by one farmer’s
extraction affects everyone sharing the well equally so the effect of the cost and strategic
externalities is potentially large. In other words, the magnitude of the clockwise rotation
of the marginal cost curve in Figure 1 may be considerable.

2.4.3 Electricity Cost-Sharing
With multiple producers, it can be difficult to calculate individual water use without
the appropriate technology. In our sample, about 38 percent of the wells base the cost on
the number of hours an individual irrigates (this means that farmers do not share the cost
of electricity but rather pay for their own consumption), while 38 percent divide the cost
based on land area and another 25 percent split cost in equal shares. The remaining 77
wells are owned by a single producer. The distribution of cost share rules across our
sample gives us enough variability to quantify the effect of these cost share rules on
irrigation efficiency.
Distributing the cost of electricity based on pre-specified payment rules may
introduce further distortions in marginal cost of pumping. To model the distortions of
cost share rules, we consider the case of a farmer that pays a pre-specified share 𝑠𝑖 of the
total electricity bill. The unit cost of water in this case is:
𝑃𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 = [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ ] (𝑎 + 𝑏(𝑤𝑖 + ∑𝑗≠𝑖 𝑤𝑗 ))

𝑊𝑠𝑖
𝑤𝑖

(2.7)
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where 𝑃𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 denotes unit cost of water under cost share with 𝑐𝑠 in the superscript
indicating cost-sharing, 𝑠𝑖 is the share of total electricity bill paid by the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ farmer and
𝐿

the rest is as before. If electricity cost is split based on land area, 𝑠𝑖 = 𝐿𝑖 , where 𝐿𝑖 is the
land endowment of the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ farmer and 𝐿 is total land area irrigated with water from the
1

well. On the other hand, if the electricity cost is split evenly among farmers, 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑁 ,
where 𝑁 is the total number of farmers drawing water from the same well.
The marginal cost of pumping can then be denoted by:
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 = [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ ](1 + 𝜌)(𝑎 + 2𝑏𝑊)𝑠𝑖

(2.8)

where 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 denotes marginal cost of water under subsidy, well share, and cost
share and the rest was defined before.
We are interested in identifying conditions under which electricity cost-sharing may
reduce the marginal cost of pumping and exacerbate over-extraction. Such a situation
occurs whenever 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 < 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 , which is found to be satisfied if (1 +
𝜌)𝑠𝑖 < 1 (derivation of this condition and further discussion can be found in Appendix
A). Given the share of the electricity bill assigned to a given farmer, one farmer’s
pumping increases other farmers’ cost even in the absence of drawdown (i.e., even in the
absence of cost and strategic externality). This is due to an increase in others’ unit cost of
water as revealed by Equation (2.7). Equation (2.7) shows that sharing the cost of
electricity creates another source of non-excludability resulting from the fact that
individual farmers cannot exclude others from their own electricity expenditure. We call
this externality “cost share externality”.
The effect of the cost share externality with subsidized electricity rates is illustrated
in Figure 1 by a clockwise rotation of the marginal cost of pumping from 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤 to
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 . The specific distortionary effect of cost-sharing is depicted as the wedge
between 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 and 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 . The magnitude of the increase in water pumped
caused by cost-sharing will depend upon the size of this wedge and the slope of the
marginal revenue curve. In turn, the size of the wedge depends upon the farmer’s share of
electricity bill and their conjectures about others’ reactions to their pumping decisions
(parameters 𝑠𝑖 and 𝜌).
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Formalization and graphical illustration of the effect of multiple distortions prevalent
in Mexico on the marginal cost of pumping allows us to generate testable hypotheses. We
now proceed to discuss our hypotheses regarding the drivers of inefficient over-extraction
and our strategy for empirical assessment of those hypotheses.

2.5 Hypotheses of this Study
From our discussion of distortions to the marginal cost of pumping, it follows that
the number of farmers sharing a well and electricity cost-sharing are both expected to
increase groundwater use. But in line with findings in previous studies in other countries
and institutional contexts (e.g., Hendricks and Peterson 2012), we expect water demand
to be inelastic to its unitary price.
Testing the hypothesis of inelastic water demand requires estimating irrigation
demand and its own price elasticity. Due to potential inefficiencies associated with
institutional distortions, the dual frontier (e.g., cost or profit functions) is not a neutral
transformation of the frontier augmented to incorporate inefficiency and estimates of
water demand elasticity from the former may be biased (Kumbhakar 2001). Therefore we
estimate a frontier irrigation demand function and allow for inefficiency in the
application of irrigation water. We exploit the estimated frontier to measure the effect of
the number of farmers sharing a well and the electricity cost share rules on irrigation
efficiency.
Radial measures of inefficiency (either input-based or output-based) preclude
decomposition of inefficiency scores with respect to a single production input masking
differences in efficiency that might be attributed to particular factor inputs (Kopp 1981).
This is a limitation worth avoiding, especially when there are reasons to suspect that
certain production factors may be used particularly inefficiently. This may be the case
with irrigation given the institutional arrangements distorting its marginal cost. Failure to
identify inefficiency attributable to a specific input factor hinders input-specific policy
design (Sauer and Frohberg 2007). To gauge efficiency in irrigation application, we use
an input-specific measure of efficiency developed by Kumbhakar (1989).
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2.6 Model
Kumbahkar’s model of input-specific efficiency was created for estimation with
panel data. Sauer and Frohberg (2007) adapt it to cross-sectional data and divide firms
into different groups to measure the input-specific efficiency of each group. In this paper,
we follow Sauer and Frohberg (2007) and use cross-sectional data to measure the impact
of institutional arrangements (i.e., multiple irrigators pumping from the same well and
electricity cost-sharing) on the efficiency with which irrigation is applied. Other physical,
hydrological, and socio-demographic variables are also incorporated.
It has been argued (Sauer and Frohberg 2007) that the Symmetric Generalized
McFadden (SGM) form is a desirable cost function specification because it is flexible
(i.e., it satisfies the second-order flexibility conditions) and at the same time it adheres to
theoretical conditions of a cost function as shown by Diewert and Wales (1987). In
addition, the SGM specification allows imposition of global concavity conditions and
estimation of average input demand functions avoids the “Greene problem”2 (Sauer and
Frohberg 2007). This set of desirable properties make this functional form an appropriate
choice for this study.
The SGM cost function is denoted as:
𝐶 ∗ (. ) = 𝑔(𝑝)𝑦 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖 𝑝𝑖 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑖 𝑦 + ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑘 𝑝𝑖 𝑞𝑘 𝑦 + ∑ 𝑎𝑘 (∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑘 𝑝𝑖 ) 𝑞𝑘
𝑖

𝑖

𝑖

𝑘

𝑘

𝑖

+ 𝑏𝑦𝑦 (∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑝𝑖 ) 𝑦 2 + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑙 (∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑙𝑘 𝑝𝑖 ) 𝑞𝑘 𝑞𝑙 𝑦
𝑖

𝑖 = 1, 2, … 𝑛,

𝑘

𝑙

𝑘, 𝑙 = 1, 2, … 𝑚

𝑖

(2.9)

where 𝑔(. ) is a function defined as:
𝑝′ 𝑆𝑝

𝑔(𝑝) = 2𝜃′ 𝑝

(2.10)

where 𝑝𝑖 is the price of variable input 𝑖; 𝑝 is the vector of such prices; 𝑦 is output; 𝑞𝑘 and
𝑞𝑙 represent quantities of fixed inputs; 𝑆 is an 𝑛 × 𝑛 symmetric matrix; 𝜃 = (𝜃1 , … , 𝜃𝑛 )′
2

When Greene (1980) estimates technical and allocative inefficiency using translog cost function, he finds
that the relationship between allocative inefficiency and the total costs of inefficiency is unclear and hard to
define in the model. As a result, he assumes that the allocative inefficiency and the total costs of
inefficiency are independent to each other, which, as Greene points out, is not a very reasonable
assumption. The problem is referred as “Greene problem” by later literature (Bauer 1990; Kumbhakar
1997).
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is a vector of nonnegative constants with at least one non-zero element; 𝑏𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖𝑖 , 𝑑𝑖𝑘 , 𝑎𝑘 ,
𝛼𝑖𝑘 , 𝑏𝑦𝑦 , 𝛽𝑖 , 𝛿𝑘𝑙 , and 𝛾𝑖𝑙𝑘 represent parameters.
Differentiating (2.9) with respect to input price and applying Shephard’s lemma, the
conditional demand function of input 𝑖, 𝑥𝑖∗ , is obtained:
∑𝑗 𝑠𝑖𝑗 𝑝𝑗 𝜃𝑖 ∑𝑖 ∑𝑗 𝑠𝑖𝑗 𝑝𝑖 𝑝𝑗
𝑑𝐶(. )
= 𝑥𝑖∗ = (
− [
]) 𝑦 + 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖𝑖 𝑦 + ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑘 𝑞𝑘 𝑦
∑𝑟 𝜃𝑟 𝑝𝑟
𝑑𝑝𝑖
2 (∑𝑟 𝜃𝑟 𝑝𝑟 )2
𝑘

+ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑘 𝑞𝑘 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑦 2 + ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑙𝑘 𝑞𝑘 𝑞𝑙 𝑦
𝑘

𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑟 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛

𝑙

𝑘

𝑘, 𝑙 = 1, 2, … , 𝑚.

(2.11)

Concavity holds for 𝑝𝑖 > 0 with 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛, 𝑦 > 0 and 𝑞𝑘 > 0 with 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑚, if
and only if, the Hessian matrix 𝑆 = [𝑠𝑖𝑗 ] is negative semi definite (nsd). Following the
procedure outlined in Diewert and Wales (1987) concavity restrictions on 𝑆 are imposed
by re-parameterizing it as 𝑆 = −𝐴𝐴′, where 𝐴 is a lower triangular matrix of order 𝑛, and
since 𝑝∗ is chosen to be a vector of ones, ∑𝑖 𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 0 for all 𝑖. For estimation purpose, 𝑏𝑦𝑦 ,
𝑎𝑘 , 𝛿𝑘𝑙 are normalized to unity, and 𝜃𝑖 is replaced by the mean values of 𝑥𝑖 over the
whole sample. This re-parameterization makes 𝐶(. ) linear homogeneous, monotone and
concave in 𝑝 as well as symmetric (see also Lau 1978, 1986), making the properties of
the cost function consistent with economic theory.
Adding systematic inefficiency components and an error term, the conditional
demand functions given in (2.11) can be written as follows:
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖∗ + 𝜁𝑖1 𝑍𝑖1 + 𝜁𝑖2 𝑍𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝜁𝑖𝐻 𝑍𝑖𝐻 + 𝑣𝑖

(2.12)

where each 𝑍𝑖ℎ ( ℎ = 1, … , 𝐻 ) is a vector of variables (𝑍𝑖ℎ1 , … , 𝑍𝑖ℎ𝐺 ) and 𝑍𝑖ℎ𝑔 ( 𝑔 =
1, … , 𝐺) indicates that the observation belongs to group 𝑔 with respect to characteristic ℎ
which may influence the efficiency of input 𝑖. For instance, the cost share mechanism is
one characteristic in our application. Three groups are observed in our sample with
respect to this characteristic: irrigators that split the electricity cost evenly, those that
divide the cost based on land area, and those that do not share the cost of electricity.
𝜁𝑖ℎ = (𝜁𝑖ℎ1 , 𝜁𝑖ℎ2 , … 𝜁𝑖ℎ𝑔 ) are vectors of parameters to be estimated. A greater value of
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𝜁𝑖ℎ𝑔 indicates that farmers within group 𝑔 of characteristic ℎ tend to use more of input 𝑖,
all else constant.
Inefficiency 𝜏𝑖𝑔ℎ of the group 𝑔 with respect to characteristic ℎ in the use of input 𝑖
can be calculated through:
𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔 = 𝜁𝑖ℎ𝑔 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛ℎ 𝜁𝑖ℎ𝑔 .

(2.13)

An intuitive interpretation of Equation (2.13) suggests that 𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔 represents the
reduction in the quantity of input 𝑖 achievable by switching to the most efficient group
with characteristic ℎ holding the application of all other inputs unchanged. The inputspecific allocative efficiency of group 𝑔 with respect to characteristic ℎ in the use of
input 𝑖 is:
𝐴𝐸𝑖ℎ𝑔 = 1 − 𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔 /𝑥𝑖ℎ𝑔 .

(2.14)

The percentage cost increase faced by observations belonging to group 𝑔 within
characteristic ℎ due to inefficiency in input 𝑖 can be calculated by:
𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑖ℎ𝑔 = 𝑝𝑖ℎ𝑔 𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔 /𝐶𝑖ℎ𝑔

(2.15)

where 𝐶𝑖ℎ𝑔 is observed total production cost of farmers in group 𝑔 with respect to
characteristic ℎ.
The measure 𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑖ℎ𝑔 allows identification of the inputs with the greatest potential for
cost savings because it weighs input quantity reductions by their respective prices. As
explained by Kumbhakar (1989), one of the advantages of this procedure is that no
special distributional assumptions are needed on 𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔 , as independence between 𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑔 and
other regressors in the demand system is not required.

2.7 Data
A survey of agricultural groundwater irrigators was conducted in Mexico by the
Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático (National Institute of Ecology and
Climate Change). Data collection on irrigation wells occurred during the 2003-2004
winter. A detailed description of the data collection process can be found in Appendix B.
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Cross sectional data was obtained from farmers in a sample of 197 wells. Irrigation
wells are uniformly scattered across the country so they are geographically representative
of agricultural groundwater irrigators in Mexico. Detailed data on quantity and prices of
inputs and outputs were obtained from farmers along with data on irrigation application
and cost of electricity used in pumping groundwater. Data includes quantities and prices
of three variable inputs (fertilizer, irrigation, and a composite of other inputs including
expenditures in land rent and preparation, labor, pesticide, and marketing), and one fixed
input (land). A vector of outputs including field crops, fruits, and vegetables were
aggregated into one single output applying Jorgenson’s procedure for “exact” aggregation
(Jorgenson et al. 1987).
Potential sources of inefficiency (i.e., elements of vector 𝑍𝑖ℎ in Equation (2.12))
considered in this study are: mechanism for sharing electricity costs (no cost-sharing,
evenly split, or based on area), and the number of farmers in each well (i.e., which can
presumably capture pressures from strategic pumping). Control variables include sociodemographic, biophysical, and hydrological variables. Variability in irrigation technology
is not observed as the overwhelming majority of farmers (96 percent in our sample) use
gravity irrigation systems.
Table 2.2 reports the mean and standard deviation of variables by type of cost share.
Some variables have similar distributions in all four groups. For example, the farmer’s
age and soil type are similar for all four groups. However, we do find systematic
differences across groups. Irrigation units that have no cost share (individually-owned
wells and the wells that everyone pays for his/her own water use) have a substantially
higher average land area (mean of 34.9 and 30.7 hectares) than farmers operating under
equal share (7.2 hectares) and share based on land area (8.5 hectares). The education
level of farmers with no cost share is higher compared to those with a cost share. These
correlations underscore the importance of controlling for education and land area when
quantifying the marginal effect of cost share on irrigation efficiency.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Data by Cost share Type
Shared Wells
With Cost Share
Equal for All
Based on Land
Users
Area

No Cost
Share

Individually
Owned Wells

46,743
(36,163)

37,988
(45,363)

95,168
(140,352)

93,685
(169,933)

1.2
(3.3)

1.0
(2.2)

1.7
(4.2)

1.3
(2.5)

6,433
(12,121)

6,327
(10,936)

15,838
(18,277)

17,871
(25,292)

Fertilizer price
(pesos/kg)

2.4
(1.2)

2.0
(0.7)

3.4
(5.0)

2.5
(1.9)

Land area (hectares)

7.2
(6.0)

8.5
(8.4)

30.7
(38.1)

34.9
(38.3)

Number of farmers
sharing one well

13.1
(9.6)

17.5
(16.2)

23.9
(19.1)

1.0
(0.0)

Soil type (1-5)

3.6
(1.1)

3.2
(1.2)

2.9
(0.9)

3.2
(1.0)

Semi-arid or arid
climate (climate type
dummy =1 )

0.7
(0.5)

0.5
(0.5)

0.5
(0.5)

0.6
(0.5)

Well depth (meters)

128.9
(46.4)

129.7
(44.7)

147.3
(57.6)

121.7
(119.8)

Farmers' age (years)

52.9
(9.4)

53.7
(7.8)

51.2
(11.3)

54.6
(11.8)

Education (1-5)

1.6
(0.6)

1.8
(0.9)

2.7
(1.6)

3.0
(1.6)

Share of fruit and
vegetable

0.8
(0.4)

0.4
(0.5)

0.3
(0.4)

0.6
(0.5)

30

45

45

77

Consumed water
quantity (m3)
Pumping cost of water
(pesos/m3)
Consumed fertilizer
quantity (kg)

Number of
observations

Mean values are reported and standard deviations are in parentheses.
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2.8 Estimation
Following Provencher and Burt (1993), the number of farmers sharing a well is
included as an explanatory variable in our estimation. Binary indicators for each
electricity cost-sharing mechanism (evenly-based and area-based) are also included. The
effect of these variables on irrigation may be confounded with the effect of other drivers
such as soil type, climate regime, depth to groundwater, age and education of farmers,
and crop types. Obtaining reliable estimates of the link between well sharing, cost share
rules and pumping requires controlling for these factors.
The system of equations is specified as:
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖∗ + 𝑎𝑛𝑖 ∗ 𝑁 + 𝑎𝑐𝑠1𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑆1 + 𝑎𝑐𝑠2𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑆2 + 𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐼 + 𝑎𝑐𝑙𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝐿
+𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻 + 𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝑎𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 + 𝑎𝑦𝑓𝑣𝑖 ∗ 𝑌𝐹𝑉 + 𝑣𝑖
𝑖 = 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟, 𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠

(2.16)

where 𝑥𝑖∗ is defined by Equation (2.11) which captures the impact of prices of inputs,
outputs, and fixed inputs, 𝑁 is the number of farmers sharing a well, and 𝐶𝑆1 and 𝐶𝑆2 are
the cost share dummies.
Equation system (2.16) also includes controls for soil type (𝑆𝐼 = 1, … ,5, where 𝑆𝐼 =
1 for finest soil and 𝑆𝐼 = 5 for coarsest), depth of well (𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑇𝐻) measured in meters to
water table, age of the farmer (AGE), education of the farmer (EDUCATION) (i.e., (1)
did not finish elementary school, (2) finished elementary school, (3) finished middleschool, (4) finished high-school, (5) more than high-school), 3 climate zone (CL), and
crop types (YFV) which is captured by the share of fruit and vegetable in total output as
these crops tend to be more water intensive than field crops.
The climate zones are based on the widely used Köppen-Geiger classification system,
which are used internationally for consistency between nations and regions. Mellinger,
Sachs and Gallup (1999) provide an excellent description of the classification system.
Since the climate zones are not ordered based on expected precipitation or irrigation

3

Education may be more appropriately captured by a dummy variable for each level of schooling.
However, this would create 4 more variables in each equation which would result in a significant increase
in the number of parameters to be estimated. Measuring education by a categorical variable increases the
parsimony of our model and eases the burden on degrees of freedom with only 197 observations.
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requirements, we create two categorical variables for the empirical analysis.4 The default
(omitted) category refers to regions with a temperate climate and a dry winter, while the
alternative category refers to regions with a semi-arid or arid climate. We expect that
irrigation requirements will be lower in the default category than the alternative category.
With shared wells we do not have sufficient information to attribute input usage and
output production to specific farmers so we use the average age and education of
surveyed farmers as the socio-demographic variables for the unit. Output includes field
crops, fruits, and vegetables. Fruits and vegetables are typically more water intensive
than field crops so we include the combined share of fruits and vegetables in total output.
The system (2.16) is estimated using a nonlinear iterative seemingly unrelated
regression estimator with Eicker-Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent standard
errors. 5 With three inputs, the matrix 𝑆𝑖𝑗 is a 3 by 3 matrix, which is recovered from
estimation of matrix A.

2.9 Results
Demand equations for water, fertilizer and the composite of other inputs are
estimated simultaneously and their R-squared values are 0.74, 0.59, and 0.86 respectively.
The coefficients for correlation of error terms across equations are -0.13, 0.10 and -0.02
for water and fertilizer equations, water and the composite input, and fertilizer and the
composite input equations respectively.6 Table 2.3 reports estimation results of the water
equation. Results for the other two inputs are reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C. The
number of farmers sharing a well does not have a statistically significant impact on

4

The limited number of degrees of freedom makes it impossible to estimate coefficients for seven
categorical variables based on each unique climate zone.
5
To impose concavity on the cost function, we have to estimate Aij instead of Sij . While Sij are linear in our
model, Aij are not. As a result, a nonlinear SUR regression is used instead of linear regression.
6
The null hypothesis of no correlation across error terms in the system is strongly rejected at the 1% level
of significance with a likelihood ratio of 3690.5 (critical value of 11.34).
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Table 2.3: Coefficient Estimates for Water Demand
Water equation
Constant
Output quantity
Interaction of land area and output quantity
Land area
Quadratic term of output quantity
Interaction of quadratic land area and output quantity
Dividing electricity bill by share of land area
Dividing electricity bill evenly
Number of farmers sharing a well
Soil type
Climate type
Depth of well
Age
Education
Share of fruit and vegetable

Own price elasticity of water demand
𝑅2
Observations

Estimates
-39896.6
(33315.0)
547.6**
(247.6)
-97.5***
(35.4)
3208.5***
(394.9)
2.1**
(0.9)
1.0**
(0.5)
16456.9**
(8114.8)
25801.5***
(8515.8)
279.0
(316.5)
6566.6
(5629.1)
12315.7
(14850.1)
42.8
(54.8)
-227.6
(419.2)
4078.8
(4436.3)
3834.3
(11379.4)
-0.06**
(0.02)
0.741
197

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**) and three asterisk (***) denote
that variables are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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irrigation application. This result suggests that strategic pumping caused by well-sharing
is weak, at best.7
Sharing the cost of electricity evenly has a positive and statistically significant
impact on irrigation application. Sharing the cost of electricity based on land area also
has a positive but smaller impact. Results of cost share variables are consistent with the
hypothesis that cost-sharing reduces irrigation use efficiency.
To ensure that the effect of cost-sharing is not being confounded with the effect of
well-sharing, we have also estimated the model with the sub-sample of shared wells only.
The effect of electricity cost-sharing is robust to this change, though the reduction in
sample size reduces the precision of the coefficients.

Table 2.4: Input-specific Allocative Efficiency and Cost Increase due to Inefficiency
Farmers

Allocative
Efficiency

Cost Increase

Farmers paying their own actual electricity consumption

1.00

0%

Farmers dividing electricity bill based on their land share

0.73

5%

Farmers dividing electricity bill evenly

0.58

7%

Parameter estimates are used to calculate efficiency as described by Equations (2.13)
and (2.14) and results are reported in Table 2.4. Implementing an evenly split cost share
mechanism decreases farmers’ irrigation efficiency to 0.58 while implementing a landbased cost share mechanism decreases farmers’ irrigation efficiency to 0.73. These
results show that a cost share rule which splits the electricity cost evenly among farmers
has a stronger effect than a rule establishing cost share based on land area.
Our results show that the cost distortion introduced by electricity cost-sharing is
substantial. Cost-sharing creates a situation where a farmer pays only a fraction of the
electricity cost of his/her extra pumping. Under an evenly split cost share rule this is

The model was also estimated with a quadratic term for 𝑁 and interaction terms between 𝐶𝑆1 , 𝐶𝑆2 and 𝑁
to consider different channels through which well sharing might affect irrigation. We have also estimated a
model where 𝑁 was replaced by a well share dummy. Well sharing had an insignificant effect across all
models.
7
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perhaps a small fraction of total electricity cost (e.g., only 20% in a well shared by 5
farmers). Under a land-share rule, larger farmers may not benefit as much as their smaller
counterparts. Consequently the effect of an evenly-split cost share rule is found to be
larger in magnitude and statistically more robust, than a cost share rule based on land area.
Our results suggest that distortions caused by the cost and strategic externalities (i.e.,
the magnitude of the clockwise rotation from 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠 to 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 in Figure 1) are not
strong. This may be explained by a small impact of individual pumping on the water level,
absence of strategic pumping from farmers sharing the well, or by unobservable selfgovernance institutions facilitating cooperative behavior. But, if such institutions were
effective enough to eliminate the marginal cost-reducing effects of well-sharing, they
would also eliminate the effect of electricity cost-sharing mechanisms (rotation from
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 to 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 in Figure 1), which does not seem to be the case. Therefore,

while the influence of hydrological and institutional features cannot be distinguished in
our analysis, results suggest that the insignificant effect of well sharing on pumping is
explained by a small impact of an individual's pumping on water level or absence of
strategic pumping, rather than the existence of cooperative institutions.
Allocative inefficiency in irrigation application results in production cost that is
higher than the minimum cost. The increase in cost for farmers operating under each cost
share mechanism can be calculated based on Equation (2.15). The percentage increase in
cost due to allocative inefficiency with cost-sharing is reported in Table 2.4. We find that
allocative inefficiency associated with area-based (evenly-based) cost share increases
total production cost by 5 (7) percent. Therefore in addition to having a significant impact
on the overall amount of water pumped, irrigation inefficiency also has a sizable effect on
overall production costs. This suggests that removal of inefficiency sources will not only
alleviate groundwater depletion but also improve farmers’ welfare.
The own price elasticity of demand for irrigation water is reported in Table 2.3 and it
is -0.06 (with a bootstrapped standard deviation of 0.02 so the elasticity estimate is
significant at 5% level), which means that a doubling of the unitary cost of pumping
would reduce irrigation by 6 percent. Thus, only a very substantial increase in pumping
cost can have a sizable impact on irrigation.
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Some limitations of this analysis are worth noting. The cross sectional nature of our
data does not allow us to control for unobservable fixed effects that may be correlated
with our explanatory variables. We are able to control for some important time-invariant
factors such as soil, climate, and socio-demographic variables, but analysis with crosssectional data always risks omitted variable bias due to correlation between
unobservables and explanatory variables.
This analysis, like the rest of the literature, neglects issues of optimal timing of
irrigation. Inefficiencies can emerge not only in terms of the total amount of water
applied during the growing season but also in terms of the timing of application. Farmers
that share the same well may play a dynamic game in which they deviate from the
optimal irrigation schedule if they believe they avoid the drawdown caused by another
farmer at the otherwise optimal irrigation time. Finally, a profit maximizing framework
may be more appropriate for farmers in this context. However, theoretically consistent
and econometrically implementable input specific efficiency measures in the context of a
profit dual function are not yet available. Expanding input specific efficiency
measurement in this direction seems to be a relevant and promising research avenue.

2.10 Policy Implications
In combination our results show that common pool problems created by the sharing
of electricity cost can have a sizable impact on pumping. As summarized by Ostrom in
several studies (e.g., Ostrom 1996), conventional solutions to the common pool problem
typically include creation of property rights (granting the property of the well to one
individual or institution) and government ownership and control. The former can have
significant implementation problems and resistance in the field. For the latter to
effectively reduce over-extraction regulators would have to: 1) pursue maximization of
social welfare as their objective; 2) have knowledge of the workings of ecological and
hydrological systems; and 3) have knowledge of institutional changes that would induce
socially optimal behavior.
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An alternative solution that has spontaneously emerged in the field and later
formalized by Ostrom et al. (1999) is that of self-governance. Our results seem to indicate
that self-governance institutions inducing cooperative behavior may not have been in
place in Mexico during the time of the survey or that they were not sufficient to prevent
considerable inefficiency from the common pool problem created by electricity costsharing rules. Self-governance cannot be successfully implemented everywhere.
Conditions like feasible improvement of the resource, trust among users, and users’
discount rate influence the chances of successful self-governance of a natural resource.
Therefore the success of these institutional reforms will be determined by the
idiosyncrasies of wells and regions in Mexico. An ex-ante evaluation of alternative
institutional arrangements to solve the common pool problem of groundwater in Mexico
constitutes an undoubtedly important research avenue in the future.
A much simpler, yet promising solution to the cost share problem is facilitating
implementation of metering systems and allocation rules that allow charging each farmer
for his own consumption. This is especially true for those wells that divide electricity
costs evenly among farmers. In some cases, there may be financial barriers to adoption of
these technologies and, in others, social ones. Public policies should be aimed at
removing the barriers preventing adoption of more modern metering systems.
The magnitude of the own price elasticity of demand suggests that elimination of the
electricity subsidy by itself is not an effective policy for a significant reduction of
groundwater pumping. This result, along with the impact of cost share variables on
irrigation demand, suggest that elimination of cost share mechanisms seems a much more
promising conservation policy than price-based instruments. In addition, intuition
suggests that the latter will have a negative effect on farmers’ welfare while the former,
by eliminating cost inefficiencies shown in Table 2.4, may result in higher welfare for
farmers.
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2.11 Conclusions
The objective of this study was to quantify the role of different sources of nonexcludability on irrigation water demand in Mexico. We model three potential distortions
of the marginal pumping cost of groundwater, and empirically gauge their impacts on
irrigation demand. Based on insights from the theoretical model of marginal cost of
pumping, we hypothesize that electricity subsidies, well sharing and electricity costsharing will increase groundwater pumping and aggravate groundwater depletion.
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that electricity cost-sharing decreases
farmers’ irrigation efficiency. In fact, results suggest that cost-sharing is at the heart of
water over-extraction observed in many areas in Mexico. Both cost share rules have a
statistically and quantitatively significant effect on pumping. Moreover, our results are
consistent with the hypothesis that water demand is inelastic and, thus, eliminating the
electricity subsidy is unlikely to result in a substantial reduction in irrigation. We estimate
that the price elasticity of irrigation is only -0.06, which means that a doubling of the
unitary cost of pumping would only reduce irrigation by 6 percent. In contrast, the
hypothesis that well sharing will decrease irrigation efficiency is rejected. Our results
indicate that the number of farmers sharing a well does not have a statistically significant
effect on individual pumping, which suggests either a limited effect of individual
pumping on water level or absence of strategic pumping by farmers sharing the wells.
Concerning the effect of these policies on farmers’ welfare, one needs to consider
that policy instruments reducing inefficiency need not cause a reduction in farmers’
surplus. This is because increases in individual marginal cost due to institutional reforms
may be offset by 1) reductions in pumping cost associated with a decrease in the total
volume pumped, and 2) an increase in water’s marginal value product due to enhanced
production efficiency. In other words the alleviation of externalities increases overall
welfare and this tends to offset the raise in individual pumping costs introduced by policy.
We suggest that policymakers consider all of these effects when making decisions about
changes to existing electricity and water policies.
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CHAPTER 3 DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT IN AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES TO
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AIMING TO DECREASE FERTILIZER APPLICATION

3.1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that fertilizer (e.g., nitrogen and phosphorus) use in
agricultural production and the associated runoff leads to high levels of water pollution in
the surrounding watershed area, as well as downstream (Goolsby et al. 2001; Rabotyagov
et al. 2010; Yuan et al. 2013; Rebolledo et al. 2016). The application rate of fertilizer on a
certain area of land is one of the key factors influencing water pollution: all else equal, a
higher fertilizer application rate leads to a larger amount of nutrient migrating from the
soil into the water system (Angle et al. 1993; Jaynes et al. 2001). When fertilizer is
overused the surplus of nutrition in the soil is more likely to cause water pollution (Angle
et al. 1993; Andraski et al. 2000). Past research finds that farmers often overuse fertilizer
to avoid potential loss in yield associated with uncertainty in weather and soil nutrition
levels (Sheriff 2005; Stuart et al. 2014). As a result, a major policy focus is on
minimizing the impact of fertilizer application on environmental systems. We contribute
to this policy discussion by shedding light on the dynamics and relative cost-effectiveness
of input- and output-based policies that use financial incentives to influence farmer
behavior.
Input- and output-based policies refer to policies that target the prices of inputs or
outputs in production; for example, a policy that affects the prices of fertilizer used in
production is an input-based policy and a policy that affects the price of crops grown on a
parcel of land is an output-based policy. This definition is different from another
definition in which an input refers to a variable in the polluter’s choice set of variables
that influence pollution runoff. In this latter case, an input-based policy is one that targets
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these choice variables, instead of directly targeting emissions or their proxies (see Shortle
and Horan 2013 for further discussion).
Different crops have different requirements for fertilizer application. Corn is a
particularly fertilizer-intensive crop. According to data published by the Economic
Research Service at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA ERS), the
average application rate of nitrogen for corn production in the United States in 2002 was
154 kg/hectare. The average rate of phosphate application was 67 kg/hectare. Conversely,
soybeans is a fertilizer-saving crop with an average application rate of nitrogen and
phosphate being only 24 and 55 kg/hectare. Not surprisingly the production of corn
usually leads to higher levels of water pollution than soybeans. Research finds that
continuous corn cultivation causes a higher level of nitrogen runoff than a corn-soybean
rotation (Weed and Kanwar 1996; Kanwar et al. 1997) because of its repeated high rate
of fertilizer application year after year (Andraski et al. 2000). For these reasons, crop
choice is another important factor influencing water pollution, and consequently, another
channel through which policy can exact reductions.
Though a variety of policy options are available for targeting improvements in water
quality via a reduction in fertilizer runoff, economists have long favored financial
incentives. Financial incentives induce a change in farmer behavior in a manner
consistent with environmental conservation without dictating the means of conservation.
This allows each farmer to select his/her best option for reducing runoff, which renders
financial incentives more efficient than command-and-control policies (Hahn 2000;
Whittaker et al. 2003). In the context of fertilizer application, financial incentives may
increase the cost of fertilizer (input-based policies) or reduce the profitability of a
fertilizer intensive crop, such as corn (output-based policies).
Input-based policies may operate as a tax on fertilizer use or a subsidy on fertilizer
reduction, and have been implemented internationally. In the United States, Wisconsin,
Iowa and Nebraska have levied taxes on fertilizer application (Larson et al. 1996; US
EPA 2001). In Europe, Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway and Sweden have also
implemented a fertilizer tax to reduce fertilizer application (Rougoor et al. 2001;
Sö derholm and Christiernsson 2008; Vojtech 2010).
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Output-based policies encourage farmers to substitute to less fertilizer-intensive
crops by either taxing fertilizer-intensive crops or subsidizing fertilizer-saving crops.
Florida has levied a tax on fertilizer-intensive crop acreage to reduce phosphorus loadings
from cropland (Ribaudo 2001). Another policy that has been suggested is to couple an
environmental standard with federal commodity program payments to reduce fertilizer
use (USDA ERS 2007, 2011). Such a policy might affect the profitability of different
crops, and lead to the reduction in fertilizer use. In the Corn Belt, corn and soybeans are
the main crops that receive government payments. For example, in Iowa, corn and
soybeans account for 69 and 30 percent respectively in the total base acres of covered
commodities by the payment programs (Plastina et al. 2016). Given the differences in the
production practices of corn and soybeans, imposing an environmental standard as a
condition for commodity program payments would increase the compliance costs of corn
production relative to soybean production, which in turn would decrease the relative
profitability of corn.
Several studies evaluate the relative efficiency of both input- and output-based
policies. The findings from these studies are mixed. In terms of a reduction in net farm
income, Huang and Lantin (1993) find that the cost per pound of reducing excess
nitrogen fertilizer application is lower for input-based policies relative to output-based
policies. Wu and Tanaka (2005) find that a fertilizer-use tax is more cost-effective than
incentive payments. Using a general equilibrium model of the United States economy,
Taheripour et al. (2008) find that output-based policies are more efficient for achieving
goals with lower nitrogen reduction, but input-based policies become more efficient when
higher levels of nitrogen reduction are targeted. In contrast, Bourgeois et al. (2014) find
that mixed policies that combine both input- and output-based policies are more costeffective than any single policy.
The literature that evaluates the relative merits of economic policies targeting water
quality and fertilizer runoff typically do so on the grounds of relative cost-effectiveness
(Hahn 2000; Shortle and Horan 2001, 2013). Comparing policies from a Paretoefficiency point of view that considers all social costs and benefits of the policy is often
impractical because of the informational requirements associated with the Pareto criterion.
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The cost-effectiveness criterion does not attempt to identify policies capable of attaining
the optimal level of pollution that maximizes social welfare as does the Pareto-efficiency
criterion. Instead, it identifies the policy instrument that attains an exogenously given
environmental target (optimal or not) at minimum cost. The cost-effectiveness criterion
has been applied to evaluate command-and-control policies as well as financial incentives.
The former include policies encouraging best management practices or land retirement
(Khanna et al. 2003; Wu and Tanaka 2005; Rabotyagov et al. 2010). The latter include
tax/subsidy policies based on agricultural input usage or ambient pollution concentration
levels (Kampas and White 2002; Wu and Tanaka 2005; Bourgeois et al. 2014). Following
this literature, we use the cost-effectiveness criterion.
One limitation in the scope of existing research that we address in this paper is that
previous research focuses on the overall long-term effectiveness of the policy – i.e., how
much water pollution reduction is achieved once the effect of the policy is fully realized.
Past research provides valuable insight; yet, an important, practical aspect of this policy
discussion is the speed at which each type of policy takes effect, or how long each policy
takes to achieve these (previously estimated) goals. Understanding the dynamics of full
adjustment is a crucial factor in assessing the relative cost-effectiveness of input- and
output-based policies. If a particular type of policy is known to be more effective, yet
takes a substantially longer time to yield these effects, then that policy may in fact be less
desirable from an environmental vantage.
Decreasing the application rate of fertilizer on a certain area of land or switching
land allocation from a fertilizer-intensive crop to a fertilizer-saving crop are both able to
reduce fertilizer use. While the adjustment of the application rate of fertilizer can be rapid,
the adjustment of land allocation across different crops may be sluggish and require a
long time to be fully realized. Because of crop rotational effects and quasi-fixed capital
constraints (Orazem and Miranowski 1994; Arnberg and Hansen 2012), farmers respond
slowly to policies targeting adjustments in land allocation. Vasavada and Chambers
(1986) find that it takes two years for total agricultural land to adjust to its optimal level
when land is treated as one single input. When land is divided across different crops,
Lansink and Stefanou (1997) find that it takes more than twelve years to adjust land
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allocation between root crops and other crops. This sluggishness in the adjustment of land
allocation affects the speed at which economic policies affect fertilizer application.
To simultaneously assess both the magnitude of input- and output-based policy
effects and the speed at which the policies take effect, we deploy an empirical dynamic
adjustment model of corn production that takes fertilizer as one of several inputs into
production. We estimate the dynamic response of fertilizer use to changes in the price of
both fertilizer (input-based policy) and corn (output-based policy). By estimating the
response of fertilizer use to changes in the prices of fertilizer and corn, we are able to
measure the effect of each type of policy on fertilizer use. By estimating the adjustment
rate of the quasi-fixed inputs (capital and land allocated to corn), we can measure the
total time required for the policy to take full effect.
We use county-level data because it is more policy-relevant than farmer level data,
as policymakers are interested in affecting change over a relatively large area. This focus
is advantageous when we consider the possibility that, while individual farmers may
respond to policy-induced incentives slowly, the aggregate response in a county may be
less sluggish if the total adjustment can be achieved through adjustments made by the
farmers with relatively low adjustment costs and higher adjustment rates.

3.2 Theoretical Foundation and Empirical Specification

3.2.1 Theoretical Foundation
We start by following previous literature (e.g., Hennessy 2006; Du and Hennessy
2012) and assume that farmers make production decisions (including the amount of
fertilizer applied) to maximize profits. To the extent that fertilizer application may also
affect skewness and kurtosis of the yield distribution (Du et al. 2012), farmers’ degree of
risk aversion and perception of fertilizer impacts may also influence their use.
Unfortunately, no information is available that allows construction of a reliable measure
of risk aversion. Nor is there information available to quantify farmers’ perception of the
effects of fertilizer on the probability distribution of yields. Therefore with the caveat that
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there may be other motivations shaping the decision on fertilizer application, we move
forward with our conventional assumption of profit maximization.
Our model is a version of the dynamic duality model that has been widely used to
study the adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs in an agricultural context (e.g., Vasavada and
Chambers 1986; Luh and Stefanou 1991; Lansink and Stefanou 1997, 2001). The
foundation of the model is the maximization of the discounted flow of profit for a
producer of multiple outputs using variable inputs and quasi-fixed inputs (Epstein 1981;
Epstein and Denny 1983; Lansink and Stefanou 1997):
∞

𝐽(𝑣, 𝑤, 𝐾, 𝑍, 𝑡) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∫𝑡 𝑒 −𝑟𝑠 [𝜋(𝑣, 𝐾(𝑠), 𝑍(𝑠), 𝑠) − 𝑤 ′ 𝐾 − 𝐶(𝐼(𝑠))]𝑑𝑠.
𝐼

(3.1)

In Equation (3.1), 𝐽(⋅) is the value function; 𝐾 is a vector of quasi-fixed inputs; 𝜋 is
defined as 𝑣𝑄 ; 𝑄 is a vector of netput (output and variable input) quantities that is
positive for outputs and negative for inputs; 𝑣 and 𝑤 are vectors of market prices of
netputs and quasi-fixed inputs, respectively; 𝑍 is a vector of fixed inputs; 𝑟 is the discount
rate; 𝑠 and 𝑡 reflect technological progress as a time trend; 𝐼 is the corresponding quasifixed input adjustment; and 𝐶(𝐼) is the adjustment cost function.
The Hamilton-Jacobi equation of the optimization problem in Equation (3.1) is
𝑟𝐽(𝑣, 𝑤, 𝐾, 𝑍, 𝑡) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝜋(𝑣, 𝐾, 𝑍, 𝑡) − 𝑤 ′ 𝐾 − 𝐶(𝐼) + (𝐼 − 𝛿𝐾)′ 𝐽𝑘 } + 𝐽𝑡 ,
𝐼

(3.2)

where δ is the depreciation rate of quasi-fixed inputs, and the subscript notation defines a
partial derivative (e.g., 𝐽𝑡 = 𝜕𝐽(⋅)/𝜕𝑡). Differentiating (3.2) with respect to 𝑣, results in
the following netput equations:
𝑄 = 𝑟𝐽𝑣 − 𝐽𝑘𝑣 𝐾̇ − 𝐽𝑡𝑣 ,

(3.3)

where 𝐾̇ (𝐾̇ = 𝐼 − 𝛿𝐾) is the adjustment of 𝐾. Differentiating (3.2) with respect to 𝑤,
results in the following adjustment equations:
−1
𝐾̇ = 𝐽𝑘𝑤
(𝑟𝐽𝑤 + 𝐾 − 𝐽𝑡𝑤 ).

(3.4)

A common assumption is that producers make optimal decisions based on
information in the current period and their expectations of prices, which are assumed to
be static (Epstein 1981; Epstein and Denny 1983; Lansink and Stefanou, 1997). This
assumption excludes uncertainty in future prices faced by farmers. Alternative
assumptions, such as quasi-rational expectations, typically require a relatively long time
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series of price data to generate expected prices. Given other data requirements (see
Section 3.3), the temporal dimension of our data is restricted to the years 2001 to 2008,
which is not long enough to facilitate estimation under alternative assumptions.

3.2.2 Empirical Specification
We use a normalized quadratic specification to parameterize the optimal value
function. To operationalize the normalized quadratic setup, we use soybeans as the
numeraire which allows us to focus on the production of corn. Even though the results in
the normalized quadratic design are not invariant to the choice of the numeraire, it is
widely used because it is flexible, yet empirically straightforward to implement (Lansink
and Stefanou 2001). These are important properties in our case, as limited degrees of
freedom render estimation of a complex model and imposition of constraints difficult.
Specifically, the normalized quadratic value function is given by
𝑣
1
𝐴 𝐶 𝑣
𝐽(𝑣, 𝑤, 𝑧, 𝐾, 𝑡) = (𝑎1 𝑎2 ) ( ) + (𝑣𝑤) [ ′
]( )
𝐶 𝐵 𝑤
𝑤
2
𝐷 𝐺 𝐻 𝑧
1
+ (𝑧 ′ 𝐾 ′ 𝑡 ′ ) [ 𝐺 ′ 𝐸 𝐿 ] [𝐾 ]
2
𝐻 ′ 𝐿′ 𝐹 𝑡
𝑧
𝑂
𝑃
𝑅 𝐾
+ (𝑣 ′ 𝑤 ′ ) [
]
[
].
𝑆 𝑀−1 𝑈 𝑡

(3.5)

In Equation (3.5), 𝑣, the vector of netput prices includes the price of corn, fertilizer,
and labor; 𝑤, the vector of quasi-fixed input prices, includes the rental price of corn land
and the shadow price of capital; z, the fixed input, is total cropland; the vector of quasifixed inputs, K, includes corn land and capital; and t is a time trend. All prices are relative
to the price of soybeans, and all other notation defines matrices of parameters to be
estimated.
Following Equation (3.3), the netput equation (in our empirical model, the supply of
corn, and the demand for fertilizer and labor) is
𝑄 ∗ = 𝑟(𝑎1 + 𝐴′ 𝑣 + 𝐶 ′ 𝑤 + 𝑂′ 𝑧 + 𝑃′ 𝐾 + 𝑅 ′ 𝑡) − 𝑃′ 𝐾̇ − 𝑅,

(3.6)
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and following Equation (3.4), the adjustment equation for quasi-fixed inputs (corn land
and capital) is
𝐾̇ = (𝑟 + 𝑀)𝐾 + 𝑟𝑀(𝑎2 + 𝐵 ′ 𝑤 + 𝐶 ′ 𝑣 + 𝑆𝑧 + 𝑈𝑡) − 𝑀𝑈.

(3.7)

Equation (3.7) defines a linear relationship between multiple factors and quasi-fixed
input adjustment, and is sometimes referred to as a multivariate linear accelerator
𝐾̇ ∗ = (𝑟 + 𝑀)(𝐾 − 𝐾 ∗ )

(3.8)

where 𝐾 ∗ is the optimal level of quasi-fixed input 𝐾 written as
𝐾 ∗ = 𝑟𝑁(𝑎2 + 𝐵 ′ 𝑤 + 𝐶 ′ 𝑣 + 𝑆𝑧 + 𝑈𝑡) − 𝑁𝑈,
𝑁 = −(𝑟 + 𝑀)−1 𝑀.

(3.9)
(3.10)

In Equation (3.8), (𝑟 + 𝑀) is the adjustment rate matrix of quasi-fixed inputs 𝐾 to
their optimal level 𝐾 ∗ . This multivariate accelerator allows the adjustment of one quasifixed input to influence the adjustment of the other quasi-fixed input. In our empirical
model, we allow adjustments in corn land and capital to affect each other; we then test for
significance of these mutual effects.

3.2.3 Measuring Short-Term and Long-Term Effects
This model allows us to measure both the short-term and long-term response of input
use to a change in price; hence, we can assess the short-term and long-term effect of a
policy that influences the price of corn or fertilizer on fertilizer application. The
difference between the short-term and long-term effects comes from sluggish adjustments
in the quasi-fixed inputs. In the short-term, the quasi-fixed inputs are assumed to be fixed
at their current level, while in the long-term they are assumed to adjust to their new
optimal levels given a new set of equilibrium conditions created by the policy. To make
these assessments, we use our model to compute short-term and long-term elasticities –
short-term elasticities keep the quasi-fixed inputs constant, and long-term elasticities
allow for complete adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs to their long-term optimal level.
Following standard definitions of short-term and long-term elasticities (Morrison and
Berndt 1981; Luh and Stefanou 1993; Richards 1999), the short-term price elasticity of
each netput to a netput price change is
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𝜀𝑄𝑠 𝑖 𝑉𝑗 = (

𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑄𝑖
| 𝑘1 =𝑘̅1,𝑘2=𝑘̅2 ) ( )
𝜕𝑉𝑗
𝑄𝑖

(3.11)

where 𝑖 and 𝑗 index the netputs and netput prices. Hence, the short-term elasticity given
in Equation (3.11) allows us to assess the sensitivity of the quantities of corn, fertilizer
and labor to prices, including both own and cross-price effects.
The short-term price elasticities of netputs to changes in quasi-fixed input prices is
𝑊𝑗
𝜕𝑄
𝜀𝑄𝑠 𝑖 𝑊𝑗 = ( 𝑖 | 𝑘1 =𝑘̅1 ,𝑘2 =𝑘̅2 ) ( )
𝜕𝑊𝑗
𝑄𝑖

(3.12)

which allows us to understand how the netput quantities respond to changes in the price
of corn land and capital.
Since, in the short term, quasi-fixed inputs are held constant and do not adjust,
changes in the price of corn or fertilizer only affect fertilizer application under the current
land allocation and capital level. That is, these short-term elasticities do not account for
indirect effects of price changes through adjustments in capital or land allocation.
The long-term price elasticity of netputs to a change in the netput price is
𝜀𝑄𝑙 𝑖 𝑉𝑗

𝜕𝑄𝑖
=(
|
𝜕𝑉𝑗

2

𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑄𝑖 𝜕𝐾𝑚 ∗ 𝑉𝑗
) ( ) + (∑
)( )
̅ 1 ,𝑘2 =𝑘
̅2
𝑘1 =𝑘
𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝐾𝑚 ∗ 𝜕𝑉𝑗
𝑄𝑖

(3.13)

𝑚=1

and the long-term price elasticity of netputs to a change in quasi-fixed input prices is
𝜀𝑄𝑙 𝑖 𝑊𝑗

𝜕𝑄𝑖
=(
|
𝜕𝑉𝑗

2

𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑄𝑖 𝜕𝐾𝑚 ∗ 𝑉𝑗
) ( ) + (∑
) ( ).
̅ 1 ,𝑘2 =𝑘
̅2
𝑘1 =𝑘
𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝐾𝑚 ∗ 𝜕𝑉𝑗
𝑄𝑖

(3.14)

𝑚=1

Notice that Equations (3.13) and (3.14) have additional terms that do not appear in
Equations (3.11) and (3.12). These terms – the summations over 𝑚 – refer to the indirect
effects that the changes in input and quasi-fixed input price have on the netput quantities
via adjustment in the quasi-fixed inputs. That is, the long-term elasticity is calculated by
adding to the short-term elasticities (the first terms in Equations (3.13) and (3.14)) the
effects associated with adjustment in the quasi-fixed factors. This is an important part of
the total effect since a change in the price of corn or fertilizer induced via policy not only
causes a change in fertilizer application directly, but also causes a change in both land
allocated to corn and capital which in turn causes a change in fertilizer application.
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The long-term price elasticity of quasi-fixed inputs with respect to netput price,
captured in the second term of Equation (3.13), is
𝜀𝐾𝑙 𝑚 𝑉𝑗

𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝐾𝑚 ∗
=(
)( )
𝜕𝑉𝑗
𝐾𝑚

(3.15)

and the long term price elasticity of quasi-fixed inputs to a change in quasi-fixed input
prices is
𝜀𝐾𝑙 𝑚 𝑊𝑗 = (

𝜕𝐾𝑚 ∗ 𝑊𝑗
) ( ).
𝜕𝑊𝑗
𝐾𝑚

(3.16)

These elasticities allow us to measure how a change in the prices of corn land and
capital affect the quantity of each of these quasi-fixed inputs.

3.3 Description of the Data
Our analysis focuses on the Wabash River Watershed, which covers 65 counties in
Indiana, 23 counties in Illinois, and a small part of Ohio. In this watershed, corn and
soybeans are the main crops produced. In 2014, the planting area of corn and soybeans in
Indiana constitutes 47.5 and 44.3 percent of the total planting area of field crops; in
Illinois, these percentages are 51.7 and 42.6 percent for corn and soybeans, respectively
(USDA NASS). We focus on the county level of aggregation to understand how
incentives to change agricultural management practices influence water quality over a
larger geographic area. Because certain data are missing for some counties, our analysis
covers 44 counties in Indiana and 16 counties in Illinois, for a total of 60 counties. Figure
3.1 provides a map of the Wabash River Watershed and the counties included in our
analysis. The counties in our analysis are distributed somewhat uniformly across space;
hence, we maintain representative coverage over the watershed area despite missing data.
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel that spans the years 2001 to 2008, providing a
total of 384 county-year observations. We exclude the 2009 to 2012 years because a
preliminary analysis indicated that the data spanning these years is too heavily impacted
by the Great Recession. The empirical model requires quantity and price data for all
outputs, variable inputs, and quasi-fixed inputs, as well as quantity data for fixed inputs.
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We focus on two outputs, corn and soybeans since the production of corn and soybeans
constitutes more than 90 percent of all crop production in the Wabash River Watershed
area; further, corn and soybeans are typical fertilizer-intensive and fertilizer-saving crops,
respectively. We include two variable inputs, fertilizer and labor; two quasi-fixed inputs,
capital and land allocated to corn; and one fixed input, total cropland. Since we only
focus on corn and soybean production, total cropland is the sum of land allocated to corn
and land allocated to soybeans.

Figure 3.1: The Wabash River Watershed
The bold (black) line in this figure shows the geographical position of the Wabash River Watershed as it
spans most of Indiana and part of Illinois. The counties included in our analysis are indicated and shaded in
blue.

Data on the production quantity of corn and soybeans, the land area allocated to corn
and soybeans, the price of land, the price and quantity of capital, and the price of
fertilizer are obtained from the United States Department of Agricultural National
Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA NASS). Both the quantity and price of labor come
from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. We use county level data on the
number of employees in the crop production industry and their wages. The land price

46
data are census data, and only have one observation every five years. We use a cubic
polynomial interpolation to construct annual land price data; we explored, county by
county, several different interpolation techniques (both linear and nonlinear), and we
found that the cubic polynomial provided the best fit to most of the counties in our
analysis. To further increase the reliability of the interpolation, we use 5-year census data
from 1982 to 2012, so that the interpolation is based on a longer time span. Further, we
calculate the rental price of land as 4 percent of its value, which is consistent with the
proportion of cash rent of farmland in its value in Indiana reported by Dobbins and Cook
(2001-2008) at the time span of our data.
Machinery and equipment data are used to measure capital. The price of capital is a
price index of machinery and equipment. To measure the machinery cost paid by farmers
each year, we construct the shadow price of machinery via 𝑆𝑃 = 𝑂𝑃(𝑟 + δ) (Morrison
and Berndt 1981), where 𝑆𝑃 indicates the shadow price, which is equal to the original
price, 𝑂𝑃 , multiplied by the sum of the discount and depreciation rates, 𝑟 and 𝛿 ,
respectively. We assume (𝑟 + δ) is 0.15. The quantity of machinery is recovered by
dividing the market value of machinery and equipment by the price index. As a result, not
only the quantity, but also the quality of machinery, is reflected in the quantity of
machinery variable. Since the market value of machinery comes from the 5-year census,
we use the same polynomial interpolation based on data from 1982 to 2012 to construct
the annual data series.
County level fertilizer quantity data come from the Offices of the State Chemist in
both Indiana and Illinois. These offices record all reported sales of fertilizer by fertilizer
companies and sales agents in each county. An ideal measurement of fertilizer quantity is
the quantity of fertilizer applied to the field in each county; however, this data is largely
unobservable. In the absence of observable fertilizer application data, the quantity sold is
a reasonable measure. Given transportation and storage costs, most farmers do not
purchase fertilizer from outside the county, or store purchased fertilizer for future use.
Therefore, the fertilizer sales data is a reliable proxy for fertilizer used in each county.
Since fertilizer application occurs after the sale, and the fall application of fertilizer is
usually for production in the following year, we measure fertilizer application each year
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as the sum of fall sales from the previous year and spring sales from the current year. The
fertilizer price data is the weighted average price of different types of fertilizers
(specifically, 09-23-30, 10-10-10, 10-20-20,10-34-00, 11-52-00, 13-13-13, 16-20-00, 1717-17, 18-46-00, 19-19-19, Anhydrous Ammonia, Muriate of Potash 60% K20, Nitrogen
solution 32%, Superphosphate 44-46%, and Urea 45%). Our calculation of the fertilizer
price index follows the same criterion used by USDA NASS.
The price of corn and soybeans is the cash price data for each crop, obtained from
GeoGrain. The GeoGrain data is available at the grain elevator level, measured on
monthly intervals. To construct county-level data, we obtain averaged cash prices across
all elevators in each county; the data are averaged temporally to obtain annual prices.
Since crop prices are unknown when farmers make production decisions during the
planting season, we use crop prices from the previous year to measure the expected price
in the current year.
Theoretically the adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs is a continuous measurement. In
empirical research it is common to deploy a discrete approximation: 𝐾̇𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡 − 𝐾𝑡−1 (see,
for example, Epstein and Denny 1983; Hsu and Chang 1990; Luh and Stefanou 1991,
1993; Fernandez-Cornejo et al. 1992; Boetel et al. 2007).
Table 3.1 provides a statistical description of the data. The table reveals that about
72,000 hectares were planted in corn and soybeans on average, but that there is
substantial variation in total area planted that ranges from 4,600 to 220,000 hectares. On
average, about half of the total planted area is allocated to corn and the other half to
soybeans. Corn price is, on average, 40 percent of the soybean price per metric ton, while
corn production measured in metric tons is 3.2 times higher than soybean production.
More importantly about 31,000 metric tons of fertilizer is applied, on average.
Preliminary statistical analysis indicates a high correlation between corn production and
fertilizer application.

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Maximum

Minimum

Corn production in a county (metric tons)

354,075.5

214,078.4

1,509,022.6

9,497.4

Soybean production in a county (metric tons)

109,590.4

55,750.4

368,297.8

5,045.8

Corn price ($/metric ton)

92.0

21.0

145.9

67.4

Soybean price ($/metric ton)

222.7

44.6

309.2

160.7

30,764.7

19,308.0

185,635.1

1,232.0

Fertilizer price ($/metric ton)

391.9

161.2

740.4

228.0

Hired labor (persons)

78.7

78.4

472.0

5.0

Wage ($/week)

481.8

146.6

977.0

113.0

Planting area of corn (hectares)

36,625.8

19,161.2

129,099.3

1,821.2

Planting area of soybean (hectares)

35,107.3

16,215.5

106,840.8

2,306.8

Land price ($/hectare)

7,694.5

1,830.7

16,143.1

3,628.0

Total planting area of corn and soybean (hectares)

71,733.1

34,480.7

220,156.8

4,613.6

Composite machinery quantity

442,184.7

176,923.3

1,325,330.6

49,602.2

171.6

21.5

209.0

144.0

Fertilizer quantity applied in a county (metric tons)

Composite machinery price
The total number of counties included in our analysis is 60.
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3.4 Results
We estimate the parameters in the system defined by Equations (3.6) and (3.7) via a
fixed effect seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) procedure. In total, after imposing the
theoretically relevant cross-equation restrictions, there are 35 parameters. Given these
parameter estimates, we can compute the short-term and long-term price elasticities and
conduct our policy analysis. We report the parameter estimates and standard errors in
Table E.1 in the appendix for reference. Our profit function specification provides
significant flexibility (i.e., is able to capture a wide range of behavioral responses). The
downside is that this specification results in estimation of a large number of parameters
which, in combination with cross-equation restrictions, results in violation of the
theoretical property of convexity of the profit function in a number of data points. This is
relatively common in estimation of dual profit or cost functions (e.g., Lansink and
Stefanou 1997).

3.4.1 Short-Term Adjustments
Table 3.2 reports the short-term price elasticities for output (corn) and the variable
inputs (fertilizer and labor), with respect to prices of the netputs and quasi-fixed inputs.
The table is organized so that the rows represent each of the netput quantities, and the
columns represent the netput and quasi-fixed input prices from which each of the
elasticities are computed.
Most partial effects are of the expected sign. Given our objective, we focus on the
intensive and extensive margin changes for fertilizer application. The own price elasticity
of corn is 0.30, indicating that a 1 percent increase in the price of corn relative to soybean
induces a 0.30 percent increase in corn supply. The own price elasticity of fertilizer is 0.96, which indicates that when the fertilizer price increases by 1 percent, the application
of fertilizer decreases by 0.96 percent. This elasticity is statistically significant, and
indicates that any policy that increases the price of fertilizer, such as taxing fertilizer use
or subsidizing a reduction in fertilizer application, is an effective means of reducing
fertilizer application in the short-term.

50
Table 3.2: Estimates of the Short-Term Price Elasticity

Quantity

Price

Corn

Fertilizer

Labor

Corn

Fertilizer

Labor

Land

Machinery

0.30***

-0.34***

-0.01

-0.14***

0.00

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.01)

(0.02)

(0.06)

0.96***

-0.96***

-0.01

-0.40***

0.55***

(0.24)

(0.28)

(0.04)

(0.07)

(0.19)

0.12

-0.07

-0.33***

-0.11

0.47**

(0.21)

(0.23)

(0.08)

(0.10)

(0.20)

All estimated elasticities are constructed using parameter estimates shown in Table D.1 from the fixed
effects seemingly unrelated regression. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, and ***, **,
* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

The elasticity value reported here reveals a negative link between fertilizer usage
and its own price. Behind this negative effect is the physical relationship between
nitrogen and corn yields. Evidence from the agronomic literature suggests that increased
nitrogen application raises corn yields at a decreasing rate. Therefore producers would
respond to changes in the price of fertilizer. Our elasticity is larger (in absolute value)
than the elasticity that can be inferred from agronomic studies. In fact, in the study area,
the elasticity suggested by agronomic studies based on field data is around -0.3 (Iowa
State University, 2016). Differences are perhaps due to the level of aggregation. The
economically optimal nitrogen rate (EONR) suggested by Iowa State extension services
are based on field level information. The spatial unit of observation in this study is a
county. Effects over an entire county incorporate a large heterogeneity in response.
Typical agronomic units (as the ones considered to calculate the EONR) are included, but
marginal units which tend to be more sensitive to changes in price are also included in
our study.
We also find that the short-term cross-price elasticities between corn and fertilizer
are statistically significant. The short-term cross-price elasticity between the quantity of
fertilizer and the price of corn is also close to 1; specifically, a 1 percent decrease in the
relative price of corn leads to a 0.96 percent decrease in the application rate of fertilizer.
This result indicates that policies that discourage planting corn by reducing its relative
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price can also lead to a significant reduction in fertilizer application through adjustment
in the application rate. The downside of reducing fertilizer application via land use
adjustment is a reduction in corn production. In fact, a 1 percent increase in the price of
fertilizer leads to a 0.34 percent reduction in the quantity of corn produced.
In percentage terms the response in fertilizer application to either a decrease in the
price of corn or an increase in the price of fertilizer is (statistically) the same. These
results imply that policies directed towards decreasing the price of corn and policies
directed towards increasing the price of fertilizer are equally effective in reducing
fertilizer application, at least in the short-term. Estimated elasticities are consistent with
prior expectations based on economic theory and agronomic relationships, lending
credence to our empirical framework. Additionally, elasticity estimates imply that
policies that increase the price of land or decrease the price of machinery can also
influence fertilizer application.

3.4.2 Long-Term Adjustments
In the long-term, both corn land area and machinery adjust to their optimal levels;
these adjustments lead to further change in fertilizer application. The long-term elasticity
estimates are reported in Table 3.3, and are not generally different from the short-term
elasticity estimates in Table 3.2. From the short-term to the long-term the magnitude of
the own-price elasticity of fertilizer increases only from -0.96 to -0.98, which means that
most of the adjustment occurs within the short-term (i.e., one year) and at the intensive
margin. In particular the additional effects from the adjustment in the two quasi-fixed
inputs (i.e., the second terms in Equations (3.13) and (3.14)) are not substantial. This can
be explained by a small elasticity of fertilizer with respect to corn acreage and machinery,
a small elasticity of corn acreage with respect to netput prices and machinery prices, or
by a mutual offsetting effect between these impacts. We explore these details in a
subsequent section.
Looking at elasticity estimates over different time horizons, it is clear that inputbased policies that affect the relative price of fertilizer are effective both in the short-term
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and long-term. Our results are consistent with the findings from several studies that
estimate the effects of input-based policies (Wu and Tanaka 2005; Taheripour et al. 2008;
Bourgeois et al. 2014). However, other studies draw mixed conclusions. For example,
while the fertilizer tax policies implemented in Austria and Sweden have been found to
significantly reduce fertilizer application, the fertilizer taxes implemented in Denmark,
Finland and Norway did not decrease fertilizer use significantly (Rougoor et al. 2001;
Söderholm and Christiernsson 2008; Ahodo and Svatonova 2014). Explanations for the

insignificance of the policy in these countries include a low tax rate, the recycling of tax
revenue back to farmers, and the interaction of the policy effect with other policies, this
insignificance nevertheless raises concern on the general effectiveness of input-based
policies. Our results provide further evidence that input-based policies might significantly
reduce fertilizer application.

Table 3.3: Estimates of the Long-Term Price Elasticity

Corn

Quantity

Fertilizer
Labor
Corn Land
Machinery

Corn
0.29***
(0.09)
0.96***
(0.25)
0.12
(0.21)
0.40***
(0.07)
0.12
(0.13)

Fertilizer
-0.34***
(0.09)
-0.98***
(0.28)
-0.08
(0.23)
-0.43***
(0.07)
0.25**
(0.13)

Price
Labor
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.04)
-0.33***
(0.08)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.05**
(0.02)

Land
-0.14***
(0.02)
-0.40***
(0.07)
-0.11
(0.10)
-0.02
(0.05)
0.13**
(0.06)

Machinery
0.02
(0.06)
0.60***
(0.19)
0.48**
(0.20)
0.25***
(0.07)
-1.27***
(0.22)

All estimated elasticities are constructed using parameter estimates shown in Table D.1 from the fixed
effects seemingly unrelated regression. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, and ***, **,
* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

We find similar insights with respect to policies that work by changing the relative
price of corn (output-based policies); these policies also affect fertilizer application
beyond the short-term through the adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs and, especially, land
allocation. However the elasticity of fertilizer demand with respect to the price of corn
does not increase significantly (as shown later, there is only a small increase in the
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elasticities) from the short-term to the long-term. Like input-based policies, output-based
policies act primarily through the short-term at the intensive margin – i.e., a reduction in
the fertilizer application rate.
Our results also confirm that output-based policies that affect the relative prices of
corn lead to adjustments in fertilizer application in the short-term and long-term, and are
consistent with findings that a high corn price is one of the main drivers of high fertilizer
application (Stuart et al. 2014) and high nitrogen loss to the water system (Hendricks et al.
2014). Our findings provide support for the feasibility of the suggested policy of targeting
a reduction in fertilizer use through the integration of environmental standards into
government commodity program payments. All else equal, a higher compliance cost of
corn production means a lower real price received by farmers, and consequently the
change in the relative price of corn and soybeans will lead to a reduction of fertilizer use.
Even in the long term, we continue to find that fertilizer application responds
similarly to a decrease in the corn price or an increase in the fertilizer price. Hence, in
both the short-term and the long-term, output-based (i.e., corn price) policies and inputbased (i.e., fertilizer price) policies are equally effective in reducing the application of
fertilizer.

3.4.3 Cost-Effectiveness of Policies
Even though the elasticity of fertilizer with respect to fertilizer price and crop price
are similar, the cost of input- and output-based policies per unit of abatement differ. Our
estimates indicate that input- and output-based policies take effect at the same speed;
hence, our analysis on the relative cost-effectiveness of these policies focuses on the
magnitude of the cost of the policies and the total effect. The average annual fertilizer
application in our sample is 1,828,672 metric tons, the average fertilizer price is
$392/metric ton, the average annual production of corn is 21,083,636 metric tons, and the
average corn price is $92/metric ton. A 10 percent reduction in fertilizer application with
an input-based policy (e.g., a tax on fertilizer) requires a 10.2 percent tax on each unit of
fertilizer (i.e., the target reduction divided by the own-price elasticity of fertilizer,
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10/0.98). This translates into a total cost of $73,146,880 (calculated as 1,828,672*392*(10/-0.98)/100). The same 10 percent reduction in fertilizer application via an outputbased policy (e.g., a tax on corn production) costs $202,051,512, which is almost three
times larger than that of the input-based policy.
These calculations indicate that, given our estimated elasticities, the cost to
agricultural producers of achieving a reduction in fertilizer application is smaller with an
input-based policy than with an output-based policy. Conversely, if the reduction in
fertilizer application is encouraged through a subsidy instead of a tax, the cost to the
policymaker of achieving a 10 percent reduction in fertilizer application is smaller if
achieved through the input-based policy. These calculations reinforce the idea that inputbased policies are generally preferred. As we have discussed, the findings in previous
studies that compare input- and output-based policies are mixed. Our results demonstrate
that, at least for our study area, input-based policies are superior from a cost-effectiveness
point of view. The advantage of the input-based policy may come from the fact that the
input-based policy directly targets fertilizer; conversely, an output-based policy targets
corn or soybean production, which is ultimately translated into a change in fertilizer
application indirectly. It is likely that some of the adjustment induced by the output-based
policy is translated into the adjustment of other inputs.

3.4.4 Decomposing Long-Term Adjustments
Two components contribute to the difference between the short- and long-term
elasticities: the adjustment of land allocation and the adjustment of capital. We are
especially interested in the adjustment of land allocation since it represents the vehicle
through which price policies affect fertilizer application at the extensive margin. While
the (small) magnitude of these effects can be explained by a small effect of each of these
components, it could also be the result of an offsetting effect. We analyze each
component to ascertain whether there are any differential effects on fertilizer application
via either of these channels. Tables 4 and 5 report the estimates of the components of the
long-term elasticity separately.
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Table 3.3 shows that less land is used for planting corn when the corn price is lower
or when the fertilizer price is higher. Policies directed towards the prices of corn and
fertilizer influence land allocation adjustments from corn to soybeans, which further
decreases fertilizer application. Table 3.4 shows that a 1 percent decrease in the corn
price and a 1 percent increase in the fertilizer price cause a 0.006 percent and 0.007
percent decrease in fertilizer application respectively by decreasing the land allocated to
corn. Hence, the magnitude of this extensive margin effect is trivial compared to the
intensive margin effects, and the effects of output- and input-based policies are similar in
magnitude (at least in terms of the point estimate).

Table 3.4: Estimates of the Long-Term Price Elasticity from Adjustment in Land
Allocation

Quantity

Corn
Fertilizer
Labor

Corn
-0.008***
(0.001)
0.006**
(0.003)
0.000
(0.002)

Fertilizer
0.008***
(0.002)
-0.007**
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.002)

Price
Labor
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)

Land
0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.000)

Machinery
-0.005***
(0.002)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.000
(0.001)

All estimated elasticities are constructed using parameter estimates shown in Table D.1 from the fixed
effects seemingly unrelated regression. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, and ***, **,
* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

A change in either the price of corn or the price of fertilizer also stimulates
adjustment of capital, which in turn affects fertilizer use. Table 3.5 shows that the crossprice elasticity of fertilizer application with respect to the corn price related to an
adjustment in capital is not significant. The own-price elasticity of fertilizer related to an
adjustment in capital is significant, but its magnitude is still small, only -0.009, which
indicates that its impact on the reduction of fertilizer application is weak.
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3.4.5 Temporal Adjustment Rates of Quasi-Fixed Inputs
Another important dimension to analyze is the time it takes for adjustments to fully
take place. Table 3.6 contains estimates of the adjustment rates of the quasi-fixed inputs.
As Equation (3.8) indicates, the adjustment rate is the proportion of the total desired
adjustment (i.e., adjustment to the optimal level of quasi-fixed inputs) that unravels
within a year. Results indicate that the adjustment rate of corn land is -1.17, which means
that the entire adjustment in land allocation to the optimal level can be completed in one
year; further, this estimate indicates slight over-adjustment as the (absolute) value is
greater than 1.

Table 3.5: Estimates of the Long-Term Price Elasticity from Adjustment in Capital

Quantity

Corn
Fertilizer
Labor

Corn
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.004
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.002)

Fertilizer
-0.004*
(0.002)
-0.009*
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.003)

Price
Labor
-0.001*
(0.000)
-0.002*
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.000)

Land
-0.002*
(0.001)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.001)

Machinery
0.021***
(0.008)
0.044***
(0.016)
0.011
(0.012)

All estimated elasticities are constructed using parameter estimates shown in Table D.1 from the fixed
effects seemingly unrelated regression. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, and ***, **,
* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

This rate of adjustment in land allocation may appear to be rapid compared to the
findings of other studies, which usually indicate multiple years of dynamic adjustment
(Vasavada and Chambers 1986; Lansink and Stefanou 1997). Yet, in the Wabash River
Watershed the two main crops – corn and soybeans – are traditionally grown in rotation,
making it easy for farmers to switch production between corn and soybeans. This case is
different from that considered in other studies; for example, rootcrops and other outputs
in Lansink and Stefanou (1997). Furthermore, since our data are county level data, while
the adjustment of land allocation could be sluggish for a certain farmer due to reasons
such as rotational requirements or contractual restrictions, county-wide adjustments are
more flexible because the adjustment only requires some farmers to re-allocate land.
When the price of corn or fertilizer changes, the county may achieve the new optimal
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level quickly once the most responsive farmers adjust their production. The rapid rate of
adjustment in land allocation indicates that the extensive margin effects of price policies
take place quickly, and so the time required for desirable behavioral changes at a policyrelevant level of aggregation is not a concern.

Table 3.6: Estimated Rates of Adjustment for Quasi-Fixed Factors

Corn land
Capital

Corn land
-1.17***
(0.06)
0.02
(0.01)

Capital
0.07
(0.11)
0.13***
(0.03)

All estimated elasticities are constructed using parameter estimates shown in Table D.1 from the fixed
effects seemingly unrelated regression. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method, and ***, **,
* indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.

Table 3.6 shows that in contrast to land allocation the adjustment in capital stock is
slow. Only about 13 percent of the total desired adjustment is completed in a year, so it
requires about 8 years for capital to adjust to its optimal level after a policy-driven shock.
This estimate is similar to those found by Chang and Stefanou (1988) and Lansink and
Stefanou (1997). However, given that the capital adjustment component in the long-term
elasticity of fertilizer is small (i.e., the evolution of capital does not significantly
influence the evolution of fertilizer application as revealed by our results), this slow rate
of capital adjustment does not substantially impact the time-frame for the realization of
the policy goals.
It is important to point out that the rapid adjustment of land allocation and the small
difference between the short-term and long-term elasticities indicates that, in our study
area, the landscape displays a high speed of adjustment to input- and output-based
policies. Therefore input- and output-based instruments are on equal footing, with no
instrument prevailing over the other in terms of the time elapsed between implementation
and effect. We bear in mind that our study is conducted at a county-level in an area in
which corn and soybeans are grown on rotation; both factors explain, in part, this rapid
adjustment, and also imply that our findings do not necessarily translate into other
environments characterized by different crops or different units of analysis. Hence, our
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results should not be taken as general indication that speed of adjustment is not relevant
for policy assessments.

3.5 Conclusions
Economists often advocate input-based and output-based economic policies to
reduce water pollution from fertilizer use. Input-based economic incentives consist of
taxing the use of fertilizer or subsidizing a reduction in fertilizer application. Outputbased incentives consist of taxing fertilizer-intensive crops (e.g., corn) or subsidizing
fertilizer-saving crops (e.g., soybeans). Both types of policies affect fertilizer use by
influencing the fertilizer application rate directly in the short-term and/or indirectly
through the adjustment of quasi-fixed inputs (i.e., land re-allocation) in the long-term.
Though the direct effect occurs in a single year, the indirect effect may require more time
if quasi-fixed factors adjust slowly. For policymakers, both the monetary cost and speed
of effectiveness are important policy considerations. Hence, a complete assessment of the
relative cost-effectiveness of these two types of policies considers both the monetary cost
and the speed of adjustment.
Consistent with theory and past research, we find that both input- and output-based
policies lead to a significant reduction in fertilizer application, but input-based policies
are more cost-effective than output-based policies. In terms of the speed at which they
take effect, the two types of policies are similar to each other; in particular, both types of
policies take effect rapidly – i.e., from one year to the next. Hence, adjustment in land
allocation is not time costly, implying that policies that operate through this channel are
not time costly either. One explanation for our result is that, since we focus on the Corn
Belt where corn and soybean are only two main crops, land allocation adjustments
between corn and soybeans are relatively easy for farmers who typically grow these crops
on rotation. We also find that much of the total effect of these policies occurs through
changes at the intensive margin (i.e., the reduction in the application rate of fertilizer),
while the effect through the extensive margin (i.e., the effects from adjustments of land
allocation from corn to soybeans) is small.
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Three limits of this study should be mentioned. First, county-level fertilizer
application data is not available; instead, we use county level fertilizer sales data. We
maintain that, at least in our study area, fertilizer sales data is a good proxy for
application data; yet, there is likely some error in measurement. Second, because the
temporal dimension in our data is limited because of fertilizer data availability, our
analysis assumes static expectation of prices which amounts to a restriction that farmers
do not fully consider price uncertainty. Future analysis may relax this assumption. Third,
this study ignores the possibility that some farmers may respond to adverse
environmental-climate conditions by increasing fertilizer application. Incorporating riskaversion as a factor underlying fertilizer application may be worthwhile.
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CHAPTER 4 HYBRIDS AND HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR
MILES TRAVELED AND GASOLINE CONSUMPTION

4.1 Introduction
The United States government has spent millions of dollars since 2006 encouraging
household consumers to purchase fuel efficient vehicles, largely in response to oil price
shocks and rising GHG emissions from fossil fuel dependent transportation since 1990
(EPA 2015). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided a substantial income tax credit for
gasoline-electric hybrids, and over the 2000's decade, gasoline-electric hybrids became
nearly synonymous with high fuel efficiency – e.g., the Toyota Prius or Honda Civic
hybrid. Calculations by Sallee (2011), for instance, indicate that the 2007 third quarter
cost of these incentives was nearly 800 million dollars. More recently, the Energy
Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 provides similar tax credit incentives for plug-in
electric vehicles, clearly indicating a continued policy focus on increasing the
proliferation of alternative-fuel vehicles.8
The purpose of these policies is twofold. At a household level, the goal is to reduce
gasoline consumption by encouraging households to drive hybrids. At a market level, the
proponents of these policies hope to stimulate widespread adoption of hybrids that may
otherwise take a relatively long period of time to gain traction in the market; the spread of
hybrids could lead to a higher level of fuel saving in the future. It is important to
understand whether these policies can be successful in both aspects – in reducing
gasoline consumption for households that choose to buy hybrids, and in jump-starting the
hybrid car market. Yet, as described by Allcott and Mullainathan (2010), a critical,
though sometimes overlooked, aspect of this policy discussion regards the interaction
8

More information on the Plug-In Electric Drive Vehicle Credit can be found at
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Plug-In-Electric-Vehicle-Credit-IRC-30-and-IRC-30D (accessed June 11,
2015).
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between behavioral drivers of demand – e.g., biocentrism, egoism, guilt, and social status
– and these two policy outcomes. Reliable policy assessment requires the counterfactual;
these non-trivial, and largely unobservable, behavioral factors make the counterfactual
elusive. Our interest in this paper is to disentangle several behavioral drivers of hybrid
vehicle demand, in order to assess the extent to which certain behavioral motives explain
hybrid ownership and driving habits, and to generate insight into the efficacy of these
incentive-type policies.
We bear in mind the following points in our assessment of the impact of hybrid
ownership on fuel savings. First, for the proliferation of hybrid ownership to lead to
(large) reductions in fuel consumption, it should be the case that a household that owns a
hybrid will not increase its driving miles to the extent that the fuel savings from driving
the hybrid are substantially offset; i.e., there is no (substantial) rebound effect. Otherwise,
the proliferation of hybrid vehicles would not lead to the expected reduction in fuel
consumption. Second, we focus on both individual and social incentives (pressure) that
correlate with hybrid ownership and driving habits. If hybrid ownership was random
throughout the population, and it could be observed that the average hybrid driver
consumes less gasoline relative to the average non-hybrid driver, a policy designed to
encourage hybrid ownership across a larger segment of the population would likely
generate a significant reduction in gasoline consumption. Yet, hybrid ownership is not
random, and the counterfactual in terms of driving habits for hybrid owners is not known.
For example, if a household that purchases a hybrid has biocentric preferences, fuel
savings may stem primarily from these preferences and not hybrid ownership per se. This
situation would imply that continued proliferation of hybrid vehicles may quickly lead
only to marginal fuel savings at best, as the preferences of marginal consumers became
less biocentric.9 Given the complexity of these demand drivers, our starting point is the
recent theoretical and empirical work linking behavioral and environmental economics
(Kotchen and Moore 2007, Allcott and Mullainathan 2010, Allcott 2011, Jacobsen et al.
2012, Sexton and Sexton 2014, Delgado and Khanna 2015, Delgado et al. 2015), which
9

Assume, for the sake of argument, that consumer preferences are uniformly distributed over a continuous
range of biocentrism, such that the endpoints represent zero and complete biocentrism. Biocentrism
indicates the extent that households care about the environment.
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motivates our perspective that, not only is the choice to buy a hybrid not random, it
depends on factors that also affect the driving behavior of households. A major
contribution of this paper is developing estimates that allow us to disentangle some of
these complex behavioral demand issues, and gain insight into the relationship between
hybrid vehicles and fuel consumption.
The socially-oriented behavioral motives also bear important implications for the
broader goal of trying to stimulate widespread proliferation of hybrid vehicles in the
consumer market. This may generally boil down to social status effects – the desire to
maintain one's relative standing among peers, or to adhere to (local) biocentric social
norms. Recent research (Narayanan and Nair 2013, Sexton and Sexton 2014, Delgado et
al. 2015) has identified these social effects to be an important and statistically significant
factor underlying part of the proliferation of the highly visible Toyota Prius. Unlike nonsocial behavioral factors, the social factors bear important implications for the efficacy of
a policy that tries to jump-start the consumer market. On the one hand, the social
incentives can increase the speed at which such policies stimulate markets – the policy
provides a first incentive, but social incentives quickly kick in to augment the policy. The
result may be a rapid proliferation of hybrid vehicles. Yet, on the other hand, the same
social incentive creates a potential rebound effect – in order to capitalize on the social
value of buying the hybrid, a household has an incentive to drive the hybrid more. The
result is the potential to undo, to an unknown extent, the benefits of hybrid vehicle
proliferation. We follow previous research and focus exclusively on the popular Toyota
Prius to assess the extent to which this socially-driven rebound effect exists, as this focus
provides the most plausible means of identifying this social-status driven rebound effect.
We use a matching approach to identify and estimate the average treatment effect of
hybrid ownership on treated (i.e., hybrid owning) households. The fact that some factors
affect both the household decision to adopt a hybrid and its driving behavior leads to
selection bias. This selection may stem from some factors that are easily observed. For
instance, since hybrid vehicles are more expensive than conventional-engine counterparts,
we expect that individuals with higher income are more likely to drive a hybrid. Standard
matching methods constitute a robust means of eliminating bias stemming from these
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observable effects. Yet, the behavioral demand discussion implies that there are largely
unobservable factors, which include personal factors (biocentrism, egoism, guilt, or costsaving)

as

well

as

social

factors

(social

status

or

social

environmental

awareness/pressure). These factors are important because they influence both hybrid
ownership as well as driving habits; these individuals would likely consume less gasoline
in the counterfactual scenario in which they did not own a hybrid. To deal with the
selection coming from these factors that are difficult to observe, we develop indicators to
measure them indirectly. We require that our matching procedure match exactly on
geographic location to ensure that the hybrid and non-hybrid matched pairs face the same
social incentives for hybrid adoption. In addition, we include the average MPG rating of
all other vehicles in the household in our nearest-neighbor covariate matching set, so as
to ensure that matched households have similar underlying preferences for cost saving
and environmental preservation. We describe these details more fully in Section 4.4.
We find that, on average, a hybrid household drives more miles per year than the
average non-hybrid household. However, this rebound effect is only about 3 percent of
the total annual miles traveled, and is insufficient to offset the fuel savings due to the
higher fuel efficiency of the gasoline-electric hybrid engine. Therefore, there is a
substantial fuel saving generated by hybrid adoption. We do not find evidence that the
miles traveled for Prius households are significantly different from non-Prius hybrid
households, which indicates that there is not a statistically identifiable social-status driven
rebound effect associated with the adoption of the Prius.

4.2 Summary of Related Research

4.2.1 Factors that Influence Hybrid Vehicle Adoption
Recent work has emphasized the importance of behavioral, social, and financial
incentives underlying hybrid vehicle adoption. While there certainly may be other factors
that correlate with hybrid vehicle adoption, such as income, education, or age (Ozaki and
Sevastyanova 2011, Heutel and Muehlegger 2014), such correlates are readily observed
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and straightforward to control for econometrically. Hence, our discussion focuses on
more complex incentives.
Fuel Efficiency

Hybrid vehicles are designed to be more fuel efficient than

comparable conventional engine vehicles, leading to a reduction in fuel costs. Research
(Heffner 2005, Klein 2007) has found that improved gas mileage is a significant factor
underlying hybrid adoption, and may be especially important for a household that
depends greatly on personal vehicle travel; for instance, a relatively long commute,
and/or no easy access to public transportation.
Personal Preference for Environmental Quality There is a growing consensus
that a substantial number of consumers value environmental quality, for reasons not
limited to altruism, egoism, guilt, or off-setting; see, for example, Kotchen (2005, 2006,
2009), Kotchen and Moore (2007), and Jacobsen et al. (2012). Delgado and Khanna
(2015) describe these motives from a general theoretical framework. The relevant insight
from these papers is a recognition that consumer preferences for environmentally friendly
products – which includes hybrid vehicles – are significant drivers of such consumer
demand (Kahn 2007), and that these preferences are largely unobservable and difficult to
disentangle (Delgado et al. 2015). Nevertheless, these preferences render hybrid
ownership non-random in a population of consumers, and without careful consideration,
these differences might lead to substantial bias in treatment parameter estimates.
Openness to New Technology

Turrentine and Kurani (2007) and Ozaki and

Sevastyanova (2011) find evidence that consumers who adopt hybrid vehicles are those
who enjoy pioneering new technology. This characteristic is less frequently discussed as
a factor underlying hybrid vehicle adoption; yet, the gasoline-electric hybrid is not a
trivial evolution in personal automobiles and is a symbol of new technology and bears
substantial uncertainty in terms of reliability and performance.
Rising Gasoline Prices Gasoline prices largely rose over the 2000s decade, and the
impact of rising gasoline prices on hybrid adoption has been repeatedly confirmed.
Rising gasoline prices have led to an increase in the hybrid vehicle market share in both
the United States (Diamond 2009, Beresteanu and Li 2011) and the United Kingdom
(Ozaki and Sevastyanova 2011).
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Hybrid Vehicle Diffusion Another motive underlying hybrid vehicle adoption that
is closely linked to social and behavioral incentives, as well as government program
incentives, is hybrid vehicle diffusion into the consumer automobile market. As hybrid
vehicles become more commonplace, consumers feel more confident that hybrid
technology is reliable and grow more comfortable with the idea of driving a hybrid
vehicle. Narayanan and Nair (2013) find a positive and significant effect of past hybrid
vehicle adoption on current hybrid vehicle adoption for the Toyota Prius. Heutel and
Muehlegger (2014) study the impact of a cumulative hybrid vehicle penetration rate for
the Toyota Prius and Honda Insight on hybrid vehicle sales, and find a positive impact for
the Prius and a negative impact for the Insight; hybrid vehicle diffusion depends on the
perceived quality of the new technology. Mau et al. (2008) and Axsen et al. (2009) report
similar findings.
Social Norms There is a growing consensus that social factors may be a significant
motive behind hybrid vehicle adoption. Hybrid owners may earn positive social status in
an environment in which there are social norms that include valuation of environmental
amenities. Others may feel social pressure to conform to these social norms. Ozaki and
Sevastyanova (2011) find that social orientation, the willingness to comply with social
norms, and peer effects are important factors motivating purchase of a Toyota Prius in the
United Kingdom. Kahn (2007) finds that people living in a more environmental friendly
community are more likely to adopt a hybrid. Research has generated compelling
evidence that consumers use hybrid vehicles (particularly the Toyota Prius) as a tool to
signal their social awareness, responsibility, and concern for others (Heffner et al. 2005,
Heffner et al. 2007, Axsen et al. 2009, Sexton and Sexton 2014, Delgado et al. 2015).
Government Sponsored Financial Incentives As mentioned in the introduction,
the federal government (and some state governments) have spent large sums of money
encouraging household consumers to invest in hybrid vehicles. 10 The general belief is
that these incentives are largely effective, though empirical results are not unanimous.
Chandra et al. (2010), Ozaki and Sevastyanova (2011), Beresteanu and Li (2011), and
Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) find evidence that government incentives (such as tax
10

Borenstein and Davis (2015) review a variety of federal government incentives designed to encourage
environmentally friendly behavior in a variety of ways, one of which is hybrid vehicle adoption.
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incentives or traffic policies) significantly impact hybrid adoption, though the impact
may be smaller than that of a modest increase in gasoline prices (Beresteanu and Li 2011)
or may vary by type and size of the incentive (Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011).
Identification of the effect of these incentives is difficult given that these incentives are
collinear with time trends, are aggregate across a dataset of household individuals, and
because the effects may be confounded by consumer self-selection into the hybrid market
leading to free-riding on these policies (Chandra et al. 2010). Diamond (2009) does not
find that financial policy incentives impact hybrid adoption.

4.2.2 Factors that Influence Household Driving Habits
Personal Preferences and Social Norms The same individual/household and social
behavioral factors that influence the decision to adopt a hybrid vehicle may also influence
the annual miles traveled by each household. Households that have a stronger motivation
to drive a hybrid may have a stronger motivation to drive more or less. For example,
while a household that purchases a hybrid because of a long commute tends to drive more
than others, a household that purchases a hybrid to reduce travel costs or minimize its
environmental footprint may drive less. Particularly, a household motivated to drive a
hybrid for social status concerns may have an incentive to drive more in order to
capitalize on the social value of the hybrid. Indeed, an interesting aspect that we explore
in this paper, is whether social factors also create an incentive to increase driving miles.
We describe this in more detail later.

4.2.3 The Rebound Effect
The adoption of energy efficient technology raises concern of a rebound effect,
which means that consumers respond to the increased efficiency, in part, by increasing
usage (Chan and Gillingham 2015). The proliferation of hybrid vehicles that achieve
significantly higher miles per gallon raises concern that hybrid owners may drive more in
response to the increased fuel efficiency, relative to the counterfactual situation in which
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the same household does not own a hybrid. This concern is not without merit, and
researchers have been trying to address this issue theoretically and empirically.
Much of the literature addressing the rebound effect focuses on general
improvements in fuel efficiency, and not hybrid adoption specifically. Further, much of
this research was conducted prior to 2005. Some of these earlier studies use aggregated
macro data and estimate rebound effects ranging from 5 percent to 31 percent (Greene
1992; Jones 1993; Haughton and Sarkar 1996). Others use micro data and find
substantially varying rebound effects. Goldberg (1998) and Greene et al. (1999) estimate
the rebound effect to be 20 percent and 23 percent, respectively; the lowest rebound
effect is found by Pickrell and Schimek (1999) to be 4 percent; the highest is found by
West (2004) to be 87 percent.
More recently, Small and Van Dender (2007) measure the rebound effect of travel
distance from an increase in fuel efficiency at the state level in the United States from
1966-2001 and 1997-2001. They estimate short term rebound effects of 4.5 percent
(1966-2001) and 2.2 percent (1997-2001), and long term rebound effects of 22.2 percent
(1966-2001) and 10.7 percent (1997-2001). Hymel et al. (2010) extend the research
period to 1966-2004 and find the rebound effects are 4.7 percent and 24.1 percent in the
short term and long term, respectively. Using Canadian data, Barla et al. (2009) estimate
a short term rebound effect of 8 percent and a long term rebound effect of 20 percent.
Wang et al. (2012) estimate the rebound effect to be as high as 96 percent in urban China.
However, one caveat of these studies is that they measure the response of travel
distance to the improvement of fuel efficiency by measuring the response of travel
distance to a decrease in fuel cost. Specifically, they estimate the rebound effect of travel
distance with regard to fuel efficiency by calculating the elasticity of travel distance to a
change in fuel cost (per mile). The assumption behind this method is that consumers
respond to an improvement in fuel efficiency and to a decrease in fuel price in exactly
same way. However, this assumption may not be valid because consumers usually
respond less to an increase in fuel efficiency than a decrease in fuel price (Gillingham
2011). With U.S. national time series data, Greene (2012) rejects the null hypothesis that
the elasticities of vehicle travel with respect to fuel prices and fuel efficiency are equal
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and opposite in sign, and while consumers’ response to fuel price is significant, their
response in travel distance to fuel economy is not. Therefore, a rebound effect measured
by the elasticity of travel distance with regard to fuel cost may be overestimated.
Greene (2012) confirms the difference in the rebound effect of travel distance to fuel
economy and fuel cost and separates them to estimate the pure rebound effect of fuel
economy. However, he still calculates the elasticity of travel distance to a change in fuel
economy, and measures the rebound effect at a macro level. Hence, there are two main
differences between our study and Greene (2012). First, we pursue a new method,
covariate matching, to directly compare the driving distances of households that are same
to each other at all characteristics except the fuel efficiency of the vehicle they drive.
Through matching households facing the same fuel price, we separate the effect of fuel
efficiency from the effect of fuel price. Second, our study is conducted at the household
level, which provides a micro level rebound effect (it is not clear the extent to which
aggregation to a macro level affects estimates of the rebound effect.)
Another difference between our work and previous studies is that we focus on the
rebound effect of an improvement in fuel efficiency from a special type of vehicles,
hybrid vehicles, instead of a general improvement in fuel efficiency. Some hybrid
vehicles are different from general higher fuel efficiency vehicles because their
distinctive look endows them with a special value, a social signaling value, which signals
social norms and affects the social status of drivers. The special social signaling value
may induce an additional rebound effect, which may differentiate the rebound effect of
hybrid adoption from the rebound effect of a general improvement in fuel efficiency.
As far as we know, there are only a few studies that focus on hybrid adoption
specifically to measure the rebound effect. de Haan et al. (2006) and de Haan et al. (2007)
use a sample of Toyota Prius buyers in Switzerland to investigate whether households
switch to the hybrid from a smaller vehicle, and whether vehicle ownership might
increase. They do not find evidence to suggest that either of these two rebound effects are
significant. Given limitations in their data, they do not investigate whether Prius buyers
drive more than non-hybrid owners; this latter effect, however, is more likely according
to the literature.
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4.2.4 Social Status Driven Rebound Effect
One characteristic of hybrid vehicles is higher fuel efficiency, which may induce a
rebound effect of hybrid ownership similar to the rebound effect from a general
improvement of fuel efficiency.

Some hybrid vehicles, however, have another

characteristic: they are instantly recognizable as being fuel-efficient hybrids. This leads to
a new kind of rebound effect, which is distinct from a general improvement in fuel
efficiency. Because (some) hybrid vehicles are recognizable, the driver is able to signal
his/her social awareness, responsibility, and concern for others (Heffner et al. 2005,
Heffner et al. 2007, Axsen et al. 2009, Sexton and Sexton 2014, Delgado et al. 2015).
This social signal value may motivate the drivers of these hybrids to drive more in order
to send signals; this leads to a special rebound effect, a social status driven rebound effect.
Identifying the existence of this status signaling rebound effect is important for
understanding whether hybrid adoption leads to same degree of fuel saving as a general
improvement of fuel efficiency.
However, isolating the social status driven rebound effect is not simple since any
change in travel distance coming from hybrid adoption could be the combination of the
two rebound effects. Our strategy is to explore the existence of the social status driven
rebound effect through comparison of household annual miles traveled for those that
drive the Toyota Prius with those that drive other hybrid vehicles. This strategy arises
from the fact that the physical look of most hybrid vehicles is not distinct from nonhybrid counterpart vehicles. The Toyota Prius, on the other hand, does not have a nonhybrid counterpart, and further was designed to be visually distinct from all other
vehicles available during the 2000s decade. That is, while most hybrid vehicles can only
be identified from their non-hybrid counterparts by the hybrid label on the rear of the car,
the Prius is instantly recognizable. As is clear from the literature, households are willing
to pay for the symbolic benefit of the Toyota Prius in order to signal their environmental
status. Several studies quantify the value of this status signal: Sexton and Sexton (2014)
calculate this status value as being between $420 and $4,200, and Delgado et al. (2015)
estimate it to be around $587.

75
Given the unique signaling value of the Toyota Prius, if there exists a social status
rebound effect driven by this signaling value, we expect to find it when we compare the
adoption of the Prius to the adoption of other hybrid vehicles. Conversely, if we cannot
find a significant social status driven rebound effect from Prius adoption compared to
regular hybrid adoption, we are able to conclude that there is no significant social status
rebound effect associated with hybrid adoption that is driven by the signaling value.

4.3 Reduced Form Evidence
Before developing our empirical model, we begin with a brief reduced form analysis
to describe the patterns in our data. Understanding these patterns is important for later
assessment of the ability of our preferred matching approach to eliminating any covariate
imbalance between hybrid and non-hybrid households.
Factors That Correlate With Hybrid Ownership We first explore factors that
correlate with hybrid ownership via probit regression of a hybrid ownership indicator on
household demographics, the availability of government (federal and state) incentives,
local (city-level) gasoline prices, geographic controls, and year fixed effects. The data is
described in detail in Section 4.5; we report these results in Table 4.1.
We find that many common stereotypes hold in our data: hybrid owners tend to have
relatively high income, have a graduate education, are frequent internet users, and have
fewer family members. We find that households that have higher MPG ratings on other
vehicles in the household are also more likely to own a hybrid, which suggests
consistency in fuel efficiency and environmental preferences within the household.
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Table 4.1: Probit Estimates of the Propensity Score of Hybrid/Prius Ownership
Constant
Middle Income
High Income
High School Degree
Associate’s Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Degree
No. of Vehicles
Household Size
Average Age
Average Age Squared
Share of Female Drivers
Internet Usage
Average Vehicle MPG
Commute Distance
Federal Incentive
State Incentive
HOV Lane Access
Gas Price
Urban
Mid-Size MSA
Small MSA
Not in MSA
2002 Indicator
2003 Indicator
2004 Indicator
2005 Indicator
2006 Indicator
2007 Indicator
2008 Indicator
2009 Indicator
Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Range of support

Hybrid Adoption
−4.935*** (0.444)
0.069 (0.043)
0.297*** (0.045)
−0.230 (0.209)
0.007 (0.204)
0.118 (0.204)
0.365* (0.204)
0.004 (0.022)
−0.067*** (0.016)
0.020*** (0.008)
−0.0002** (0.0001)
−0.079 (0.062)
0.243*** (0.053)
0.030*** (0.003)
0.0001 (0.001)
0.091** (0.046)
−0.009 (0.033)
−0.059* (0.031)
0.136*** (0.042)
0.012 (0.032)
−0.159*** (0.037)
−0.187*** (0.039)
−0.234*** (0.049)
0.914*** (0.324)
0.985*** (0.320)
1.168*** (0.317)
1.288*** (0.316)
1.162*** (0.335)
1.394*** (0.320)
1.391*** (0.322)
1.144*** (0.374)
36,780
-5,017.169
10,096.338
[0.000,0.458]

Prius Adoption
−1.372 (1.094)
−0.047 (0.133)
−0.232* (0.136)
0.347 (0.796)
0.564 (0.775)
0.656 (0.773)
0.872 (0.772)
0.107* (0.060)
0.015 (0.046)
−0.020 (0.022)
0.0003 (0.0002)
0.134 (0.174)
0.322* (0.169)
0.027*** (0.006)
−0.0001 (0.002)
−0.077 (0.126)
0.076 (0.078)
0.030 (0.086)
0.217* (0.112)
−0.139 (0.092)
−0.153 (0.098)
−0.143 (0.106)
0.051 (0.138)
−0.575* (0.341)
−0.029 (0.312)
−0.301 (0.308)
−0.571 (0.434)
−0.645* (0.333)
−0.737** (0.349)
−6.058 (87.334)
1,285
-826.755
1,713.511
[0.000,0.953]

Middle income is defined as income between $50,000 and $100,000 per year, and high income is defined
as annual household income above $100,000. The range of support at the bottom of the table indicates the
range of support of the estimated propensity score for each model. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent level is denoted with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively. In the Prius adoption model, both 2001 and 2002
year indicators are used as the base category because there are too few households in the data that
purchased a Prius in 2001.
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Table 4.2: OLS Estimates of Annual Miles Traveled for Hybrid/Prius Adoption
Hybrid

Prius

Constant

1,013.50 (6,218.80)

3,425.52 (35,493.17)

Hybrid/Prius Adoption

914.28*** (341.55)

−800.94 (665.76)

Middle Income

1,284.93*** (168.94)

544.83 (1,167.21)

High Income

2,897.99*** (196.02)

2,591.68** (1,194.54)

High School Degree

−98.15 (630.64)

6,225.19 (5,910.51)

Associate’s Degree

932.56 (626.03)

9,140.24 (5,717.48)

Bachelor’s Degree

720.07 (630.34)

8,751.38 (5,704.42)

Graduate Degree

796.81 (633.46)

9,200.45 (5,700.19)

No. of Vehicles

7,305.19*** (101.13)

8,288.42*** (524.99)

Household Size

1,304.51*** (70.25)

822.43** (409.35)

185.28*** (33.32)

180.98 (193.36)

Average Age Squared

−3.12*** (0.31)

−2.92 (1.78)

Share of Female Drivers

42.50 (273.07)

−310.17 (1,527.74)

954.46*** (188.98)

−1,109.45 (1,479.80)

Average Vehicle MPG

−30.79** (14.02)

−0.46 (44.96)

Commute Distance

164.16*** (3.94)

190.82*** (19.02)

Gas Price

−1,054.90 (1,588.37)

−7,839.47 (9,023.96)

Urban

−1,826.30*** (148.24)

−1,567.92* (817.35)

608.97*** (224.62)

787.50 (996.85)

Small MSA

1,155.14*** (224.77)

435.04 (1,078.01)

Not in MSA

2,742.35*** (251.10)

3,227.70** (1,308.28)

Observations

36,780

1,285

Yes

Yes

0.33

0.43

0.34

0.40

Residual Std. Error

11,846.46

11,184.06

F Statistic

265.99***

14.48***

Average Age

Internet Usage

Mid-Size MSA

State Fixed Effect
2

R

2

Adjusted R

Middle income is defined as income between $50,000 and $100,000 per year, and high income is defined
as annual household income above $100,000. Statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level is
denoted with ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
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Table 4.1 shows that federal tax incentives (see Appendix F for details) are
positively correlated with hybrid ownership (Sallee 2011). We do not find that state level
incentives are significant, and we find that HOV lane privileges are negatively related to
hybrid ownership. 11 We also find that gasoline prices are positively correlated with
hybrid adoption, as is MSA city size. Finally, our time dummies reveal an increasing
trend in hybrid adoption over time.
In the last column in Table 4.1 we restrict the sample to hybrid owning households,
and look for differences between Prius owning households and non-Prius hybrid
households. The table reveals that there are few significant differences between Prius
households and non-Prius hybrid households. We see that Prius households are less likely
to be in the highest income category, have more vehicles, are frequent internet users, and
average a higher MPG rating on other vehicles in the household. We suspect that the
income effect comes from the presence of luxury hybrids in the dataset: the highest
income hybrid consumers are more likely to buy a Toyota Camry hybrid than a Prius.
Factors That Correlate with Annual Miles Traveled In Table 4.2 we report
reduced form least squares estimates from the regression of annual miles traveled on the
hybrid ownership indicator and control variables. We find that the hybrid indicator is
positive and statistically significant, which indicates that hybrid ownership correlates
positively with annual miles traveled. The point estimate implies that hybrid owning
households, all else constant, drive nearly 915 miles more per year compared to nonhybrid households. The last column in Table 4.2 reveals that there is not a significant
difference in annual miles traveled between Prius households and non-Prius hybrid
households.
Many other control variables in the hybrid adoption model are significant, and take
the expected sign. We see that an increase in income correlates with an increase in annual
miles traveled, and that annual miles traveled is increasing with age, though at a
decreasing rate. Other point estimates indicate that households in the largest MSAs (the

11

It is likely that certain state level policies are endogenous to hybrid ownership, which leads to a negative
correlation between HOV lane access and hybrid ownership. For example, a state with lower adoption rate
of hybrid vehicles may have stronger motivation to provide HOV lane access to hybrids, in order to
proliferate hybrid adoption in the state.
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base group) average fewer driving miles per year, and households with higher MPG
ratings on other vehicles drive fewer miles per year.
As in the probit adoption models, we do not find much significant difference
between Prius households and non-Prius hybrid households in terms of annual miles
traveled. In this model, we find that annual miles traveled is increasing in income, the
number of vehicles, household size, and the length of commute.
The reduced form least squares estimates provide basic information on variables
related to hybrid/Prius adoption and annual miles traveled of households. However, our
analysis does not entirely rely on these since the reduced forms are limited by the
assumed functional form and are not able to incorporate all critical influencing factors
(e.g., local social pressure, certain characteristics of vehicles) into the model.

4.4 Model, Identification, and Estimation

4.4.1 Hybrid Rebound Effects
We are interested in understanding the relationship between household ownership of
a gasoline-electric hybrid vehicle and annual vehicle miles traveled.
Proposition 1

Ownership of a gasoline-electric hybrid vehicle leads to an increase

in the number of household vehicle miles traveled in a year.
In line with theoretical insight (Chan and Gillingham 2015), we expect that owners
of gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles respond to the increase in fuel efficiency, in part, by
increasing annual vehicle miles traveled. Yet, despite this intuition, it is not known to
what extent hybrid owning households might increase annual miles traveled, especially
when we consider that the adoption of a hybrid may induce a different rebound effect
compared to general improvement of fuel efficiency. From understanding the potential
for a rebound effect, we can understand the extent to which potential fuel savings from
hybrid vehicle adoption may be eroded via behavioral response.
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Proposition 2

There exists a social-status driven rebound effect associated with

the Toyota Prius.
We postulate that a household that owns a Toyota Prius has an incentive to increase
its driving in order to fully capture the social-status benefits afforded by the Prius.
Research has shown that the Toyota Prius signals environmental social status (Sexton and
Sexton 2014, Delgado et al. 2015), and we conjecture that the signaling ability of the
Prius is fully realized by maximum driving exposure. This social-status rebound effect
has not yet been given direct attention (e.g., status effects are excluded by Chan and
Gillingham 2015, p. 141). We believe in the context of hybrid cars this effect may be
important. Further, we can understand the degree to which social status effects that serve
to increase the proliferation of hybrid ownership may also constitute a hindrance to the
efficacy of the incentive policies.

4.4.2 Empirical Framework
We are interested in two potential outcomes:
𝑌1𝑖 = 𝜇1 (𝑋𝑖 ) + 𝑈1𝑖
𝑌0𝑖 = 𝜇0 (𝑋𝑖 ) + 𝑈0𝑖

(4.1)

in which 𝑌𝑗𝑖 is the total annual vehicle miles traveled by household 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛 in
vehicle state 𝑗 = 0, 1 for which 𝑗 = 1 denotes hybrid ownership (treatment), 𝑋𝑖 is a 𝑘dimensioned vector of observable household-specific factors that influence gasoline
consumption, 𝜇𝑗 (𝑋𝑖 ): ℝ𝑘 → ℝ is the conditional mean of 𝑌𝑗𝑖 given 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑈𝑗𝑖 is an error
term that captures unobservable factors that influence miles traveled. We focus on miles
traveled as the outcome, because given fuel efficiency ratings it is straightforward to
calculate whether hybrid households consume less gasoline compared to non-hybrid
households. This model describes two possible states from which the household chooses
– hybrid or non-hybrid – and allows the household to select into a state based on 𝑋𝑖 .
Given (4.1), define 𝛥𝑖 = 𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖 to be the effect on miles traveled from driving a
hybrid – the treatment effect for household 𝑖 . From this design, different treatment
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parameters can be defined; typically, researchers are interested in mean effects. Our
interest here is on the mean effect of treatment on treated households:
𝐸[∆𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1]

(4.2)

where 𝐻𝑖 is a binary indicator for whether or not the household owns a hybrid. That is,
we are interested in the average effect of driving a hybrid vehicle on miles traveled for
households that own a hybrid. We choose this parameter for the following reason. It is
known that identification of the average effect of treatment on any randomly selected
household; 𝐸[∆𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 ] requires a full support condition of the propensity score (e.g.,
Heckman et al. 1998). In our data, this condition fails; we discuss this condition in more
detail below, and provide a clear explanation. Rather, our data supports identification of
the average effect of treatment on the treated population. Given substantial differences in
the populations of hybrid owning (1285 households) and non-hybrid owning households
(35,495 households), it is more practical to focus on the average effect of treatment on
the treated population.
We can directly estimate 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1] using observational data, but not the
counterfactual 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1] . Under the assumption that 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1] ≈
𝐸[𝑌0𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1], then a control group of non-hybrid owning households can be used to
estimate the counterfactual. The selection bias is given by
𝐵(𝑋𝑖 ) = 𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1]

(4.3)

and 𝐵(𝑋𝑖 ) = 0 in the event that conditional on 𝑋𝑖 there are no differences between the
hybrid and non-hybrid households except for hybrid ownership status. Under the
structure in (4.1),
𝐵(𝑋𝑖 ) = 𝐸[𝑈1𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑈0𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1].

(4.4)

In other words, the bias will be non-zero if we fail to control all potential unobservables
that are correlated with both miles traveled and hybrid adoption.
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4.4.3 Identification and Estimation

4.4.3.1 Identification
There are a variety of tools available to deal with observables; Equation (4.4)
indicates that our primary concern is in regards to the unobservable factors that may
correlate with both hybrid adoption and annual miles traveled. Heckman and Vytlacil
(2001a, 2005), Heckman et al. (2006), and related papers describe instrumental variables
strategies for identifying and estimating different treatment parameters based on versions
of the design in (4.1). Too often in practice, and is the case here, instrumental variables
are difficult to obtain.
As we describe in Section 4.5, our data includes numerous (observable) control
variables that cover a wide range of factors that correlate with both hybrid adoption and
vehicle miles traveled. Despite the richness of data, we remain concerned that there are
two unobservable factors that likely influence both hybrid adoption and vehicle miles
traveled. The first is household preferences for fuel efficiency and environmental quality,
and the second is local social norms. As we describe in Section 4.2, both factors are
correlated with both adoption and miles traveled. If we exclude them in the control
variables, it is unlikely that the conditional means of these unobservables are either equal
across hybrid and non-hybrid states, or both zero, and the bias in (4.4) will not be zero.
In reality, it is very difficult to directly observe households’ preferences for fuel
efficiency, environmental quality, and the local social norms they face. However, some
indicators, combined with the covariate matching method, can be used to capture them
indirectly. We precede our analysis by making the following assumptions:
(i) Unobservable household preferences for fuel efficiency and environmental quality
is monotonically related to the average miles per gallon of vehicles owned by the
household.
The assumption implies that household preferences for fuel efficiency and
environmental quality can be captured by the MPG ratings of other vehicles owned by the
household. As we will discuss in detail in Section 4.5, the treatment status of a household
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is defined by one certain vehicle in the household (the criteria used to choose the vehicle
is described in that section). We use the average fuel efficiency rating on other vehicles
owned by the household in order to ensure that this measure does not depend on the fuel
efficiency rating of the vehicle that defines the treatment status of the household. That is,
this measure of other MPG ratings is related to the treatment status of the household only
through the household’s preference for environmental quality. Since only the MPG of
other vehicles can be used to measure the household’s preference level for fuel efficiency
and environmental quality, our analysis is restricted to households that own multiple
vehicles.
We contend that this assumption is plausible and not overly restrictive. This
assumption requires that for any two households with different degrees of fuel efficiency
or environmental preference, the household with a greater preference will have a higher
average fuel efficiency rating across vehicles in the household. This allows us to use
nearest neighbor matching to control for unobservable preferences for fuel efficiency or
environmental quality that influence both hybrid adoption and vehicle miles traveled. In
addition, this assumption rules out cases such as a two-vehicle household that owns a
Toyota Prius and a Hummer and is characterized by both strong positive and negative
environmental preferences.
(ii) Local social norms are constant within a metropolitan area.
This assumption is based on the findings from previous research that households that
live in the same area have similar social norms (Kahn 2007, Sexton and Sexton 2014).
Through matching households who live in the same metropolitan area to each other, we
are able to eliminate the effect of local social norms. We realize that this assumption rules
out complex network effects, such as differences in social incentives related to the
environment at the place of work, and daily recreation. While these complexities may, in
some cases, exist, they are impossible to observe; hence, this assumption places certain
restriction on these interactions to make identification tractable, while not completely
ruling out social incentives. In our analysis, we consider models that replace (ii) with the
more flexible assumption:
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(iia) Local social norms are constant within a zip code area.
Under (iia), we can allow for variation in social norms across zip codes, but require
that social incentives are not heterogeneous within. The zip code area is smaller than the
CBSA area, and so matching on zip code relaxes the assumption of homogeneity within
the CBSA area though still requiring homogeneity of social norms within the same zip
code to maintain tractability.

4.4.3.2 A Matching Estimation Strategy
The fundamental problem of causal inference is that a single household cannot be
observed in both hybrid (treated) and non-hybrid (untreated) states at the same point in
time (Holland 1986). To address this issue, untreated (control) households can be used to
proxy for the counterfactual, and a variety of methods are available to facilitate this
comparison. As discussed in Imbens and Rubin (2015), common parametric regression
methods depend critically on the functional form restrictions for extrapolation of the
counterfactual. A flexible, and more robust alternative is to use the method of matching.
Given our interest on 𝜏𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸[∆𝑖 |𝑋𝑖 , 𝐻𝑖 = 1], the method of matching imputes the
1
counterfactual outcome for hybrid drivers nonparametrically via 𝑌̂0𝑖 = 𝑀 ∑𝑀
𝑗=1 𝑌𝑗 for the

𝑀 closest matches, in terms of observable characteristics, to household 𝑖. We use nearest′

neighbor matching, using the Mahalanobis distance metric 𝐴 = (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋𝑗 ) 𝑆 −1 (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋𝑗 )
for 𝑆 being the sample covariance between 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑋𝑗 , to control for observable factors. In
practice, 𝑀 is selected by the econometrician and we use 𝑀 = 1; Imbens (2004) indicates
that one-to-one matching (i.e., setting 𝑀 = 1 so that each treated unit is matched to a
single control unit) is the approach with the least bias.
It is well-known, at least anecdotally, that hybrid owners are more likely to have
higher income and higher education. Additionally, we might expect that hybrid
households are not particularly large (in terms of household members) given that hybrid
vehicles are relatively smaller passenger cars. We might also suspect that households that
have a longer commute distance to work are more likely to purchase a hybrid as a means
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of reducing the cost of the commute. Each of these covariates are observable, and
including them in our set of matching covariates allows us to eliminate any bias
otherwise induced in 𝜏𝑎𝑡𝑡 by differences in these covariates across hybrid and non-hybrid
households.
An advantage of the matching estimator, coupled with assumptions (i) and either (ii)
or (iia), is that we can eliminate bias induced by unobservable household green
preferences and local social norms by including certain variables into our set of matching
covariates. It is possible to explicitly impose an exact match in terms of a specific
attribute; asymptotically, discrete and key covariates are exactly matched, though in
practice a large sample of control units is required to reliably impose an exact match
along a certain dimension (the greater the exact match requirements, the more data that is
needed). Given the large size of our set of non-hybrid (control) households, we can
reliably restrict our matched households in several key dimensions, and eliminate
potential bias from these unobservable factors.
The first dimension on which we require an exact match is the year in which the
hybrid was purchased. As discussed in our review of the literature, the hybrid market
penetration rate is an important factor impacting hybrid adoption and underlying the
proliferation of hybrid vehicles throughout the 2000s decade. Gasoline price and
government policy incentives, which vary temporally, are also important factors affecting
hybrid adoption. By requiring the hybrid households to match to non-hybrid households
that purchased a vehicle in the same year, we can eliminate the effect of the market
penetration rate, the effects of temporal changes of gasoline prices and policy incentives
on hybrid adoption, as well as other unobservable year factors.
The second dimension on which we restrict our match is the geographical area of
residence, defined as either the CBSA or zip code. Restricting the matched households to
reside within the same geographic area eliminates any differences in social values that
might otherwise confound our estimates of 𝜏𝑎𝑡𝑡 . For instance, certain areas (e.g., San
Francisco) are typically regarded as espousing a higher degree of social concern for the
environment. By requiring hybrid owners in San Francisco to be matched to non-hybrid
owners also in San Francisco, we can eliminate any general effects that are unique to, but
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common throughout, San Francisco. Exact matching on geographical area also eliminates
the effects of spatial variation of gasoline prices and policy incentives. Combined with
the exact matching on purchase year, matched households are guaranteed to face the
same gasoline price and same policy incentives when they make the vehicle purchase
decision.
In our analysis, we consider restrictions at the CBSA level, as well as the zip code
level. The former is able to eliminate effects from factors associated with the residential
location of the household, and also provides a greater number of matching options in the
same matching area which increases the quality of the match for other variables. The
latter especially strengthens the location matching, which eliminates the effects of
geographical dissimilarities because zip codes are plausibly more homogeneous than
CBSAs.12
The third dimension over which we require an exact match is the vehicle type or
counterpart of each hybrid. Requiring an exact match on vehicle type ensures that our
hybrid households are matched to non-hybrid households that purchased a similar sized
vehicle (i.e., a vehicle in the same class). To strengthen this matching dimension, we also
exactly match hybrid households to those households who did not purchase a hybrid, but
purchased a counterpart model of a hybrid. For example, matching a household that
purchased a Honda Civic hybrid to a household that purchased a non-hybrid Honda Civic.
Following the literature, we match the Toyota Prius, which does not have a counterpart
non-hybrid model, with the Toyota Corolla (Sexton and Sexton 2014). Through exact
matching on hybrid counterparts, we ensure that matched households are highly similar
to each other in vehicle tastes and preferences, with the only difference being whether the
vehicle is a hybrid or not.
Other dimensions over which we conduct exact matching include frequency of
internet use and household education. We match on frequency of internet use to capture
unobservable preferences for new technology. It is important to bear in mind that the
NHTS survey was conducted in 2008-2009, and records hybrid purchases over the 2000s
12

Not all households belong to a CBSA. We consider models in which we classify all households that are
not in a CBSA to a common group and match them on state level green plan capacity index, and another
model that removes these households from the analysis.
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decade. During this time period, daily internet use was not generally commonplace across
all socio-economic groups. Low frequency of internet use indicates that the household is
not open to new technology. Finally, our initial attempt was to include education in our
nearest neighbor match, but we find via post-match balancing statistics that we obtain a
better post-match balance when imposing the exact match on education as well.
In addition to requiring an exact match along these dimensions, we use nearest
neighbor matching on a number of household characteristics that could affect driving
distance or hybrid adoption of the households, including income, household size, number
of vehicles, average age of drivers in the household, share of female drivers in the
household, commute distance, local green preference capacity index, and average MPG
of all other vehicles owned by the household.

4.4.3.3 Identification and Estimation of the Social Status Rebound Effect
To estimate whether there is a social status rebound effect, we restrict the sample to
only hybrid vehicles, and to define all non-Prius hybrids to be the control group.
Treatment, in this setup, is Prius ownership. We continue to deploy the nearest neighbor
and exact matching strategy as described before to deal with both observable and
unobservable factors, except that we conduct nearest neighbor matching on education
instead of exact matching since exact matching over education no longer improves
matching quality. Then, the significance of our matching estimate 𝜏̂ 𝑎𝑡𝑡 indicates the
existence of a significant social status rebound effect; see, also, Delgado et al. (2015).

4.4.3.4 Failure of the Support Condition Necessary for Identifying the ATE
To further motivate our choice to focus on the 𝐴𝑇𝑇, we discuss the potential for
identification of causal effects when hybrid ownership is considered as treatment. This
discussion is useful for understanding which types of policy assessments can be made in
this context. An important result that is described in detail in Heckman et al. (1997) and
Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) is that identification of the average treatment effect
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requires full support of the estimated propensity score of treatment. 13 The average effect
of treatment on the treated, on the other hand, only requires the propensity score take
values over some interval (0, 𝑝′ ) for some 𝑝′ < 1. In essence, identification of the 𝐴𝑇𝑇
does not require as much from the data; in practice, it is more likely that the 𝐴𝑇𝑇 is
identified even in cases in which the 𝐴𝑇𝐸 is not. See also Carneiro et al. (2010, 2011).
This point is important because it provides critical insight into the types of causal
effects that can be identified with respect to hybrid vehicles and hybrid drivers. Our own
probit estimates of the propensity score in Table 4.1 show the range of support being
(0.000, 0.458) and (0.000, 0.953). Across many probit models we estimated – that both
include and exclude the federal incentive variable as a potential instrumental variable (see
the following subsection) – we do not obtain estimates of the propensity score for the
hybrid model that have a maximum support that exceeds about 0.55. Given the
theoretical econometric conditions, these estimates indicate that identification of an 𝐴𝑇𝐸
parameter is not feasible (at least given our NHTS sample). In all models we estimate, we
do find estimates of the propensity score arbitrarily close to zero, which indicates that the
𝐴𝑇𝑇 may be identified.
These results, while somewhat disappointing, are both intuitive and informative. If
one imagines a stereotypical hybrid household to be relatively high income and high
education (this stereotype is also apparent in our NHTS sample), it is certainly possible to
find plenty of non-hybrid drivers who match the same demographic characteristics. To
use the cliché green/brown terminology, there are plenty of brown consumers who match
the demographics of green consumers. This means that comparison of individuals on the
basis of observable demographics, for instance through probit regression of the
propensity score, does not have sufficient power to satisfy the full support condition.
Hence, from these insights, we choose to focus on the 𝐴𝑇𝑇; this parameter is more likely
to be identified by observational data, and also allows for informed policy assessment via
a means of understanding whether existing hybrid owners drive differently from the
counterfactual.

13

Of course, depending on the chosen estimator, other conditions must be satisfied. To make the current
point, we focus only on the support requirement.

89
4.4.3.5 Why Not an IV Approach?
A related point is the viability of an instrumental variables approach to identification
via the tools developed by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001, 2005). Obviously, any
factor that influences hybrid adoption that is correlated with individual, household, or
community environmental preferences is not a valid instrumental variable, as the same
variable will be correlated with annual miles traveled. Additionally, given that our
measurements are at the household level, the more aggregated the measurement of the
potential instrumental variable, the more likely the variable is to be a weak instrument
(see also Diamond 2009). Given these restrictions, discovery of an instrumental variable
is difficult.
Our first instinct was to use the federal tax deductions and credits as an instrumental
variable, as these variables have been shown to be correlated with hybrid adoption at an
aggregated level and are plausibly exogenous to household vehicle choice. Though these
variables are valid, preliminary regressions strongly indicate that these variables are weak
and unreliable. The weakness of these instruments comes from the fact that they are
aggregated in availability across consumers, and essentially become collinear with
gasoline prices, hybrid vehicle penetration rates in the automobile market, and a time
trend.14 It is possible to estimate probit regressions in which the federal incentive measure
is positive and significantly correlated with hybrid adoption; see Table 4.1. However, (i)
the statistical significance is not stable across samples and model specifications; (ii) is not
robust to nonlinear specifications; and (iii) has an average marginal effect of less than 5
percent on the probability of hybrid adoption. Furthermore, direct deployment of the
federal incentive as an instrumental variable in an IV-regression of annual miles traveled
on hybrid ownership (and controls) generates infeasible coefficient estimates and
standard errors, and does not pass standard tests of weak instruments.15

14

State and local incentives also exist, but these variables are less credibly valid as state and local policy
incentives are likely correlated with general trends of environmental preferences within the state or local
communities. Still, we experimented with these variables, which turned out to be even less reliable than the
federal incentive measures. Complete details regarding these variables and regression results can be
furnished upon request from the authors.
15
For instance, the IV point estimate implies that hybrid households drive about 50,000 miles less per year
compared to non-hybrid households.
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Moreover, economists understand that hybrid ownership is driven to a substantial
degree by unobservable individual/household specific preferences, as well as
community/social influence. Many households might be classified as never-takers of
hybrid treatment; it is likely that there are no instrumental variables that can yield
exogenous incentives for these consumers to purchase a hybrid. To be more concrete, in
certain communities, hybrid vehicles might bear a negative social stigma, under which
many consumers are not willing to purchase a hybrid (for instance, under a government
rebate policy). These consumers certainly exist, and it is important to recognize that it is
unlikely that their hybrid treatment effect can be identified through typical observational
data. Similarly, certain green consumers are always-takers; it is equally difficult to find
any type of exogenous incentive that encourages these consumers to purchase a hybrid,
since they are naturally pre-disposed to hybrid ownership. Research (e.g., Sallee 2011)
has shown that the government incentives do significantly correlate with the household
decision to buy a hybrid; it is not clear, however, whether green households simply time
their purchases to coincide with a maximum incentive value, or whether the incentive
independently induces hybrid purchase in a group of compliers. It is likely that the
incentive both stimulates compliers to purchase a hybrid – likely consumers with lightgreen preferences – as well as being taken simply by green consumers who would have
purchased the hybrid regardless (Ozaki and Sevastyanova 2011). It is difficult to know
how big is the complier group, and hence whether an instrumental variables approach is a
promising empirical strategy.
Instead, our approach is to use a flexible, nonparametric matching approach to
eliminate bias from both observable and unobservable factors that influence both hybrid
adoption and driving behavior. Given knowledge of the unobservable factors that likely
have the largest influence on both the hybrid choice and driving habits (see assumptions
(i) and (ii)), we are able to design a matching setup that eliminates the bias.
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4.5 Data Construction and Summary Statistics

4.5.1 Data Construction
The majority of our data comes from the 2009 National Highway Travel Survey
(NHTS), conducted nationally by the U.S. Department of Transportation from March
2008 through May 2009. The original data contains 150,147 households, 309,163
vehicles, and 351,275 individual persons. Since our analysis is at the household level, the
original data at the person and vehicle levels are aggregated to the household level.

4.5.1.1 The Definition of Treatment
Since we conduct our analysis at the household level, treatment is defined as whether
or not the household owns a gasoline-electric hybrid. That is, any household that has
purchased at least one brand new hybrid vehicle is considered treated, and any household
that has purchased a brand new non-hybrid vehicle is part of the control group. Hence,
our analysis is restricted only to households that have purchased at least one new vehicle
during the 2000s decade.
We define hybrid status in the following way. For hybrid households, if the
households bought only one hybrid, the purchased hybrid is chosen. If a household
purchased more than one hybrid, then the hybrid first purchased is chosen because the
first hybrid purchase defines the first instant in which the household was hybrid treated.
For households that do not own a hybrid, we choose the vehicle that was purchased most
recently. The most recent purchase is chosen for three reasons. First, the most recent
purchase is the most recent instance in which the household had an opportunity to decide
whether to receive treatment or not. Second, given that the NHTS survey was conducted
during 2008 and 2009, the most recent purchase corresponds to the purchase time when a
household's characteristics are the most similar to its characteristics at the survey time.
Third, for matching hybrid households to non-hybrid households who are similar, it is not
necessary to match based on all purchases. With a large control group, we have the
advantage of choosing the most representative purchase of each household.
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4.5.1.2 NHTS Data Sample
Overview Since our focus is on measuring the difference in miles traveled between
households who own a hybrid vehicle and households that do not, we include variables
measuring hybrid ownership and miles traveled of households, household characteristics,
characteristics of all vehicles owned by households, and characteristics of regions in
which the households live. All households with incomplete information on these
variables are dropped. Since hybrid vehicles are only available in the sample after 2000,
to avoid any potential estimation bias from the systematic differences that might exist
between households that purchased a hybrid and households that purchased a new car
prior to 2000, we limit our study to households who bought at least one new vehicle after
2000. To determine whether a purchased vehicle is brand new or used, we follow the
same criterion used by NHTS: when the difference between the purchase year and the
model year of a vehicle is less than two years, the vehicle is assumed to have been
purchased brand new; otherwise, the vehicle is assumed to have been purchased used.
The NHTS data provides information on whether a specific vehicle is a hybrid
vehicle or not; however, in the NHTS survey, gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles are not
coded differently from vehicles using some kind of alternative fuel. Since we only focus
on electric-gasoline hybrid vehicles, to eliminate vehicles that use alternative fuel but are
not gasoline-electric hybrids, we compare NHTS information on the make/model/year of
each vehicle with a list of all possible make/model/year combinations of gasoline-electric
hybrid vehicles. The sources for comparison include the Vehicle Make and Model book
associated with the NHTS documentation, Edmunds.com, Hybridcars.com, Wikipedia,
and previous economic research. Any alternative fuel vehicles that are not found to be
gasoline-electrics are dropped.
In addition, we are only interested in vehicles that are used for personal travel and
consume gasoline. We include any vehicles classified as automobile/car/station wagon,
van (minivan, cargo van, or passenger van), sport utility vehicle, and pickup truck, and
drop motorcycle, other trucks, golf carts, and other vehicles. The NHTS survey also
includes an indicator for whether or not the vehicle has a commercial license plate; we

93
remove all households who own any such vehicle. We also remove all households who
own vehicles using diesel, natural gas or electricity, other than motor gasoline.
Several further removals of observations are conducted due to the specific
requirements of certain variables. We provide the detailed definitions of some variables
included in this study below; the information of the further data removals based on
certain variables are also provided in the description of the variable.
Annual Miles Traveled The measure of annual miles traveled by each household
comes from the variable BESTMILE in the NHTS survey. Due to the imprecision of
perception and memory of respondents, it is difficult to collect precise and reliable
information on miles traveled for a whole household in the past whole year. To obtain a
reliable measurement of annual miles traveled, NHTS estimates the annual miles traveled
for each household via (i) information on each vehicle owned by a household, including
self-reported miles traveled, the odometer reading, model year, purchase year, and
vehicle type; (ii) information on the primary driver of each vehicle, including the
education, age, gender, and working status of the primary driver; (iii) information on the
characteristics of each household, including number of persons, number of vehicles,
household life cycle classification, and the MSA region in which the household lives; and
(iv) miles traveled in the assigned travel day of each household. The most critical sources
of information are self-reported annual miles traveled, the odometer reading of each
vehicle, and information on the primary driver. When all three sources are available, all
are used jointly to construct the estimate of annual miles traveled (72.4 percent of the
vehicles in the NHTS survey fall into this category). When some information is missing,
only the existing information is used. After estimation, the annual miles estimate is
validated via comparison to the odometer reading and self-reported annual miles traveled.
If the difference surpasses certain criteria, the annual miles estimate is identified as an
outlier. We drop all households for which the BESTMILE estimate is classified as an
outlier.
Household Income Household income is a categorical variable, and measures the
total income of each household. This variable has 18 different categories, representing
intervals of $5,000. For instance, Category 1 indicates annual household income of less
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than $5,000, and Category 2 indicates annual household income between $5,000 and
$9,999. The highest category, Category 18, indicates annual household income greater
than $100,000.
Highest Education The NHTS survey records the education level of each person as
a categorical variable, taking 5 distinct values. These values from 1 to 5 represent less
than high school; high school or GED; some college, vocational, or an Associate's degree;
a Bachelor's degree; and graduate or professional degree. We use the highest level of
education in the household as our measure of household education.
Life Cycle The NHTS survey includes a life cycle variable, that indicates whether
the household has one or two heads, children, and whether or not the head(s) are retired.16
We believe these life-cycle indicators are important correlates of both the hybrid adoption
decision and miles traveled.
Internet Usage We include in our analysis an indicator for whether at least one
member in the household uses the Internet almost every day. This variable is used to
measure both the attitude of the household to new technology, general socioeconomic
status, and degree of connectedness. The adoption of a hybrid is affected by the attitude
of households towards new technology. If a household is open to new technology, we
expect members in that household to use the internet frequently. Since this variable is
measured at the person level in the survey, we use the frequency of the person with the
most frequent Internet use among all household members, in order to capture the
maximum preference to new technology for each household.
Commute Distance to Work Commute distance to work measures the sum of
commute distance across all workers in each household. Work commute constitutes
mandatory travel, and affects both hybrid adoption and miles driven. We dropped any
households with a single family member reporting a commute distance of more than 75
miles.

16

Specifically, the categories with values 1 to 10 are one adult, no children; 2+ adults, no children; one
adult, youngest child 0-5; 2+ adults, youngest child 0-5; one adult, youngest child 6-15; 2+ adults, youngest
child 6-15; one adult, youngest child 16-21; 2+ adults, youngest child 16-21; one adult, retired, no children;
2+ adults, retired, no children respectively.
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MPG of Other Vehicles To measure the general degree of environmentalism and
preference for fuel saving at the household level, we include the average MPG rating of
other vehicles. As we have described, it is difficult to measure households’ preference for
fuel efficiency and the environment; yet, households with stronger environmental
preferences and those that care more about fuel costs are more likely to purchase
relatively fuel efficient vehicles for all vehicles in the household (see also Table 4.1).
Hence, incorporating this variable into our matching analysis allows us to match hybrid
households to non-hybrid households that have similar preferences on both fuel
efficiency and the environment.
Household Geographic Location The geographic location of households is also
correlated with both the hybrid adoption decision and driving habits. For example,
households living in a more environmental friendly area would be more likely to buy a
hybrid; households living a large metropolitan area may have an advantage of better
public transportation and drive less. Additionally, certain states or cities (e.g., California
or Seattle; Sexton and Sexton 2014) are known to have a reputation of being more
environmentally friendly, which correlates with both hybrid adoption and driving habits.
As we have described, matching geographically allows us to control for general spatial
influences that may correlate with both hybrid adoption and driving habits.
To control for these correlates, we include several variables to control for these
effects. The NHTS survey has several variables that we consider: MSA category, MSA
population, and Rail. MSA category measures the metropolitan statistical area of each
household, MSA population size measures the size of the MSA in which the household
lives, and Rail is a binary variable that measures whether or not the MSA area has rail
transportation services available.17 In addition, we consider a more simple Urban/Rural
indicator variable to differentiate households in urban from rural areas.

17

Specifically, MSA category takes values 1 if the MSA in which the household lives has a population of 1
million or more, and has a rail system; 2 if the MSA has a population of 1 million or more, but does not
have a rail system; 3 if the MSA has a population of less than 1 million; 4 if the household is mot in an
MSA. The MSA population variable takes a value of 1 if the household lives in an MSA with fewer than
250,000; 2 for an MSA with a population between 250,000-499,999; 3 for an MSA with 500,000-999,999;
4 for an MSA of 1,000,000-2,999,999; 5 for an MSA of 3 million more; and 6 if the household is not in an
MSA.
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Basic Household Demographics We also include the number of vehicles in each
household, household size, the number of drivers, the average age of drivers, and the
number of workers, in order to control for the impact of these household demographics
on both hybrid adoption and annual miles traveled. We record the Hispanic status of the
household as a binary indicator that equals one if the household self-reports as being
Hispanic, and zero otherwise. The race of each household is categorical. 18 We also
include the average age of all drivers and the share of female drivers in each household.
Gasoline Price We obtained data on the price of regular grade gasoline from 2000
to 2009 from the Council for Community and Economy Research. The data measures the
quarterly gasoline price at the CBSA level, which provides variation across and within
years and CBSA regions. We match households via geographic location to gasoline
prices. We first match at the city level; any household that cannot be matched to a
gasoline price at the city level is matched at the CBSA level; any remaining household is
matched into a state average for the gasoline price. For different parts of our analysis, we
are interested in both the gasoline price at the time in which the hybrid was purchased, as
well as the gasoline price at the time the NHTS survey was taken and annual miles
traveled was computed.
Green Plan Capacity Index We also use the Green Plan Capacity (GPC) index
from Resource Renewal Institute (Siy et al. 2001) to measure the strength of
environmentalism across different regions in which households live as an important
control for unobservable factors that may correlated with hybrid vehicle adoption. The
GPC index is defined on a 100-point scale, covering 65-indicators, and is calculated for
each state in the U.S. It is comprised of four sub-indices: comprehensiveness of the
environmental management framework; level of environmental policy innovation; fiscal
and program commitment; and the quality of governance. The index is time invariant,
varying only over states.
Policy Incentives Incentives from the federal government and state government are
also important factors influencing households' hybrid adoptions (Sallee 2011). We obtain
18

The categories with values from 1 to 8 indicate whether the household members are white, African
American, Asian, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific, Multiracial,
Hispanic/Mexican, and other respectively.
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detailed data on these policy incentives from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the
Alternative Fuels Data Center (AFDC) of the United States Department of Energy,
official state statute documentation, and previous economic research (Diamond 2009,
Gallagher and Muehlegger 2011, Sallee 2011).
Before 2006, the federal government provided a $2,000 federal tax deduction for all
hybrid purchases. The exact benefit for each household depends on the real income tax
rate for the household, which we cannot observe. We assume the same tax rate, 25
percent, for all households. 19 Since January 1, 2006, the tax deduction policy was
replaced by a tax credit policy. The specific amount of credit that a certain hybrid model
receives is based on its fuel efficiency level compared to equivalent gasoline vehicles.
The amount of full credit across models varies between $450 and $3,150, and phased out
gradually after the manufacturer of the model sold a total of 60,000 hybrids. Federal tax
credit incentives for all hybrids from Toyota phased out in 2007, and federal tax credit
incentives for hybrid models from Honda phased out at the end of 2008. To obtain a
uniform measure of the tax credit across households, we use the weighted mean of tax
credits of all hybrids in our dataset at each point in time. The weights of different hybrid
models are decided by their proportion across all hybrids models in our dataset, which is
used as a proxy of the market share for each hybrid.
State hybrid incentives include income tax credits, sales tax exemptions, tax rebates,
and HOV lane access. Detailed information on federal and state incentives, including the
specific implementation period, amount, and data sources, are provided in Appendix F.

4.5.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.3 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample, as well as the hybrid and
Prius samples individually. Our final dataset includes 36,780 households. Of these,
35,495 households do not own a hybrid vehicle, while 1,285 households own a hybrid
vehicle. Of these hybrid owning households, 696 own a Prius. The distribution of all
makes and models of the hybrid vehicles in the sample are provided in Appendix E,
19

25 percent is very close to the mean of real incentives benefit Beresteanu and Li (2011) calculated using
TAXSIM tax software.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic
Hybrid/Prius
Indicator
Annual Miles
Traveled
Household Income
Highest Education
No. of Vehicles
Household Size
No. of Adults
No. of Drivers
No. of Workers
Hispanic
Race
Average Age of
Drivers
Share of Female
Drivers
Life Cycle
Internet Usage
Commute Distance
Penetration Rate
Gas Price (Purchase)
Gas Price (Survey)
Year Purchased
Vehicle Type
MPG of Other
Vehicles
MSA Category
Rail in MSA
Urban
GPC Index
Federal Incentive
State Incentive
Observations

All Households
Std.
Mean
Dev.

Hybrid Households
Std.
Mean
Dev.

Prius Households
Std.
Mean
Dev.

0.03

0.18

0.54

0.50

26,636

14,495

27,914

14,461

27,259

13,391

13.92
3.77
2.35
2.69
2.10
2.12
1.21
0.05
1.29

4.50
1.06
0.64
1.12
0.50
0.54
0.88
0.22
1.11

15.86
4.34
2.35
2.62
2.08
2.12
1.30
0.05
1.30

3.47
0.86
0.65
0.98
0.47
0.53
0.87
0.22
1.14

15.81
4.43
2.37
2.57
2.08
2.14
1.29
0.04
1.25

3.50
0.81
0.65
0.96
0.48
0.55
0.90
0.21
1.01

53.31

14.06

53.31

12.85

54.47

13.06

0.51

0.23

0.50

0.21

0.50

0.20

5.98
0.83
14.61
0.01
2.32
3.51
2,005.49
2.05

3.34
0.38
17.73
0.01
0.66
0.17
1.97
1.14

5.77
0.94
16.48
0.02
2.61
3.58
2,006.32
1.36

3.32
0.24
18.98
0.01
0.58
0.20
1.48
0.77

5.90
0.95
16.20
0.02
2.58
3.60
2,006.16
1.02

3.37
0.22
18.72
0.01
0.59
0.21
1.54
0.21

21.21

4.55

23.20

7.34

24.27

8.56

2.49
0.17
0.70
37.71
881.71
96.60
36,780

0.98
0.38
0.46
7.33
773.85
475.38

2.20
0.98
0.29
0.45
0.76
0.43
38.69
6.99
996.28
805.48
74.51
488.25
1,285

2.20
0.31
0.75
38.88
954.74
92.99
696

1.01
0.46
0.43
7.35
786.95
572.00
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Table E.1. In that table, we see that the Toyota Prius is the most popular hybrid model,
contributing to over 50 percent of the hybrids in our dataset, while the next most popular
hybrids are the Honda Civic, Toyota Camry, Toyota Highlander, and Ford Escape.
From Table 4.3, we see that the average household drives about 26,636 miles per
year; hybrid households drive more miles per year (27,914). Prius households average
more miles than the full sample, but fewer miles than the hybrid sample (27,259). Further,
in the full sample of households, about 3 percent own a hybrid vehicle. Not surprisingly,
hybrid households average a higher income and education, are more frequent Internet
users, average longer commutes, purchased the hybrid in a year/location with higher
gasoline prices, and under higher Federal incentives. Further, we see that hybrid
households average higher MPG ratings on other vehicles in the household, which
provides some indication that hybrid households have uniformly stronger preferences for
environmental preservation. We do not find much significant difference between hybrid
and non-hybrid households in terms of the other household demographics. In general,
these averages conform to the intuition suggested by our review of the literature.

4.6 Covariate Matching Results

4.6.1 Metrics to Assess Balance and Overlap
Prior to implementing our matching and differencing estimation strategy, it is
informative to assess overall balance and overlap in the NHTS sample for hybrid and
non-hybrid households, and Prius hybrid households and non-Prius hybrid households.
The procedures here follow Imbens and Rubin (2015).
The Normalized Difference

The first metric we consider for assessing balance is

the normalized difference for each covariate, given by
𝜇𝑡 − 𝜇𝑐
∆𝑐𝑡 =
2
2
√(𝜎𝑡 + 𝜎𝑐 )⁄
2

(4.5)
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in which μ denotes the mean, 𝜎 2 denotes the variance, and the subscripts 𝑡 and 𝑐 indicate
the treated and control samples, respectively. This normalized differences provides a
measure of dispersion of the means of the two samples that is unit free. Further, in
contrast to the standard t-test for equality of means, the normalized difference is invariant
to changes in the sample size. Further, as stated by Imbens and Rubin (2015), the purpose
of balance tests is not to directly test the null hypothesis that the two subsamples have the
same central tendencies, but rather assess the feasibility of using adjustment methods
(e.g., matching or regression) to eliminate biases associated with observable covariates
that arise in treatment effect estimation. To estimate ∆𝑐𝑡 , one can use sample averages
and sample variances.
The normalized difference is in standard deviations. The larger the normalized
difference for each covariate, the more difficult it will be to deploy adjustment techniques
to adjust for biases. To provide some perspective, normalized difference measures of
approximately 0.1 are in line with “what one might expect in a completely randomized
experiment” (Imbens and Rubin 2015, p. 352).
The Log Ratio of Standard Deviations While the normalized difference measures
differences in the central tendencies of the covariate distributions across treated/control
samples, the log ratio of standard deviations measures the difference in dispersions of the
two distributions. This measure is given by
𝛤𝑐𝑡 = log(𝜎𝑡 ) − log(𝜎𝑐 )

(4.6)

where 𝜎 denotes the standard deviation and the rest of notations is as before. This
measure can also be calculated from sample standard deviations, and the larger the value
of 𝛤𝑐𝑡 for any particular covariate the larger the difference in distributional dispersion.
For large values of 𝛤𝑐𝑡 , the more difficult it will be to adjust for biases.
The Fraction of Observations in the Tails of the Opposing Distribution One of
the important requirements for different bias adjustment methods (e.g., matching) is
sufficient overlap in the distributions of covariates. One way to assess overlap is to
determine the fraction of observations in the treated group that lie in the tails of the
distribution for the control group. The larger the fraction of observations that lie in the
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tails of the opposing treatment groups distribution, the more difficult it will be to find a
corresponding observation in the opposing group to match to the treated units.
Formally, we calculate this percentage via
𝜋𝑡𝛼 = [1 − 𝐹𝑡 (𝐹𝑐−1 (1 − 𝛼 ⁄2))] + 𝐹𝑡 (𝐹𝑐−1 (𝛼 ⁄2))

(4.7)

for significance level 𝛼 and distribution functions 𝐹(⋅) . If we choose 𝛼 = 0.05 , we
calculate 𝜋̂𝑡0.05 as
𝜋𝑡0.05 = [1 − 𝐹𝑡 (𝐹𝑐−1 (0.975))] + 𝐹𝑡 (𝐹𝑐−1 (0.025)).

(4.8)

4.6.2 Pre-Match Assessment of Balance and Overlap
We report the results for our pre-match balance and overlap assessments in Table
G.1. For all covariates, we use the full sample of 36,780 observations, of which 1,285 are
hybrids and 35,495 are non-hybrids.
It is clear from the table that there are substantial differences between hybrid and
non-hybrid households along several important dimensions. We see that the normalized
difference for household income, education, Internet usage, hybrid market penetration
rate, gasoline price, year purchased, the MPG of other household vehicles, vehicle type,
and MSA characteristics are all substantially higher than 0.10. These measures suggest
that estimates that do not adjust for these differences are likely to be biased.
The other metrics included in the table indicate that it will likely be feasible to
restore balance via matching. The log difference in standard deviations and percent of
observations in the tails of the opposing treatment group are all relatively low, which
indicates substantial overlap in the distributions of these covariates between hybrid and
non-hybrid samples. This is, in part, because of the large number of non-hybrid (control)
households afforded to us by the NHTS survey. Through such a large set of non-hybrid
households, we are able to carefully identify a close match for each hybrid household.
We report pre-match balance and overlap statistics for the Prius treatment model
(hybrid only sample) in Table G.2. For that sample there is fewer significant differences
between Prius and non-Prius hybrid samples, pre-match. The largest differences are in
terms of education, year purchased, MPG of other vehicles, and vehicle type. With the
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exception of vehicle type, the other metrics indicate there is likely sufficient overlap to
restore adequate balance via matching. We rely on an exact match for vehicle type to
restore balance.

4.6.3 The Effect of Hybrid Ownership on Annual Miles Traveled
Our matching estimates of the effect of hybrid ownership on annual miles traveled
are reported in Table 4.4. In the top two panels, we require an exact match at the CBSA
level as given by assumption (ii); the top panel further requires an exact match on vehicle
type, and the middle panel further restricts the match to the exact vehicle counterpart. The
bottom panel invokes assumption (iia) and restricts the match to the zip code level. The
rest of the matching is as described previously. Finally, Model 1 includes households that
are not located in a CBSA, requiring an exact CBSA match to another household also not
in a CBSA but located within states with the closest GPC index, while Model 2
eliminates these households.
Each model specification has its own matching advantages. Matching on zip code
and/or excluding households not in a CBSA are able to strengthen matching on
geographical area; matching on the counterparts of each hybrid is able to improve the
similarity on all factors influencing households’ choice related to brand, style, etc.;
matching on CBSA and/or including households not in a CBSA increase the matching
options and matching quality of other variables. The combination of all models covers
different dimensions that are important in households’ driving behavior and hybrid
adoption.
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Table 4.4: Matching Estimates of the Effect of Hybrid Ownership on Annual Miles
Traveled
CBSA Level (Vehicle Type)
Estimate
Standard Error
No. of Matched Hybrids
CBSA Level (Counterpart)
Estimate
Standard Error

Model 1

Model 2

786.978*
436.140

772.432*
436.267

1072

1036

749.873**
339.485

398.077
340.082

451

434

No. of Matched Hybrids
Zip Code Level
Estimate
Standard Error

521.638**
249.826

No. of Matched Hybrids

299

The reported estimates and standard errors are Abadie and Imbens (2011) bias-corrected variants. An exact
match is required for household education, year of purchase, frequency of Internet usage, vehicle type or
counterpart, and CBSA or zip code. Matching on other covariates uses nearest neighbor matching using the
Mahalanobis distance metric, allowing for one matched control unit for each treated unit. CBSA Model 1
includes observations that are not in a CBSA, and Model 2 excludes observations that are not located in a
CBSA.

We find that, in most of the models we estimate, hybrid owning households drive
more miles per year than households that do not own a hybrid. Our estimates range from
just under 400 miles per year to just over 785. To provide more precise interpretation, the
top panel estimate for Model 2 implies that a household that owns a hybrid, on average,
drives 772 miles more per year than a non-hybrid owning household that purchased a
new vehicle in the same year, resides in the exact same CBSA (and hence faces the same
gasoline prices and social incentives), and has the same household demographics (e.g.,
income, education, commute distance, etc.). The only insignificant rebound effect comes
from the model matching on CBSA, non-hybrid counterparts, and excluding households
not in CBSA. Generally, our results are similar across different model specifications,
which increases the credence of our estimates.
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4.6.4 Is There A Social Status Rebound Effect?
We report our matching estimates of the 𝐴𝑇𝑇 for the Prius social status driven
rebound effect in Table 4.5 for the two CBSA models that match on vehicle type. Due to
relatively small sample size of only hybrid households, we are not able to conduct
matching at the zip code level. We find that in both models, the treatment effect estimates
are not significant, which indicates that Prius and non-Prius hybrid households do not
drive a significantly different number of miles per year. Hence, despite the anecdotal
evidence that the social status signaling ability of the Toyota Prius might create an
incentive for Prius drivers to increase driving miles to capitalize on the status signal, we
do not find statistical evidence of this behavioral response. Further, we do not find a
significant social status rebound effect associated with Prius adoption.

4.6.5 Post-Match Balance and Overlap Assessment
Though our matching estimates are intuitive, the credibility of those estimates as
causal effects depends critically on whether the matching procedure was able to restore
balance to the covariate distributions. We report post-match balancing statistics for the
estimates from Table 4.4 in Tables D.1, D.2, and D.3, and in Table D.4 for the estimates
from Table 4.5. The normalized difference between the treated and control units is nearly
zero (below 0.10) for most of the covariates across each of the specifications, indicating
little chance that these covariates induce bias into our estimates.
The most difficult covariate to get into balance is the average MPG of other vehicles.
It is clear from these post-match balancing tables that the normalized difference for this
covariate is greatly reduced via the matching procedure, and in each case is always below
0.20 (recall that 0.10 is the benchmark for being as good as random). Hence, while there
remains a slight distance in terms of this covariate, the match is still very good and it is
not likely that this covariate leads to any significant bias in our estimates of the treatment
parameter. From these measures, we conclude that there is virtually no cause for concern
that our treatment effect estimates are measured with bias.
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Table 4.5: Matching Estimates of the Effect of the Prius Premium on Annual Miles
Traveled
CBSA Level
Estimate
Standard Error
No. of Matched Hybrids

Model 1

Model 2

−669.727
581.303

−334.350
582.087

330

322

The reported estimates and standard errors are Abadie and Imbens (2011) bias-corrected variants. An exact
match is required for year of purchase, vehicle type, frequency of Internet use, and CBSA. Matching on
other covariates uses nearest neighbor matching using the Mahalanobis distance metric, allowing for 1
matched control unit for each treated unit. Model 1 includes observations that are not in a CBSA, and
Model 2 excludes observations that are not located in a CBSA. See text for further details.

4.7 Policy Implications: Hybrid Ownership and Gasoline Consumption
The causal estimates of the impact of hybrid ownership on annual miles traveled has
direct implications for policies that seek to reduce gasoline consumption via hybrid
vehicle adoption. In this section, we provide some rough calculations as to the average
fuel savings accrued on account of hybrid adoption, taking into account the (small)
rebound effect we have estimated.
From Table 4.4, the largest hybrid vehicle rebound effect is about 787 miles per year.
Given that the average hybrid household in the sample drives 27,914 (Table 4.3), this
rebound effect amounts to about 3 percent of annual miles traveled. Table 4.6 shows the
average fuel efficiency increase for hybrid vehicles over either non-hybrid vehicles in the
same class or to exact non-hybrid counterpart vehicles. In the first case, the average
increase in fuel efficiency is 118.5 percent, and in the second case, is 93.4 percent. That
is, the average fuel efficiency for hybrids is about double the average fuel efficiency for
non-hybrids (either by type or counterpart).
The average annual fuel consumption of a household is calculated by dividing the
total annual miles traveled by MPG (fuel consumption = total annual miles
traveled/MPG). It is then straightforward to compute a rough estimate of the change in
fuel consumption from adoption of a hybrid vehicle.
In the first case, comparing hybrids with all other non-hybrids, we estimate that the
highest rebound effect of hybrid adoption is about 787 miles, on average a 2.8 percent
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increase from original miles traveled, and the corresponding increase of fuel efficiency is
118.5 percent. With the estimates, we calculate the associated fuel savings. Specifically,

𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =

𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑉𝑀𝑇
𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑀𝑇 × 103 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡
=
𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝑀𝑃𝐺
𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑃𝐺 × 218.5 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡

= 𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 47.0 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡

(4.9)

which means that the average household that adopts a hybrid decreases its fuel
consumption approximately 53.0 percent.
In the second case, we only compare hybrids with their counterpart non-hybrid
vehicles. The highest rebound effect of hybrid adoption is about 750 miles, averagely 2.7
percent increase from original miles traveled; the corresponding increase of fuel
efficiency is 93.4 percent. The associated fuel savings can be calculated to be 46.9
percent with the same way in Equation (4.9). While this calculation is approximate, the
potential fuel savings are substantial. One immediate implication of these calculations is
that policies that encourage hybrid vehicle adoption are able to significantly reduce the
consumption of gasoline.

Table 4.6: The Increase in Fuel Efficiency from Hybrid Adoption
All Other Non-hybrids

Non-hybrid Counterparts

Non-hybrid

21.6

24.4

Hybrid

47.2

47.2

118.5%

93.4%

Increase in Fuel Efficiency

Each number reports the average MPG for the vehicles in each category. All other non-hybrid vehicles
include all non-hybrid vehicles in our sample; the Toyota Corolla is used as the counterpart for the Toyota
Prius.

As discussed earlier, our method is different from the method used in previous
studies. First, we separate the response of driving distance to an improvement of fuel
efficiency from the response coming from a change in the fuel price. Second, we use a
matching method to compare the travel distance of households driving vehicles with
different fuel efficiency directly instead of calculating the elasticity of driving distance
with respect to fuel economy. To compare our results with findings from previous studies,
we transfer our results to be comparable with elasticities. In our case, the fuel efficiency
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of a hybrid increases 118.5 percent compared all other vehicles and 93.4 compared to the
hybrid counterparts. It means that the hybrid fuel costs decrease 54.2 and 48.3 percent,
respectively (if we use the same assumption in the previous literature that fuel costs have
the equal and opposite effect on travel distance as fuel economy). Correspondingly, with
a 100 percent decrease in fuel cost, the travel distance in our cases increase by 5 and 6
percent, respectively. Consistent with the definition of a rebound effect in the literature,
the rebound effects in our case are 5 and 6 percent.
Small and Van Dender (2007) find that the rebound effect of driving distance with
regard to fuel cost per mile is 2.2 percent in the short term and 10.7 percent in the long
term. Hymel et al. (2010) find that the rebound effect is 4.7 percent in the short term and
24.1 percent in the long term. They both measure the response of vehicle travel to the fuel
cost per mile, not fuel economy. Greene (2012) measures the response of vehicle travel to
fuel economy and does not find a significant rebound effect. Gillingham et al. (2013) find
evidence that rebound effects for energy efficient technology do not generally exist, and
that any rebound effect that may exist is not enough to offset the environmental gains
stemming from the improved efficiency. Our results are generally in line with findings
from previous studies, and particularly consistent with the findings of Greene (2012) and
Gillingham et al. (2013). With different model specifications, the estimated rebound
effect is either not significant or very small.

4.8 Conclusion
We explore households’ adoption of gasoline-electric hybrid vehicles and the impact
of hybrid ownership on annual miles traveled in order to understand how hybrid
ownership impacts fuel consumption. Specifically, we examine two rebound effects: (1)
whether households drive more due to the higher fuel-efficiency of hybrids; and (2) if
there is a social status driven rebound effect associated with the social signaling value of
a hybrid. Our research has important implications for environmental policy related to
vehicle miles traveled and gasoline consumption: post assessment of policies encouraging
the adoption of hybrids during the 2000’s decade; potential impact that policies have on
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vehicle miles traveled by fully-electric vehicles; and the effects of tightening the
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards which foster proliferation of
gasoline-electric hybrids to raise fleet fuel economy. Our analysis critically focuses on
issues of identification in light of several behavioral factors that are known to influence
both hybrid adoption and miles traveled.
We construct multiple model specifications with different advantages to estimate
rebound effects of hybrid adoption. With most model specifications, we find a
statistically significant rebound effect due to the higher fuel-efficiency of hybrids: a
household that owns a hybrid vehicle drives more miles per year, on average, than an
identical household that does not own a hybrid. However, this rebound effect is only
about 3 percent of the total annual miles traveled, and is insufficient to offset the fuel
savings due to the higher fuel efficiency of the gasoline-electric hybrid engine.
Additionally, we do not find any evidence of a statistically significant social status
rebound effect associated with ownership of the Toyota Prius. Generally, we conclude
that the rebound effect associated with hybrid adoption is small and hybrid adoption is
able to save almost half of current gasoline consumption.
Our ability to interpret these estimates as causal effects rests on whether or not there
remain any significant post-estimation differences between hybrid and non-hybrid
households. All post-matching balance assessments indicate that there are no remaining
differences between the hybrid and non-hybrid samples; hence, our interpretation is
causal.
Our results provide an important insight into the effect of government policies that
incentivize the adoption of alternative fuel-efficient vehicles and jump-start the
alternative fuel car market. In particular, policies that encourage hybrid adoption do lead
to fuel savings, despite the non-randomness of households who adopt them and the
rebound effect of increased fuel efficiency on vehicle miles traveled. In addition, while
certain hybrids are a mechanism to signal social status, we do not find evidence that this
same mechanism leads to an alternative form of rebound. Our results also provide a
valuable analogue for the effects of policies incentivizing the adoption of fully-electric
vehicles or tightening of the CAFE standards.
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While the methodology applied in this study appropriately captures the differences
between annual miles traveled across households, we have to ignore any intra-household
substitution of driving between different vehicles, since miles traveled for each vehicle
are aggregated to the household level from the vehicle level. It is likely that hybrid
vehicles would be driven more than non-hybrid vehicles inside a hybrid household since
the former is more fuel efficient than the latter. However, the possibility of intrahousehold substitution does not undermine our findings. The substitution of driving from
non-hybrid vehicles to hybrid vehicles would only increase the average fuel efficiency of
annual driving miles inside the household and induce greater fuel savings.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS

5.1 Summary of Key Findings
The interface between water and agriculture bears important scientific implications.
First, water is an important input for agriculture. Irrigation in agriculture is a crucial
factor to increase agricultural productivity, and access to water has a substantial impact
on local agricultural economic development. Second, agriculture has a substantial impact
on water. Irrigation in agriculture constitutes the largest withdrawal of water, which could
aggravate water depletion when over-exploitation of water is already severe; agricultural
production, especially fertilizer use, is one of the main sources of water pollution in many
countries. Studying the specific mechanisms behind the interface of water and agriculture,
and identifying the ones that maximize the positive benefit that agriculture can obtain
from water and minimize the negative impacts of agriculture on water quantity and
quality, are important for achieving agricultural development and sustaining a healthy
environment.
My first essay measures irrigation efficiency and explores the most effective policies
to reduce groundwater depletion in Mexico. I find that the mechanisms of electricity costsharing implemented in many wells have a sizable impact on inefficiency of irrigation
application and groundwater depletion. Hence, I conclude that the elimination of cost
share mechanisms seems like a more promising policy instrument for groundwater
conservation in Mexico. Moreover, irrigation is inelastic to its own per unit cost, and
electricity price-based policies may not be able to generate substantial effect in reducing
irrigation application. Results also show that well-sharing does not significantly affect
groundwater pumping, suggesting either a limited effect of individual pumping on water
levels or absence of strategic pumping by farmers sharing the wells.
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My second essay compares input- and output-based policies and identifies the most
cost-effective policies to reduce fertilizer use and water pollution from agriculture.
Results show that both input- and output-based policies lead to a significant reduction in
fertilizer application, but input-based policies are more cost-effective than output-based
policies. In terms of the speed at which they take effect, the two types of policies are
similar to each other; in particular, both types of policies take effect rapidly – i.e., from
one year to the next. Hence, adjustment in land allocation is not time costly, implying that
policies that operate through this channel are not time costly either.
In my third essay, I find that, on average, a hybrid household drives more miles per
year than the average non-hybrid household. However, this rebound effect is only about 3
percent of the total annual miles traveled, and is not large enough to offset the fuel
savings from the higher fuel efficiency of the gasoline-electric hybrid engine. Hence,
driving a hybrid leads to substantial fuel savings. I do not find evidence that the miles
traveled of Toyota Prius households is significantly different from non-Prius hybrid
households, which indicates that there is not a statistically identifiable social-status driven
rebound effect associated with the adoption of a hybrid.

5.2 Main Contributions
My first essay has four main contributions. First, I theoretically model the existence
of cost-sharing externalities, and identify the conditions under which the externality
causes higher groundwater extraction. Second, I empirically examine the existence of the
cost-sharing externality and quantify its impact on the over-extraction of groundwater.
My findings bear important policy implications because cost-sharing is a common issue
not only in developing countries but also in developed countries. The (substantial) effect
of the cost-sharing externality on the inefficiency of water use indicates the importance
for policy to tackle this issue. Third, I compare three policy options faced by the Mexican
government and identify the most effective one, which is the elimination of electricity
cost-sharing mechanisms in groundwater pumping. Fourth, I address the well-sharing
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problem, another common issue of groundwater pumping in developing countries, and
quantify its impact on over-extraction of groundwater.
My second essay has three main contributions. First, I propose a new dimension of
policy assessment, time cost, in assessing economic policies that are directed toward
decreasing fertilizer use and water pollution in agriculture. This dimension is important
for both policymakers and society, but it has received relatively little attention in previous
research. Second, I compare the cost-effectiveness of input and output-based policies to
reduce fertilizer use in agricultural production. My findings indicate that while both of
them are effective for reducing fertilizer use, input-based policies are more cost-effective.
My third essay has three main contributions. First, I examine the existence of a new
rebound effect, a social status driven rebound effect, which is associated with the
distinctive outlook and social signal value of the Toyota Prius. Second, I empirically
measure the rebound effect induced by the higher fuel efficiency of hybrid, focusing
extensively on causal identification and management of omitted variables bias. My
method relaxes the assumption used in previous research that consumers’ respond to the
increase of fuel efficiency and the decrease of gasoline price in the exactly same way.
Third, I develop appropriate measurements of subtle characteristics of households, such
as a preference on lower travel cost, preference on environmental protection, and social
pressure. These characteristics are unobservable and have been obstacles in studying
behavioral demand patterns with respect to an increase in fuel efficiency or hybrid
adoption.

5.3 Directions for Future Research
My first essay finds that two cost-sharing rules lead to different levels of overpumping of groundwater, which is interesting and meaningful for policy design. However,
the mechanisms behind the differences on the impacts of the two cost-sharing rules, and
their potential social welfare implications for different types of farmers are still unknown.
If policymakers are informed of these differences, policies could be designed more
precisely and their potential impacts on different farmers could be better predicted.
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Future research that builds a theoretical model that can provide insight into the
mechanism and potential welfare impacts on farmers would be valuable.
My second essay quantifies the cost-effectiveness of policies to adjust agricultural
practices, which is essential for policy assessment, but it is only the first step in
developing policy that ultimately seeks an improvement in water quality. Beyond
measuring cost-effectiveness, another essential portion is measuring the impact of these
agricultural adjustments on water pollution. The magnitude of this impact is the key
information desired by policymakers. The impact may take a long time to fully appear
since nutrient runoff from agricultural production may stay in the water system for
several years. That is, the dynamic changes of the impact of the adjustments in
agricultural practices on water pollution are important as well. My future research will
quantify these dynamic impacts to provide full information for policy design and policy
assessment.
My third essay measures the rebound effects of hybrid adoption on miles traveled
and finds a significant rebound effect induced by higher fuel efficiency of the hybrid
vehicle. According to the literature, the rebound effect may be different in the long-term
and in the short-term. Future work measuring dynamic changes in the rebound effects
would be interesting.

APPENDICES
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Appendix A: Conditions under which electricity cost-sharing distorts marginal cost
of pumping
We are interested in identifying conditions under which electricity cost-sharing may
reduce the marginal cost of pumping and exacerbate over-extraction. Such a situation
occurs whenever 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 < 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 . Both marginal cost expressions depend
upon variables assumed exogenous to the farmer in this study. In particular, the price of
electricity (𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ ), the conjectural variation parameter (𝜌), the share of the electricity bill
paid by farmer 𝑖 (𝑠𝑖 ), and the total amount of water pumped by other farmers in the well
(∑𝑗≠𝑖 𝑤𝑗 ) are exogenous to the individual farmer.
The conjectural variation parameter captures a farmer’s beliefs about other farmers’
reaction to his pumping. These beliefs typically emerge from previous experience and are
pre-determined (exogenous) relative to the farmer’s pumping decision. We consider a
range of values of 𝜌 to illustrate the robustness of the distortive effect of cost-sharing on
marginal cost. Similarly, cost-sharing rules are established before the beginning of the
growing season. Moreover the number of farmers sharing a well and the size of farms
were also determined previous to farmers’ pumping decisions. 20 Therefore 𝑠𝑖 is also
exogenously determined in our analysis.
Letting 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ denote the subsidy per kWh, the difference in marginal cost between
farmers without cost share rule and with cost share rule is:
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 − 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠
= [𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ ][𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊 + (1 + 𝜌)(𝑏𝑤𝑖 − 𝑠𝑖 (𝑎 + 2𝑏𝑊))] > 0.

(A.1)

With no over-subsidy on electricity cost (𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ > 0) and assuming symmetry
(𝑤𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖 𝑊) we can re-write the above condition as:
𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊 + (1 + 𝜌)(𝑏𝑠𝑖 𝑊 − 𝑠𝑖 𝑎 − 2𝑏𝑠𝑖 𝑊) > 0

(A.2)

which after some algebraic manipulation can be re-written as:
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Among the groups that indicated a year of formation in the original survey, less than 10 percent were
formed within five years preceding the survey.
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(𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊) − (1 + 𝜌)𝑠𝑖 (𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊) > 0.

(A.3)

Since 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊 > 0 as defined before, Equation (A.3) implies that
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 − 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 > 0
if and only if
(1 + 𝜌)𝑠𝑖 < 1.
In general the higher 𝜌, the less likely it is that implementing a cost share rule will
reduce marginal cost of pumping. This is to be expected intuitively. When a farmer
anticipates that others will significantly increase their pumping in response to an increase
in her own pumping, the benefits of cost-sharing vanish.
Table A.1 describes the conditions for increased extraction under cost share.
Conditions are depicted for three conjectural variation scenarios: (1) 𝜌 = 1 , where
pumping rates are strategic complements, also known as Loschian conjecture after the
model of Loschian competition, (2) 𝜌 = 0 where pumping rates are strategically
independent, also known as Cournot-Nash conjecture after the model of Cournot
competition, and (3) 𝜌 = −1, where pumping rates are strategic substitutes, also known
as Bertrand conjecture after the model of Bertrand’s competition.
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Table A. 1: Marginal Cost Change under Cost Share Rules
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠 − 𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑤,𝑠+𝑤𝑠+𝑐𝑠 > 0
𝜌 = −1

[𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ ](𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊) > 0 , which is always true.
[𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ ](𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊)(1 − 𝑠𝑖 ) > 0 , which holds whenever 𝑠𝑖 < 1.

𝜌=0

Regardless of the cost share rule, the condition 𝑠𝑖 < 1 holds for all wells shared by
more than one producer.

[𝑝𝑘𝑤ℎ − 𝑣 𝑘𝑤ℎ ](𝑎 + 𝑏𝑊)(1 − 2𝑠𝑖 ) > 0 , which holds whenever 𝑠𝑖 < 0.5.
𝜌=1

When costs are evenly split, 𝑠𝑖 < 0.5 holds whenever N>2. When costs are divided
based on land area, 𝑠𝑖 < 0.5 holds for all irrigators that operate less than half of the
land irrigated by the well; i.e., 𝐿𝑖 < 0.5𝐿.
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Appendix B: Data collection process

The data collection process required two steps. First the enumerators collected the
data on the irrigation unit, (e.g., number of farmers sharing the well, crops grown by
producers) from an individual familiar with the management of the well. In some cases
the respondent is a single individual with well management responsibility while in other
cases it is any one of the users or a group of users. The enumerators then asked the
respondent(s) to identify a representative individual who produced each of the main crops
for the unit. Those identified individuals were interviewed for the crop-specific survey,
which was completed for each of the primary crops grown by producers who share the
well. Thus, there is one crop-specific survey for each crop-well combination. The cropspecific survey includes questions about inputs, outputs, and prices for each crop.
Cross sectional data was obtained from farmers in a sample of 256 wells. A total of
197 observations contained complete information for our estimation purposes so this is
the size of our sample. Irrigation wells are uniformly scattered across the country so they
are geographically representative of agricultural groundwater irrigators in Mexico.
Regarding the well selection mechanism, a sample was initially drawn based on a
national survey of irrigation wells, and the enumerators tried to find those wells from the
sample. However, in many cases the irrigation wells that were chosen did not exist. In
those cases the enumerators tried to replace the sample well with another well from the
same area.
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Appendix C
Table C. 1: Coefficient Estimates for Input Demands (water, fertilizer and other
inputs)
Estimates
Water equation
Constant
Output quantity
Interaction of land area and output quantity
Land area
Quadratic term of output quantity
Interaction of quadratic land area and output quantity
Dividing electricity bill by share of land area
Dividing electricity bill evenly
Number of farmers sharing a well
Soil type
Climate type
Depth of well
Age
Education
Share of fruit and vegetable
Own price elasticity of water
Fertilizer equation
Constant
Output quantity
Interaction of land area and output quantity
Land area
Quadratic term of output quantity
Interaction of quadratic land area and output quantity
Dividing electricity bill by share of land area
Dividing electricity bill evenly
Number of farmers sharing a well
Soil type
Climate type
Depth of well
Age
Education
Share of fruit and vegetable

-39896.6 (33315.0)
547.6** (247.6)
-97.5*** (35.4)
3208.5*** (394.9)
2.1** (0.9)
1.0** (0.5)
16456.9** (8114.8)
25801.5*** (8515.8)
279.0 (316.5)
6566.6 (5629.1)
12315.7 (14850.1)
42.8 (54.8)
-227.6 (419.2)
4078.8 (4436.3)
3834.3 (11379.4)
-0.06** (0.02)

2059.1 (8825.2)
-167.5** (66.2)
8.3* (4.9)
417.3*** (96.9)
0.2 (0.2)
-0.04 (0.07)
-73.9 (1862.8)
-154.4 (2643.8)
62.7 (96.0)
358.1 (855.8)
-7899.0 (5075.5)
2.0 (7.1)
62.9 (71.9)
-530.0 (1352.6)
3007.5 (3707.5)
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Table C.1. Continued
Estimates
Other inputs equation
Constant
Output quantity
Interaction of land area and output quantity
Land area
Quadratic term of output quantity
Interaction of quadratic land area and output quantity
Dividing electricity bill by share of land area
Dividing electricity bill evenly
Number of farmers sharing a well
Soil type
Climate type
Depth of well
Age
Education
Share of fruit and vegetable
𝑅 2 (Water equation)
𝑅 2 (Fertilizer equation)
𝑅 2 (Other inputs equation)
Observations

-15245.0 (13229.9)
66.5 (60.3)
7.1 (4.5)
1517.7*** (116.2)
-0.9*** (0.3)
-0.2*** (0.1)
-796.3 (2009.3)
-6010.8** (2759.0)
-62.7 (74.6)
-581.0 (2091.5)
7362.3 (6421.6)
35.4* (21.1)
170.3 (165.9)
307.1 (1778.8)
2305.2 (4497.1)
0.741
0.592
0.862
197

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Asterisk (*), double asterisk (**) and three asterisk (***) denote
that variables are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Appendix D
Table D. 1: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Parameter Estimates
A11
A12
A13
A22
A23
A33
B11
B12
B22
C11
C12
C21
C22
C31
C32
O11
O21
O31
P11
P12
P21
P22
P31
P32
R11
R21
R31
S11
S21
V11
V21
M11
M12
M21
M22

Coefficient
2722.86***
-2095.62***
-314.06
1446.34***
132.51
4210.31***
136.19
-994.10*
4930.27***
-2281.58***
9.65
1600.72***
-1087.95***
535.11
-1120.01**
18.90***
-3.54
4.86*
-0.76***
-1.28***
-0.15**
0.66***
-0.01
0.20
2810.18***
-1080.62***
10.62
-15.00***
7.06
-1326.01***
846.18***
-1.21***
0.07
0.02
0.09***

Standard Error
784.21
531.96
560.50
418.06
424.32
974.66
481.69
515.60
1283.33
351.14
517.65
278.40
372.86
477.22
467.65
4.86
2.56
2.62
0.09
0.40
0.06
0.22
0.06
0.22
356.24
275.05
280.00
1.64
7.16
193.97
307.03
0.06
0.11
0.01
0.03

The regression includes fixed effects. ***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The
letter name for the parameters corresponds to the matrix names given in Equation (3.5), and the subscript
notation refers to the element position (row, column) in that matrix. The order of netputs is corn, fertilizer,
labor and the order of quasi-fixed inputs is corn land and capital.

125
Appendix E: Additional Descriptive Statistics
Table E. 1: Summary of Makes and Models for Hybrid Vehicles
Make

Model

Number

Percent

Cadillac

Escalade

1

0.1

Chevrolet

Tahoe

19

1.5

Chevrolet

Silverado

2

0.2

Chrysler

Aspen

3

0.2

Ford

Escape

59

4.6

GMC

Yukon

10

0.8

Honda

Civic

176

13.7

Honda

Accord

41

3.2

Lexus

LS 600hl

3

0.2

Lexus

GS 450h

9

0.7

Lexus

RX 400h

25

1.9

Mazda

Tribute

1

0.1

Mercury

Mariner

13

1

Nissan

Altima

16

1.2

Saturn

Vue Green Line

8

0.6

Toyota

Camry

133

10.4

Toyota

Prius

680

52.9

Toyota

Highlander

86

6.7

1285

100

Total

The data in this table come from two sources: IRS http://www.irs.gov/uac/AlternativeMotor-VehicleCredit-1 and http://www.cars.com/go/advice/Story.jsp?section=buy and subject=tax and story=taxCredit.
Further, when there is difference in the credit amount across different model years for a certain hybrid
model, we use the credit amount of the most recent model year before 2009. Also, when there is difference
in the credit amount across different types of hybrid within a certain model, we use the mean of the credit
amounts.
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Appendix F: Federal and State Hybrid Adoption Incentives

Table F. 1: Summary of Ongoing Federal Tax Credits for Hybrid Vehicles (after
1/1/2006)
Make

Model

Credit Amount

Cadillac

Escalade

$2,000

Chevrolet

Malibu

$1,300

Chevrolet

Tahoe

$2,200

Chevrolet

Silverado

Chrysler

Aspen

$2,200

Dodge

Durango

$2,200

Ford

Escape

$2,475

GMC

Yukon

$2,200

GMC

Sierra

$450

Mazda

Tribute

$2,475

Mercury

Mariner

$2,475

Nissan

Altima

$2,350

Saturn

Aura

$1,300

Saturn

Vue Green Line

$1,550

$450
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Table F. 2: Summary of Phased out Federal Tax Credits for Hybrid Vehicles (after
1/1/2006)
Model
Toyota Prius

Toyota Camry

Toyota Highlander

Lexus GS 450h

Lexus RX 400h

Lexus LS 600h

Honda Civic

Honda Accord

Honda Insight

Purchase Date
1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007
10/1/2007 1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007
10/1/2007 1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007
10/1/2007 1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007
10/1/2007 1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007
10/1/2007 1/1/2006 - 9/30/2006
10/1/2006 - 3/31/2007
4/1/2007 - 9/30/2007
10/1/2007 1/1/2006 - 1/1/2008
1/1/2008 - 6/30/2008
7/1/2008 - 12/31/2008
1/1/2009 1/1/2006 - 1/1/2008
1/1/2008 - 6/30/2008
7/1/2008 - 12/31/2008
1/1/2009 1/1/2006 - 1/1/2008
1/1/2008 - 6/30/2008
7/1/2008 - 12/31/2008
1/1/2009 -

Credit Amount
$3,150
$1,575
$787.50
$0
$2,600
$1,300
$650
$0
$2,600
$1,300
$650
$0
$1,550
$775
$387.50
$0
$2,200
$1,100
$550
$0
$1,800
$900
$450
$0
$2,100
$1,050
$525
$0
$1,300
$650
$325
$0
$1,450
$725
$362.50
$0
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Table F. 3: Summary of State Level Incentives for Hybrid Vehicles
State
Income Tax Incentives
Colorado
Louisiana
New York
Oregon
South Carolina
Utah
West Virginia
Sales Tax Incentives
Connecticut
Washington D.C.
Maine
Maryland
Maryland
New Mexico
New York
Washington
Washington

Amount

Start Date

End Date

$6542*
$500*
$2,000
$1,500
$630*
$1720*
$3750*

7/1/2000
1/1/1991*
1/1/2001*
1/1/1998*
6/1/2006
2001*
7/1/1997

12/31/2010
7/9/2009
12/31/2004
12/31/2009
12/31/2009
12/31/2005*
6/30/2006

$1500*
$3294*
$625*
$1,000
$1,500
$750*
$240*
$2,015
$73

10/1/2004
4/15/2005*
1/1/1997
7/1/2000
7/1/2004
7/1/2004
1/1/2000
1/1/2009
8/1/2009

10/1/2008
Not yet expired
12/31/2005
7/1/2004
5/20/2010
6/30/2009
5/28/2005
7/31/2009
12/31/2010

8/10/2005*
3/1/2008
2003
3/1/2006
9/1/2006*
6/30/2006*

6/30/2007
Not yet expired
9/30/2017
9/30/2017
12/31/2010
7/1/2011

7/15/2007
11/29/2004

10/1/2008
3/6/2010

2008
2005
5/31/2007

Not yet expired
9/30/2012
Not yet expired

7/26/2002

12/31/2012

HOV Lane Access
California
Colorado
Florida
New York
Utah
Virginia
Rebate Incentives
Illinois
Pennsylvania

$1,000
$500

Testing Exemptions
Idaho
Maryland
Nevada
Personal Property Tax Incentive
Michigan

$32

The ∗ indicates that the value comes from previous studies.

Appendix G: Pre-Match Balancing and Overlap Assessments
Table G. 1: Pre-match Balancing and Overlap Assessment – Hybrid Treatment
Hybrid Households
Mean
Household Income
Education
No. of Vehicles
Household Size
No. Adults
No. Drivers
Hispanic
Race
Average Age
Share of Female
Life Cycle
No. Workers
Internet Usage
Commute Distance
Penetration Rate
Gas Price (Purchase)
Gas Price (Survey)
Year Purchased
MPG of Other Vehicles
Vehicle Type
MSA Category
Rail in MSA
Urban
GPC Index

15.865
4.337
2.353
2.617
2.075
2.125
0.051
1.304
53.315
0.500
5.773
1.296
0.941
16.475
0.017
2.606
3.582
2006.315
23.201
1.358
2.202
0.286
0.758
38.693

Std.
Dev.
3.469
0.863
0.646
0.985
0.467
0.534
0.219
1.140
12.852
0.209
3.318
0.869
0.236
18.975
0.013
0.577
0.204
1.485
7.342
0.770
0.982
0.452
0.428
6.987

Non-Hybrid
Households
Mean

Std. Dev.

13.853
3.746
2.353
2.696
2.100
2.116
0.052
1.291
53.310
0.511
5.991
1.210
0.825
14.543
0.011
2.315
3.505
2005.463
21.142
2.079
2.505
0.169
0.696
37.679

4.515
1.065
0.642
1.128
0.505
0.544
0.222
1.106
14.098
0.229
3.340
0.877
0.380
17.681
0.010
0.659
0.169
1.984
4.402
1.148
0.980
0.375
0.460
7.336

Normalized
Difference

Log Diff.
of Std.
Dev.

%
Hybrid
in Tails

% NonHybrid in
Tails

0.500
0.609
0.001
-0.074
-0.051
0.015
-0.007
0.011
0.000
-0.052
-0.066
0.098
0.366
0.105
0.577
0.471
0.413
0.486
0.340
-0.737
-0.309
0.280
0.140
0.142

-0.264
-0.210
0.006
-0.136
-0.079
-0.018
-0.014
0.031
-0.093
-0.088
-0.007
-0.010
-0.476
0.071
0.262
-0.133
0.188
-0.290
0.512
-0.400
0.002
0.186
-0.071
-0.049

0.011
0.037
0.734
0.048
0.065
0.055
0.949
0.928
0.026
0.083
0.339
0.219
0.059
0.305
0.114
0.042
0.047
0.005
0.096
0.822
0.286
0.714
0.242
0.029

0.094
0.147
0.732
0.066
0.076
0.090
0.948
0.923
0.087
0.087
0.301
0.248
0.175
0.323
0.125
0.140
0.043
0.190
0.043
0.623
0.169
0.831
0.304
0.056
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Table G. 2: Pre-match Balancing and Overlap Assessment – Prius Treatment
Prius Households

Household Income
Education
No. of Vehicles
Household Size
No. Adults
No. Drivers
Hispanic
Race
Average Age
Share of Female
Life Cycle
No. Workers
Internet Usage
Commute Distance
Penetration Rate
Gas Price (Purchase)
Gas Price (Survey)
Year Purchased
MPG of Other Vehicles
Vehicle Type
MSA Category
Rail in MSA
Urban
GPC Index

Mean
15.809
4.431
2.368
2.575
2.079
2.138
0.045
1.249
54.474
0.503
5.898
1.295
0.951
16.195
0.017
2.581
3.598
2006.161
24.273
1.023
2.195
0.306
0.747
38.882

Std. Dev.
3.496
0.809
0.655
0.957
0.478
0.545
0.206
1.006
13.063
0.201
3.372
0.898
0.216
18.723
0.013
0.593
0.206
1.541
8.558
0.213
1.010
0.461
0.435
7.353

Non-Prius Households
Mean
15.930
4.226
2.336
2.667
2.071
2.109
0.058
1.368
51.945
0.496
5.625
1.297
0.929
16.807
0.017
2.635
3.564
2006.497
21.933
1.754
2.209
0.261
0.771
38.470

Std. Dev.
3.438
0.912
0.635
1.016
0.454
0.520
0.233
1.278
12.469
0.218
3.250
0.834
0.258
19.280
0.013
0.556
0.202
1.396
5.309
0.975
0.949
0.440
0.421
6.527

Normalized
Difference

Log Diff. of
Std. Dev.

% Prius
in Tails

% Non-Prius
in Tails

-0.035
0.238
0.049
-0.094
0.017
0.055
-0.060
-0.104
0.198
0.036
0.082
-0.003
0.095
-0.032
0.022
-0.094
0.168
-0.229
0.329
-1.035
-0.014
0.099
-0.055
0.059

0.017
-0.120
0.030
-0.060
0.052
0.048
-0.123
-0.239
0.047
-0.080
0.037
0.074
-0.177
-0.029
0.016
0.064
0.019
0.099
0.477
-1.520
0.063
0.047
0.033
0.119

0.037
0.024
0.724
0.045
0.069
0.078
0.955
0.922
0.086
0.073
0.341
0.237
0.049
0.322
0.046
0.059
0.053
0.057
0.089
0.989
0.306
0.694
0.253
0.069

0.025
0.211
0.745
0.053
0.061
0.056
0.942
0.944
0.041
0.095
0.338
0.197
0.071
0.282
0.041
0.049
0.053
0.022
0.051
1.000
0.261
0.739
0.229
0.036
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Appendix H: Post-Match Balance Assessments

Table H. 1: Post-match Balancing Assessment for CBSA and Vehicle Type
Matching Model – Hybrid Treatment
Model 1
Covariate
Household Income
Education
No. of Vehicles
Household Size
No. of Drivers
Hispanic
Race
Average Age
Share of Female
Life Cycle
No. of Workers
Internet Usage
Commute Distance
Penetration Rate
Gas Price (Purchase)
Gas Price (Survey)
Year Purchased
MPG of Other
Vehicles
MSA Category
MSA Size
Rail in MSA
Urban
GPC Index
CBSA
Vehicle Type

Model 2

-0.028
0.000
0.082
0.049
-0.031
0.013
0.061
-0.052
0.029
0.003
-0.080
0.000
0.080
-0.002
-0.011
0.002
0.000

Log Diff.
of Std.
Dev.
0.063
0.000
0.152
0.072
0.147
0.026
0.170
0.028
0.266
-0.029
0.024
0.000
0.206
0.000
-0.018
-0.001
0.000

0.176
-0.006
0.015
0.002
0.011
-0.003
0.000
0.000

Normalized
Difference

-0.036
0.000
0.078
0.051
-0.028
0.009
0.057
-0.049
0.030
0.012
-0.083
0.000
0.074
-0.005
-0.015
0.002
0.000

Log Diff.
of Std.
Dev.
0.067
0.000
0.149
0.080
0.150
0.017
0.165
0.028
0.262
-0.026
0.026
0.000
0.191
-0.004
-0.019
-0.002
0.000

0.301

0.167

0.302

-0.000
-0.012
0.001
-0.007
-0.012
0.000
0.000

-0.005
0.011
0.000
0.021
-0.018
0.000
0.000

-0.003
-0.010
0.000
-0.015
-0.053
0.000
0.000

Normalized
Difference

Post-match normalized difference and log ratio of standard deviation statistics for the matched estimates
reported in Table 4.4. An exact match is required for household education, frequency of Internet usage,
year of hybrid purchase, vehicle type, and CBSA. One-to-one nearest neighbor matches using the
Mahalanobis distance metric was required for household income, size, vehicle count, MPG of other
vehicles, commute distance, age, share of female, and GPC index. See the notes to Table 4.4 and text for
further details.
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Table H. 2: Post-match Balancing Assessment for CBSA and Counterpart Matching
Model – Hybrid Treatment
Model 1
Covariate
Household Income
Education
No. of Vehicles
Household Size
No. of Drivers
Hispanic
Race
Average Age
Share Female
Life Cycle
No. of Workers
Internet Usage
Commute Distance
Penetration Rate
Gas Price (Purchase)
Gas Price (Survey)
Year Purchased
MPG of Other
Vehicles
MSA Category
MSA Size
Rail in MSA
Urban
GPC Index
CBSA
Counterparts

Model 2

0.189
0.000
0.067
-0.023
-0.152
-0.099
-0.050
0.010
-0.047
-0.138
-0.042
0.000
-0.084
-0.010
-0.012
0.003
0.000

Log Diff.
of Std.
Dev.
-0.079
0.000
0.119
-0.004
0.009
-0.159
-0.019
0.006
0.034
-0.003
-0.075
0.000
-0.075
-0.001
-0.116
-0.001
0.000

0.067
-0.010
-0.039
-0.005
-0.133
-0.025
0.000
0.000

Normalized
Difference

0.145
0.000
0.052
-0.035
-0.161
-0.102
-0.040
0.017
-0.048
-0.129
-0.055
0.000
-0.097
-0.009
-0.016
-0.003
0.000

Log Diff.
of Std.
Dev.
-0.030
0.000
0.109
-0.006
-0.005
-0.158
0.008
-0.004
0.051
0.003
-0.079
0.000
-0.087
-0.011
-0.115
-0.001
0.000

0.200

0.051

0.211

-0.022
0.022
-0.001
0.113
0.030
0.000
0.000

0.000
-0.028
-0.009
-0.126
0.014
0.000
0.000

-0.015
0.014
-0.002
0.119
0.039
0.000
0.000

Normalized
Difference

Post-match normalized difference and log ratio of standard deviation statistics for the matched estimates
reported in Table 4.4. An exact match is required for household education, frequency of Internet usage,
year of hybrid purchase, counterparts of hybrid, and CBSA. One-to-one nearest neighbor matches using the
Mahalanobis distance metric was required for household income, size, vehicle count, MPG of other
vehicles, commute distance, age, share of female, and GPC index. See the notes to Table 4.4 and text for
further details.
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Table H. 3: Post-match Balancing Assessment for Zip Code and Vehicle Type
Matching Model – Hybrid Treatment
Covariate
Household Income
Education
No. of Vehicles
Household Size
No. of Drivers
Hispanic
Race
Average Age
Share Female
Life Cycle
No. of Workers
Internet Usage
Commute Distance
Penetration Rate
Gas Price (Purchase)
Gas Price (Survey)
Year Purchased
MPG of Other Vehicles
MSA Category
MSA Size
Rail in MSA
Urban
GPC Index
Zip Code
Vehicle Type

Normalized
Difference
-0.016
0.000
0.040
0.032
-0.074
-0.059
-0.010
0.081
-0.001
0.181
-0.147
0.000
-0.086
-0.024
-0.031
0.000
0.000
0.198
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.115
0.000
0.000
0.000

Log Diff. of
Std. Dev.
-0.037
0.000
0.157
0.035
-0.005
-0.119
0.084
-0.019
-0.035
-0.010
0.049
0.000
-0.011
-0.010
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.129
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.084
0.000
0.000
0.000

Post-match normalized difference and log ratio of standard deviation statistics for the matched estimates
reported in Table 4.4. An exact match is required for household education, frequency of Internet usage,
year of hybrid purchase, vehicle type, and zip code. One-to-one nearest neighbor matches using the
Mahalanobis distance metric was required for household income, size, vehicle count, MPG of other
vehicles, commute distance, age, share of female, and GPC index. See the notes to Table 4.4 and text for
further details.
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Table H. 4: Post-match Balancing and Overlap Assessment for CBSA Level
Matching Model – Prius Treatment

Covariate
Household Income
Education
No. of Vehicles
Household Size
No. of Drivers
Hispanic
Race
Average Age
Share Female
Life Cycle
No. of Workers
Internet Usage
Commute Distance
Penetration Rate
Gas Price (Purchase)
Gas Price (Survey)
Year Purchased
MPG of Other
Vehicles
MSA Category
MSA Size
Rail in MSA
Urban
GPC Index
CBSA
Vehicle Type

Model 1
Normalized
Log Diff.
of Std.
Difference
Dev.
-0.205
0.146
0.041
0.101
0.132
0.119
-0.180
-0.065
0.013
0.189
0.187
0.426
-0.041
0.023
0.184
0.171
0.001
0.225
-0.005
0.065
-0.190
0.165
0.000
0.000
-0.069
0.076
0.046
0.046
0.084
0.052
-0.019
0.004
0.000
0.000

Model 2
Normalized

-0.246
0.004
0.136
-0.180
0.007
0.189
-0.041
0.173
0.010
-0.021
-0.169
0.000
-0.068
0.047
0.068
-0.003
0.000

Log Diff.
of Std.
Dev.
0.207
0.135
0.124
-0.072
0.174
0.426
0.023
0.163
0.211
0.060
0.153
0.000
0.068
0.037
0.032
-0.003
0.000

Difference

0.127

0.111

0.101

0.124

-0.004
-0.006
0.012
-0.095
-0.022
0.000
0.000

0.005
0.018
0.001
0.080
0.107
0.000
0.000

0.008
-0.003
0.006
-0.128
-0.035
0.000
0.000

0.017
0.023
0.001
0.122
-0.096
0.000
0.000

Post-match normalized difference and log ratio of standard deviation statistics for the matched estimates
reported in Table 4.5. An exact match is required for year of hybrid purchase, vehicle type, frequency of
internet use and CBSA. One-to-one nearest neighbor matches using the Mahalanobis distance metric was
required for household income, size, vehicle count, MPG of other vehicles, highest education, commute
distance, age, share of female, and GPC index. Model 1 allows for households outside of CBSA to be
matched, and Model 2 focuses only on households within a CBSA. See text for further details.
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